On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Morris County, Docket No. C-45-11.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Reisner and Accurso.
Plaintiffs Jersey Central Power & Light Company (JCP&L) and Pennsylvania Power Company (Penn Power) appeal from the grant of a motion to dismiss their complaint against defendant Renee Lempke. Plaintiffs filed their action in the Chancery Division seeking to enjoin defendant from continuing to prosecute a suit against them in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. Judge Deanne Wilson dismissed the complaint under principles of comity. We affirm.
Both this action and the Pennsylvania action arise out of the accidental death of defendant's husband, Robert Lempke. Defendant's husband was employed as a utility worker by JCP&L. He was killed in the course of his employment when he came in contact with an energized downed power-line while working in an emergency relief effort to restore power in Western Pennsylvania following a severe storm in September 2008. JCP&L and Penn Power contend that Mr. Lempke was performing work for Penn Power as a "borrowed employee" of JCP&L at the time of his death.
Following Mr. Lempke's fatal accident, JCP&L began paying workers'
compensation benefits to his widow, defendant Renee Lempke and to his
remaining dependents, including his former wife. Sometime thereafter,
defendant filed a dependency claim petition for enhanced benefits with
the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Division
of Workers' Compensation. In her petition, defendant sought to
terminate the benefits being paid to Mr. Lempke's first wife. JCP&L
answered the claim petition on October 15, 2009. In the course of the
workers' compensation action, Renee Lempke and JCP&L stipulated that
the decedent, Robert Lempke, was employed by JCP&L and suffered a
fatal injury in the course and scope of his employment.*fn1
Defendant was ultimately successful in obtaining enhanced
compensation benefits pursuant to an award entered on November 15,
While her workers' compensation action was pending in New Jersey, defendant filed a writ to commence suit against JCP&L and others in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on December 30, 2009. In her subsequently filed complaint, first and second amended complaints and in her answers to interrogatories, defendant has consistently averred that her late husband was employed by JCP&L and working in the scope of his employment at the time of his death. In her third amended complaint, however, filed on August 11, 2010, defendant claimed that "[w]hile initially it appeared that Mr. Lempke worked for JCP&L at the time [of the accident], documents reveal that he may have been employed by First Energy. Investigation is ongoing as to his legal employer."
JCP&L filed preliminary objections in the nature of a motion to dismiss the third amended complaint on the basis of the exclusivity provision of Pennsylvania's Workers' Compensation Act. The court overruled JCP&L's preliminary objections and directed it to file an answer. JCP&L answered the third amended complaint and subsequently moved for summary judgment contending that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law under the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act. The Pennsylvania court denied JCP&L's motion for summary judgment on June 8, 2010. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Apparently frustrated in its efforts to get the Pennsylvania suit dismissed, JCP&L, along with Penn Power, instituted this action in March 2011 to enjoin defendant from maintaining the Pennsylvania suit against them and from domesticating or otherwise enforcing any judgment against them obtained in Pennsylvania or elsewhere arising out of Mr. Lempke's fatal accident. Defendant made a motion to dismiss, which Judge Wilson granted under principles of comity and which plaintiffs now appeal.
On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the motion judge misapplied the "first-filed" rule and inappropriately allowed defendant to evade the workers' compensation bar. Plaintiffs contend that defendant's New Jersey workers' compensation petition was the first-filed action and thus an anti-suit injunction is necessary to vindicate the exclusivity provision of New Jersey's workers' compensation law and spare them from being forced to defend the second-filed Pennsylvania action. Defendant counters that the Pennsylvania action was the first-filed suit and because, as Judge Wilson properly found, plaintiffs will have the opportunity for adequate relief in the Pennsylvania action, comity demands the dismissal of the after-filed New Jersey suit.
We review a trial court's determination to grant a comity stay or dismissal under an abuse of discretion standard. Sensient Colors Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 193 N.J. 373, 390 (2008). The power to impose an anti-suit injunction to bar a litigant from prosecuting a suit pending in another state is "a delicate one" that should be conscientiously exercised only when the "true interests of justice so require." Trustees of Princeton Univ. v. Trust Co. of N.J., 22 N.J. 587, 598 (1956). Upon a careful review of the entire record, we are satisfied that Judge Wilson did not abuse her discretion in declining to enter such an injunction here.
"New Jersey has long adhered to 'the general rule that the court which first acquires jurisdiction has precedence in the absence of special equities.'" Sensient Colors, supra, 193 N.J. at 386 (quoting Yancoskie v. Del. River Port Auth., 78 N.J. 321, 324 (1978)). Here, the motion judge determined that the Pennsylvania action was first-filed because the New Jersey workers' compensation proceeding was an administrative action in which the negligence claims defendant is pursuing in Pennsylvania were not cognizable.
We have recently had occasion to consider whether the first-filed rule applies only to lawsuits or whether other forms of dispute resolution might qualify as first-filed actions under the general rule of comity. In CTC Demolition Co. v. GMH AETC Management, 424 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2012), we observed that "[a]lthough the creation of the first-filed rule may have presupposed that the interplay of its principles would relate solely to which of two lawsuits should proceed to disposition, the proliferation of mediation and arbitration as an alternate but highly-favored method for resolving disputes since the first-filed rule's development, suggests the legitimacy of [the] argument that [the] demand for mediation should be treated like the filing of a complaint." Id. at 7. In CTC, ...