The opinion of the court was delivered by: Honorable Joseph E. Irenas
IRENAS , Senior District Judge:
This action initially arose when Defendant Borough of Palmyra ("Palmyra") issued a resolution closing Plaintiff National Amusement, Inc.'s ("National") flea market to the public due to dangerous subsurface unexploded ordnance. This Court granted summary judgment on all counts in favor of Palmyra. However, National now moves for attorneys' fees pursuant to § 1988 for work related to the Consent Order Judge Bumb entered on July 18, 2008. The Consent Order obtained an expedited ordnance removal schedule and permitted National to reopen contingent upon certain precautionary measures.
During, and shortly after World War II, Palmyra owned National's
property. See National Amusements, Inc. v. Borough of
Palmyra , __ F.Supp.2d __, 2012 WL 379909, *1 (D.N.J. 2012).
During that time, Palmyra authorized the United States Army to test
munitions. Id. The former weapons testing impact
zone is located where National currently operates the flea market.
During the intervening years, no people were reportedly injured, though, required inspections uncovered the possibility of subsurface unexploded munitions. As a result, Environmental Resources Management, Inc. ("ERM") contracted with Munitions Management Group, LLC ("MMG") to investigate possible unexploded munitions and safely dispose of them. Id. On March 10, 2008, during the course of the munitions disposal operations, MMG observed a munition flush with the asphalt surface of the parking lot. Id. at *2. The presence of a highly explosive munition at, or just below, ground level was particularly concerning because vendors at the flea market used stakes to secure tables and tarps. Id. Serious injury or death could result from a stake being driven into a live munition. Id. Furthermore, the risk at any given time was unpredictable because munitions can change their subsurface depth due to frost heaving - a phenomenon in which subsurface ice forms and pushes objects towards the surface. Id. MMG informally reported this information to Palmyra on March 10, 2008.
In response to this "imminent threat to public safety," on March 10, 2008, Palmyra drafted a resolution authorizing Police Chief Richard Dreby to request National to voluntarily close their operations or, if National refused, to exercise his emergency powers to restrict the public's access to National's property. Id. at *3. When National refused to close voluntarily, Chief Dreby closed National's Property.
On June 6, 2008, National filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Order to Show Cause. ( See Dkt. Nos. 3-4) In support of the Motion, National relied almost exclusively on the first count of the Complaint entitled "Arbitrary and Capricious Action." *fn1 ( See Pl.'s Br., Dkt. No. 4)
Decision on the Motion was unnecessary, however, because on July 30, 2008, Judge Bumb entered a Consent Order whereby National could resume operations by August 13, 2008 provided certain institutional precautions adequately protected the safety of flea market customers. ( See Consent Order ¶ 4, Dkt. No. 17) By way of example, one such institutional precaution was to erect physical barriers to prevent vendors and customers from accessing high risk areas. ( Id.
On December 11, 2008, National filed the Amended Complaint, which sought monetary damages for two alleged violations of § 1983 and one action in lieu of prerogative writ under the New Jersey State Constitution. *fn2 See National , 2012 WL 379909, *5. For approximately the next two years, the parties fought principally over interim attorneys' fees related to the entry of the Consent Order. On October 8, 2010, this Court denied the application for interim attorneys' fees without prejudice to its renewal upon the completion of litigation. (Order, Dkt. No. 107)
On September 30, 2011, Palmyra filed for summary judgment. (
See Dkt. No. 120) In an Opinion and Order dated February
3, 2012, this Court granted the motion in full. ( See
Dkt. Nos. 126-27) The instant Motion for Attorneys' Fees
essentially renews the previous one.
II. "In any action . . . to enforce a provision of section. . . 1983 . . . of [Title 42]. . . the court in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Upon determination that a plaintiff is a prevailing party and is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees, the Court must then decide upon a reasonable award of fees and costs.
"The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). This approach is otherwise referred to as the lodestar and "is strongly presumed to yield a reasonable fee." Washington v. Philadelphia Cnty. Ct. Of Common Pleas , 89 F.3d 1031, 1035 (3d Cir. 1996). Once the lodestar is determined, the court may, in its discretion, adjust the lodestar for many reasons, one important reason being the results obtained by the prevailing party. Hensley , 461 U.S. at 434; McKenna v. City of Philadelphia , 582 F.3d 447, 455-59 (3d Cir. 2009).
The burden is on the fee-applicant to establish a prima facie case. Hensley , 461 U.S. at 437. If a prima facie case is established, the opposing party bears the burden of presenting contrary evidence. See ...