The opinion of the court was delivered by: Bumb, District Judge
Petitioner Gerald Lofton, a prisoner currently confined at the Federal Correctional Institution at Fort Dix, New Jersey, has submitted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241*fn1 and has paid the $5 filing fee.
Because it appears from a review of the relevant record that Petitioner is not entitled to relief, the Petition will be dismissed.
Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio for Conspiracy to Possess With Intent to Distribute Cocaine Base (violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 21 U.S.C. § 841(B)(1)(A)) and Felon in Possession of a Firearm (violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(G)(1)). On June 18, 2008, he was sentenced to a term of 240 months imprisonment with a 10 year term of supervised release. Applying the available Good Conduct Time ("GCT"), the projected release date is September 11, 2025.
Petitioner brings this petition stating that the Bureau of Prisons incorrectly calculated his GCT based on time served rather than sentence imposed, allegedly resulting in seven fewer days of credit per year than he should have received.
Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies as to this issue. In fact, it does not appear that Petitioner has followed any of the administrative remedy procedures available to him at any time related to the challenge brought in the instant petition.
Respondent asserts that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief because he did not exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his challenge to the calculation of his sentence before filing this habeas petition.
Although 28 U.S.C. § 2241 contains no statutory exhaustion requirement, a federal prisoner ordinarily may not bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the execution of his sentence, until he has exhausted all available administrative remedies. See, e.g., Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000); Arias v. United States Parole Comm'n, 648 F.2d 196, 199 (3d Cir. 1981); Soyka v. Alldredge, 481 F.2d 303, 306 (3d Cir. 1973). The exhaustion doctrine promotes a number of goals:
(1) allowing the appropriate agency to develop a factual record and apply its expertise facilitates judicial review;
(2) permitting agencies to grant the relief requested conserves judicial resources; and (3) providing agencies the opportunity to correct their own errors fosters administrative autonomy.
Goldberg v. Beeler, 82 F.Supp.2d 302, 309 (D.N.J. 1999), aff'd, 248 F.3d 1130 (3d Cir. 2000). See also Moscato v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 761 (3d Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where exhaustion would not promote these goals. See, e.g., Gambino v. Morris, 134 F.3d 156, 171 (3d Cir. 1998) (exhaustion not required where petitioner demonstrates futility); Lyons v. U.S. Marshals, 840 F.2d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 1988) (exhaustion may be excused where it "would be futile, if the actions of the agency clearly and unambiguously violate statutory or constitutional rights, or if the administrative procedure is clearly shown to be inadequate to prevent irreparable harm"); Carling v. Peters, 2000 WL 1022959, *2 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (exhaustion not required where delay would subject petitioner to "irreparable injury").
In general, the BOP Administrative Remedy Program is a multi-tier process that is available to inmates confined in institutions operated by the BOP for "review of an issue which relates to any aspect of their confinement." 28 C.F.R. § 542.10. An inmate must initially attempt to informally resolve the issue with institutional staff. 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(a). If informal resolution fails or is waived, an inmate may submit a BP-9 Request to "the institution staff member designated to receive such Requests (ordinarily a correctional counsel)" within 20 days of the date on which the basis for the Request occurred, or within any extension permitted. 28 C.F.R. § 542.14. An inmate who is ...