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Marie Robinson, et al v. City of Ocean City

November 14, 2012


The opinion of the court was delivered by: Simandle, District Judge:


This matter comes before the Court on Defendant City of Ocean City's ("Ocean City") Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket Item 20], which will be granted because the Court finds as follows:

1. On May 24, 2008, Plaintiff Marie Robinson attended her niece's graduation party on 32nd Street in Ocean City. (Pl. Statement of Facts ("SOF") ¶ 1.) She left the party at 10:00 p.m. and, while stepping from the sidewalk into the street, stepped into a pothole. (Pl. ¶¶ 2-3.) The pothole was located against the curb. (Pl. SOF ¶ 4.) As a result of her fall, Plaintiff sustained a meniscal tear of her left knee, bruises, contusions, and swelling. (Pl. SOF ¶¶ 5-6.) Five days later, on May 29, 2008, a man named "John" complained about a pothole in front of 303 32nd Street that had harmed two family members. (Pl. SOF ¶ 21.) There was a second complaint on May 30, 2008 about a "very bad pothole" at 32nd Street. (Pl. SOF ¶ 22.) Fran Inacio, Ocean City's Supervisor of Streets for the Public Works Department, visited the area on May 29th, after receiving the first complaint. (Pl. SOF ¶ 8, 23.) He inspected the potholes, coned them off, and assigned two employees to make repairs, which were done on June 2, 2008. (Pl. SOF ¶¶ 23, 25.)

2. In deposition testimony, Inacio and Michael Rossbach, Ocean City's Director of Public works, described Ocean City's methods for maintaining its streets. Ocean City has 93 miles of streets and 33 miles of alleys. (Inacio Dep. 61:16-17.) At least twice a year but usually four or five times per year, the Public Works Department inspects the streets. (Inacio Dep. 24:6-21; Rossbach Dep. 26:16-17.) The inspection is a "windshield survey," in which a public works employee drives the streets looking for defects, such as potholes, and repairs them as needed. (Rossbach Dep. 22:9-21.) Inacio acknowledged that, if there are cars parked on the street, the employees conducting the windshield survey may be unable to see potholes blocked by the parked cars. (Inacio Dep. 27:12-23.) He stated that it would not "be feasible to get out and look behind each car. We would never get anything done." (Inacio Dep. 28:1-3.) The Public Works Department also responds to service requests from residents or other members of the public within one to two weeks. (Rossbach Dep. 28:21-29:19.) In addition, Ocean City's engineering department surveys the roads approximately every five years to compile road ratings that inform capital plans on which roads most need to be redone. (Rossbach Dep. 19:4-9.)

3. Marie Robinson and her husband, Ronald Robinson, filed a Complaint [Docket Item 1] in this Court against the City of Ocean City and other unnamed John Doe and ABC Corporation Defendants responsible for maintaining Ocean City's roads. Marie Robinson made negligence claims against all Defendants, and Ronald Robinson made loss of consortium claims against all Defendants. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) because Plaintiffs are Pennsylvania residents, Defendants are New Jersey citizens, and Plaintiffs have alleged over $75,000 in damages. New Jersey law provides the rule of decision.

4. Defendant Ocean City filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket Item 20] alleging that Plaintiff failed to satisfy the requirements of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act. Ocean City argued, essentially, that it had no actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition and that Plaintiffs did not show that its road maintenance program, i.e. its efforts to protect against the dangerous condition, were palpably unreasonable.

5. Plaintiffs filed Opposition [Docket Item 23], arguing that Ocean City had constructive notice because the nature of the pothole indicated that it had developed over a period of time that was sufficient for Ocean City to have located and repaired it. Plaintiffs also argued that they had created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Ocean City's actions and/or inactions were palpably unreasonable. Plaintiffs' expert witness, Russell J. Kolmus, III, P.E., examined the pothole site and, based on cracking in the road, observed that, "The incident potholes were foreseeable to a qualified roadway maintenance manager." (Kolmus Expert Report at 12.) Kolmus asserted that Ocean City's inspection methods were inadequate because an inspector driving in a car cannot observe potholes that are underneath parked cars. He concluded, "The inspection methods to detect potholes employed by Ocean City were ineffective and obviously/palpably unreasonable, in that the entire roadway could not be viewed at the time of inspection in areas where parking was allowed." (Kolmus Expert Report at 17.) Kolmus also opined that the "lack of effective inspection methods resulted in the incident fall." (Id.) He suggested that Ocean City should have the streets inspected on foot and should prohibit parking on inspection days to ensure unfettered views. (Id. at 12-13.)

6. Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party."

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is "material" only if it might affect the outcome of the suit.

Id. The district court must "view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment motion." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).

7. The New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:4--1 to 14--4, governs claims against governmental entities arising from dangerous conditions on public property. Any application of the Tort Claims Act "must start from its guiding principle, that is, that immunity from tort liability is the general rule and liability is the exception." Polzo v. County of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 578 (2008) ("Polzo I") (internal citations omitted). Under the Act, a plaintiff must show that the property was in a dangerous condition, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, and that the dangerous condition created a foreseeable risk of injury. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:4-2. In addition, a plaintiff must show either that "a negligent or wrongful act or omission" of a public employee created the dangerous condition or that the "public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition . . . a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition." N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:4-2(a)-(b). The Tort Claims Act constructively imputes notice of the dangerous condition to a public entity "only if the plaintiff establishes that the condition had existed for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition. . . ." N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:4-3(b).

8. Finally, the Act provides that, even if a dangerous condition existed and the public entity was on notice, the public entity nevertheless will be immune from liability "if the action the entity took to protect against the condition or the failure to take such action was not palpably unreasonable." N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:4-2. "Palpably unreasonable" means more than ordinary negligence and imposes a steep burden on a plaintiff. Polzo I at 580. The term "implies behavior that is patently unacceptable under any given circumstances and it must be manifest and obvious that no prudent person would approve of its course of action or inaction." Coyne v. State, Dept. of Transp., 182 N.J. 481, 493 (2005). The Third Circuit has explained that in order to be "palpably unreasonable" under New Jersey law, actions must be the result of "capricious, arbitrary, whimsical or outrageous decisions of public servants." Waldorf v. Shuta, 896 F.2d 723, 738 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal citation omitted). The question of palpable unreasonableness is generally decided by the fact-finder as it constitutes a question of fact; "[n]evertheless, like any question of fact, the determination of palpable unreasonableness is subject to a preliminary assessment by the court as to whether it can reasonably be made by a fact-finder considering the evidence." Charney v. City of Wildwood, 732 F. Supp. 2d 448, 457 (D.N.J. 2010), aff'd, 435 F. App'x 72 (3d Cir. 2011).

9. For purposes of this motion, Plaintiffs have proffered admissible evidence that the pothole was a dangerous condition, that it was the proximate cause of Marie Robinson's injuries, and that her injuries were foreseeable. Plaintiffs allege both that Ocean City's negligent or wrongful road maintenance caused the dangerous condition and that Ocean City had constructive notice. Plaintiffs have not alleged that Ocean City had actual notice of the pothole. The Court will therefore analyze whether a reasonable jury could conclude that Ocean City's road maintenance program caused the dangerous condition, that Ocean City had constructive notice, and that Ocean City's actions or inactions were palpably unreasonable. The Court holds, as a matter of law, that the answer to each question is no.

10. Ocean City did not create the dangerous condition. Plaintiffs argue that Ocean City "caused the pothole to form by failing to utilize proper preventive maintenance practices. . . ." (P. Opp'n at 13.) But the New Jersey Supreme Court has held, in assessing a case involving a defect in a road, that "[e]ven if we were to assume that the County had an inadequate inspection program, natural conditions-not a flawed inspection program-'created' the depression on the shoulder of roadway. . . ." Polzo v. County of Essex, 209 N.J. 51, 66-67 (2012) ("Polzo II"). Plaintiffs' expert witness, Mr. Kolmus, acknowledged that cracks are inevitable and that potholes are formed when water filters through cracks into the layers below the asphalt surface. (Kolmus Expert Report at 11.) He explained that freezing and thawing of the water causes the road material to loosen and, eventually, potholes form. (Id.) Natural conditions, not allegedly flawed inspection programs, create potholes. The Polzo II court further explained that "[a] dangerous condition of property may be 'created' if, for example, a public entity's snow plow creates a pothole or the entity's paving of a roadway is negligently performed." ...

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