The opinion of the court was delivered by: William J. Martini, U.S.D.J.:
On April 12, 1999, Plaintiff Carla Caesar rolled over in her father's SUV. Her insurance company, Esurance, provided Caesar with $15,000 in benefits. Hoping for an additional recovery, Caesar made a claim with her father's insurer, Defendant Fireman's Fund Insurance Company ("Fireman's). Fireman's denied the claim. Caesar now asks this Court to enter a summary judgment declaring her entitlement to Fireman's coverage; Fireman's cross-moves for the opposite declaration. Because Caesar was not covered under the Fireman's policy, the Court will DENY Caesar's motion and GRANT Fireman's cross-motion.
The following facts are undisputed: On April 12, 2009, Caesar was driving an SUV that belonged to her father. Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute ("Pl.'s Statement") ¶¶ 9, 11, ECF No. 34-2. The SUV rolled over, and Caesar sustained injuries. Id. ¶ 14. As the named insured on her Esurance policy, Caesar recovered $15,000. Id. ¶ 25. She also tried to recover under her father's policy, but Fireman's denied her claim. Id. ¶ 43. Of interest here, Fireman's argued that Caesar was not covered because she fell under the terms of a policy exclusion. Id. ¶ 46. That exclusion, Exclusion A.1.c. ("Exclusion A.1.c." or "the Exclusion"), disclaims personal injury protection ("PIP") coverage for anyone who "is entitled to New Jersey [PIP] Coverage as a named insured . . . under the terms of another policy." Fireman's Personal Injury Protection Coverage (Standard Automobile Policy)-New Jersey Exclusion A.1.c., ECF No. 34-7 at 90.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant it entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. A factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, and a fact is material if it will affect the outcome of the trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In deciding summary judgment motion, the Court considers all evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 2007).
For present purposes, Caesar makes two arguments in support of her summary judgment motion. First, she argues that Exclusion A.1.c. does not apply to her. The Court disagrees. Second, she argues that Exclusion A.1.c. is invalid under New Jersey law. Even if Caesar were right about this latter point, the Court would not void the Exclusion. Instead, it would dial back the Exclusion to make it conform with New Jersey law. The dialed-backed Exclusion would still cover Caesar, so Caesar's second argument for summary judgment fails. Caesar is not entitled to benefits from Fireman's.
A.The Fireman's Policy Does Not Cover Caesar.
Caesar falls under the terms of Exclusion A.1.c. With exceptions not relevant here, Exclusion A.1.c. applies where an insured "is entitled to New Jersey [PIP] Coverage as a named insured . . . under the terms of another policy." At the time of the accident, Caesar was a named insured under her Esurance policy. Therefore, Caesar satisfied the terms of Exclusion A.1.c. She is not entitled to benefits from Fireman's.
Caesar's argument to the contrary focuses on the Exclusion's use of the word "is". Exclusion A.1.c. applies if two conditions are met. An individual is excluded from coverage if she is (1) a named insured (2) who "is entitled to . . .
[c]overage . . . under the terms of another policy." Exclusion A.1.c. Caesar does not dispute that she is a named insured under her Esurance policy. Instead, she disputes that she "is" entitled to Esurance coverage. She acknowledges that she was entitled to Esurance coverage at the time of the accident. But she argues that her entitlement to coverage ended once she exhausted her policy. Caesar's argument is creative but incorrect.
Exclusion A.1.c. is almost a word for word copy of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-7(b)(3) ("Section 7(b)(3)"). Exclusion A.1.c. applies if an insured "is entitled to New Jersey [PIP] Coverage as a named insured. . . ." Section 7(b)(3) also applies if an insured "is entitled to [New Jersey PIP] coverage . . . as a named insured[.]" Taking its lead from the Supreme Court of New Jersey's decision in Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 153 N.J. 205, 208-10 (1998), the Court concludes that the word "is" in Exclusion A.1.c. has the same meaning as the word "is" in Section 7(b)(3).
The facts in Rutgers are as follows: Following a series of car accidents, Rutgers honored claims from its named insureds. It then sought contribution from other companies, one of which was the Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. Like Fireman's in this case, Ohio argued that Rutgers' policy holders fell under the terms of an Ohio policy ...