ROBERT B. KUGLER, District Judge.
This matter arises out of Plaintiff Anna Rodriguez's ("Plaintiff") claims against Defendants Jersey Shore Pharmacy ("JSP"), Kim Baker, and John Does (1-10) (collectively "Defendants") for violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD"), the New Jersey Family Leave Act ("NJFLA"), the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ("COBRA"), and the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). Currently before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss certain counts of Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (Doc. No. 4). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendants' motion.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In August 2010, Defendant JSP hired Plaintiff as a billing specialist. Compl. § 1. During the course of her employment, Plaintiff informed her Human Resource Manager, Defendant Kim Baker, that she had a special needs child and required a scheduling accommodation in order to properly care for him. Id . §§ 2-3. Defendant Baker denied this request. Id . § 3. Thereafter, Plaintiff was disciplined by her superiors for tardiness and absences from work. Id . § 4.
On September 27, 2011, Plaintiff called into work to advise her supervisor Sara Fishbein that she would be late for her shift. Compl. § 5. Upon her arrival, Plaintiff was summoned to Ms. Baker's Human Resources office where she was given a final warning and instructed that she could not "be late or call out anymore from now to the end of the year." Id . § 7. As a result of this admonition, Plaintiff suffered a "complete breakdown, " culminating with her doctor's placing her on a two-week work leave due to "stress and anxiety and depression." Id . §§ 10-11.
After meeting with her doctor, Plaintiff informed her supervisor Ms. Fishbein that, per her doctor's instructions, she would be absent from work for two weeks. Id . § 11. She indicated that she would drive into work the next day to deliver a doctor's note attesting to her condition, but the medication she was taking prevented her from driving a car. Id . §§ 11-12. Consequently, Defendant Baker informed Plaintiff that "she had let her go because she didn't provide the note" as promised. Id . § 14. Notwithstanding this apparent notice of termination, Plaintiff delivered the doctor's note to her employer. She was then advised that she could return to work on October 3, 2011 for a meeting. Id . §§ 15-17. At that meeting she was again informed that her late delivery of the doctor's note had resulted in her employment being terminated. Id . § 18.
On September 25, 2012, Plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court of New Jersey for Atlantic County (Doc. No. 1-2). Her Complaint asserts seven causes of actions. Count One alleges that Defendants violated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD") by wrongfully terminating Plaintiff as a result of an actual or perceived disability. Compl. Count One § 20. Count Two asserts that Defendants violated the New Jersey Family Leave Act ("NJFLA") by denying Plaintiff's requests for scheduling accommodations. Compl. Count Two § 4. Count Three alleges that Defendants interfered with Plaintiff's rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") by failing to inform her of her rights under the Act and by terminating her after she requested a change in her schedule. Compl. Count Three §§ 5-6. Count Four states a claim against Defendant Baker, alleging that her conduct concerning Plaintiff was discriminatory and in violation of the NJLAD. Compl. Count Four § 2. Count Five asserts that Defendant JSP's "Leave of Absence" and "Disability Leave" policies violate the FMLA. Compl. Count Five §§ 3-4, 7. Count Six states that Defendants violated COBRA by failing to provide Plaintiff with information about how to take advantage of benefits offered under the Act. Compl. Count Six § 6. Finally, Count Seven asserts that unknown Defendants John Does (1-10) violated the NJFLA and NJLAD due to their participation in the decision to terminate Plaintiff. Compl. Count Seven §§ 2-4.
On October 17, 2012, Defendants removed the case to this Court, and on November 16, 2012, they filed the instant motion (Doc. No. 4) seeking to dismiss Counts Two, Three, Five, and Seven of the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When evaluating a motion to dismiss, "courts accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside , 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny , 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). In other words, a complaint survives a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
To make this determination, a court conducts a three-part analysis. Santiago v. Warminster Twp. , 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Id . (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 675). Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 131 (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 680). Finally, "where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief." Id . (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 680). This plausibility determination is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679. A complaint cannot survive where a court can infer only that a claim is possible rather than plausible. Id.
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. FMLA Claims (Counts Three and Five)
Count Three of the complaint alleges that Defendants conduct interfered with Plaintiff's rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. Defendants respond that Plaintiff's Complaint does not allege ...