ROBERT B. KUGLER United States District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon the Clerk's receipt of two submissions (docketed in this matter as Docket Entries Nos. 1 and 1-1). For the reasons expressed below, Plaintiffs' submission docketed as Docket Entry No. 1-1 (made, seemingly, in lieu of their applications to proceed in this matter in forma pauperis), will be denied without prejudice, and Plaintiffs' other submission (docketed as Docket Entry No. 1) will be dismissed with a clarification that: (a) to the degree this submission was striving to operate as a civil complaint, it will be dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiffs' filing of a clear and concise pleading showing their entitlement to relief, in compliance with this Court's guidance provided below; and (b) to the degree this submission was striving to operate as a document "registering" Plaintiffs' rights, of any kind, simply by the virtue of having this submission entered on this District's docket, this submission will be deemed stricken from the docket with an express statement that the docket sheet created in this matter cannot be used, directly or indirectly, as a source or evidence of any right conferred upon Plaintiffs.
The submissions made in this matter cannot be understood without: (a) an overview of analogous actions instituted in this District and other federal courts; and (b) at least partial replication of the submissions made in the case at bar. Since these submissions are fashioned in the style that would likely confuse the reader having no familiarity with this type of actions, the Court finds it warranted to begin its discussion with a summary of relevant prior cases.
A. Murakush -Amexem Proceedings and Analogous Actions in This District
One of the recent proceedings of this type was adjudicated by this Court in Murakush Caliphate of Amexem Inc. v. New Jersey ("Murakush-Amexem"), F. Supp. 2d , 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51887 (D.N.J. May 13, 2011). There, this Court detailed as follows:
1. Moorish and Redemptionist Movements
Two concepts, which may or may not operate as interrelated, color the issues at hand. One of these concepts underlies ethnic/religious identification movement of certain groups of individuals who refer to themselves as "Moors," while the other concept provides the basis for another movement of certain groups of individuals, which frequently produces these individuals' denouncement of United States citizenship, self-declaration of other, imaginary "citizenship" and accompanying self-declaration of equally imaginary "diplomatic immunity."
In 1998, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit -- being one of the first courts to detail the concept of Moorish movement, observed as follows:
[The Moorish Science Temple of America is a] black Islamic sect . . .
[T]hree-fourths of its temples (congregations) are inside prisons. The Moors, as adherents to the Moorish Science Temple are called, have their own version of the Koran and a list of prophets that includes, in addition to the prophets recognized by orthodox Islam, Buddha, Confucius, and the founder . . . of the Moorish Science Temple . . . . Two groups vie for leadership of the sect: one in Mt. Clemens, Michigan, headed by [someone referred to as] Grand Sheik/Moderator Brother R. Love-El, and one in St. Louis headed by [someone referred to as] Grand Sheik Jerry Lewis-Bey. (The suffixes "El" and "Bey" refer to the African tribes from which the Moors believe black people are descended.)
[b]. "Redemptionism," "Paper Terrorism" and Related Concepts
Shortly after the concept of Moorish movement was outlined by the Seventh Circuit, discussions of another movement appeared on the pages of legal opinions issued by the federal judiciary; that other movement was dubbed as "sovereign citizenship" movement. This movement was fostered by
a loosely organized collection of groups and individuals who have adopted a right-wing anarchist ideology originating in the theories of a group called the Posse Comitatus in the 1970s. Its adherents believe that virtually all existing government in the United States is illegitimate . . . . [Therefore, such] "sovereign citizens" wage war against the government and other forms of authority using "paper terrorism" harassment and intimidation tactics, and occasionally resorting to [physical] violence.
Sovereign Citizen Movement, Anti-Defamation League, at http://www.adl.org/Learn/ext_us/SCM.asp?LEARN_Cat=Extremism&LEARN_SubC at=Extremism_in_America&xpicked=4&item=sov (visited on Mar. 31, 2011).*fn2
Consequently, a decade after the Seventh Circuit's issuance of Bey v. Lane, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted a stream of government actions aimed at controlling the "paper terrorism" activities of sovereign citizens, which -- by then -- matured into a wide-spread criminal scheme, where the scheme participants' "self-legitimized" their names for the purposes of initiating fraudulent legal transactions. The Court of Appeals explained:
Evidently, [adherents of this scheme have been] filing [fraudulent] financing statements under Article 9 of the UCC, which sets forth a process for perfecting security interests in property. These liens and judgments, accessible on financing statement forms, are easy to file. Once registered, however, the fraudulent liens are very burdensome to remove. For example, in a New Jersey incident, [one group] registered a fraudulent $14.5 million lien with the New Jersey Department of Revenue against a federal prosecutor and a $3.5 million lien against a federal judge for using [the group participants'] "copyrighted" names in court papers and hearings . . . . [Adherents of this scheme] have filed these commercial liens with state departments of revenue, departments of state, or other the state agencies responsible for receiving and recording these financial instruments. Further investigation revealed that various publications were advocating the exploitation of the UCC filing process and provided explicit instructions on how to perfect these fraudulent security interests, including sample financing statements forms. [These publications built on] the "Redemptionist" theory, which propounds that a person has a split personality: a real person and a fictional person called the "strawman." . . . Redemptionists claim that government has power only over the strawman and not over the live person, who remains free [and, thus,] individuals can free themselves by filing UCC financing statements, thereby acquiring an interest in their strawman. Thereafter, [pursuant to this "theory,"] the real person can demand that government officials pay enormous sums of money to use the strawman's name or, in the case of prisoners, to keep him in custody. If government officials refuse, [adherents of this scheme] file liens against [government officials] . Adherents of this scheme also advocate that [they] copyright their names to justify filing liens against officials using their names in public records such as indictments or court papers.
Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 203 and nn. 3 and 4 (3d Cir. 2008); accord Roche, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 5773, at 2 (noting that the "sovereign citizen" litigant elected to present the district court's dismissal of his petition as a "contract" between the court and the litigant).
The "strawman" concept is, occasionally, presented/exploited somewhat differently by those redemptionists who claim that -- at the moment of their denouncement of United States citizenship and/or their accompanying self-grant of imaginary alternative citizenship -- their "strawman" incarnation became "deceased," and their live persons quasi-expatriated from the U.S. (while continuing their actual physical residence in the United States). In connection with this odd quasi-expatriation scheme, such redemptionists often claim that their live persons: (a) hold "estates" in the form of actual physical bodies of their respective "quasi-deceased" strawmen;*fn3 and (b) reside in geographic locales "self-claimed away" from the United States.
[c]. Interplay Between Moorish and Sovereign Citizenship Movements It does not appear that one's Moorish ethnic roots (or Moorish religious convictions, or both) have any reason to go hand-in-hand with one's adhesion to the sovereign citizenship movement (or with one's professing the theory of redemptionism, or with one's practice of "paper terrorism," claims of self- granted "diplomatic immunity," etc.).
However, and unfortunately enough, certain groups of individuals began merging these concepts by building on their alleged ancestry in ancient Moors (and/or on their alleged or actual adhesion to Moorish religious convictions) for the purposes of committing criminal offenses and/or initiating frivolous legal actions on the grounds of their self-granted "diplomatic immunity," which these individuals deduce either from their self-granted "Moorish citizenship" and from their correspondingly-produced homemade "Moorish" documents (or from correspondingly-obtained "world passports") or from a multitude of other, equally non-cognizable under the law, bases, which these individuals keep creating in order to support their allegations of "diplomatic immunity."*fn4
Murakush-Amexem, F. Supp. 2d , 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51887 at *2-12 (footnotes in original).
2. Relevant Information Provided in Cases Preceding MurakushAmexem
The above-quoted Murakush-Amexem decision built on a prior determination reached in this District with regard to a group of nineteen actions of this type (hereinafter, collectively, "Marrakush Cases"). See Marrakush Soc'y v. N.J. State Police, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68057 (D.N.J. July 30, 2009). Addressing the submissions made in these nineteen actions, the Marrakush Cases court noted that the filings "were heavily peppered by references to the Barbary Treaties, United Nations documents, United States Constitution, . . . United States President, etc., [incuded] copies of . . . the Barbary Treaties, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, etc., . . . pages of homemade quasi-documents, . . . flocks of apostles certifying unspecified documents . . . and analogous incomprehensible paperwork. All these submissions were heavily laden with Arabic and quasi-Arabic terminology, designations of geographic locales composed . . . of Earth coordinates combined with references to imaginary 'principalities' and 'territories,' . . . and riddle-like, self-created 'Marrakush' argot." Murakush- Amexem, F. Supp. 2d , 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51887 at *20-22 (footnotes and citations to Marrakush Cases omitted).
Collecting cases of this type, which had been filed in other federal district courts, the Marrakush Cases court noted, inter alia, that: (a) some cases of this type were initiated by individuals who were defined as a "'squatters [who were taking] over vacant home[s]," Marrakush Cases, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68057, *41; and, in addition, (b) other cases of this type were instituted not with any litigation in mind but, rather, as a result of the litigants' desire to create an appearance that their claims, paperwork, etc. were "legitimized" as a result of having their paperwork simply entered on the docket of a federal court.
The action commenced [by these type of litigants] in the Eastern District of New York appears to be, simultaneously, the most puzzling and the most instructive . . . . See In re El, [Civil Action No.] 09-406 (E.D.N.Y). Initiated shortly after termination of the [actions initiated by these litigants in the [S.D. Fla., this E.D.N.Y. action] remained unassigned until its termination. . . . [T]he information provided in both the [E.D.N.Y.] docketed and non-docketable submissions suggests that [these litigants] commenced that [E.D.N.Y.] matter in hope to obtain a certain aura of legitimacy . . . through the very fact of the filings made with the [E.D.N.Y.] Specifically, the docket in [E.D.N.Y. a]ction reflects [inter alia] . . . a massive compilation of homemade "apostilles" generated by [these litigants], allegedly pursuant to "the laws of nature." These homemade "apostilles" were attached to . . . numerous homemade documents titled "promulgation proclamation" . . . , a homemade "copy certification by record custodian" . . . as well as pages and pages of a peculiar "Notice of U.S. Person/Entity/Item Dissolution" composed of a virtually incomprehensible chain of quasi-legalese. See id., Docket Entry No. 1. [These litigants later] used the fact of submissions made in the Eastern District of New York to create an impression in this District that [these litigants'] "credentials" were "on file" with the Eastern District of New York. While imitating -- or, at the very least, striving to imitate -- official documents, none of these submissions stated a single claim. See id. In fact, they did not contain even a vaguest hint as to an actual intent to initiate a legal suit. Rather, accompanied by the filing fee of $39, these documents suggest nothing but [these litigants'] mere interest in having [these submissions] "placed on file" with a federal court.
Marrakush Cases, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68057, *46-49 (footnote 29 incorporated in the main text).
3. Disposition Reached in Murakush-Amexem and Preceding Cases
In Murakush-Amexem, well in sync with the typical litigation mode employed in this type of cases, the Murakush-Amexem litigants: (a) did not submit a proper in forma pauperis ("IFP") form, substituting it by a homemade "promissory bond"; and, in addition (b) composed their pleading out of incomprehensible "Marrakush argot," thickly peppered with quasi-Arabit terms, self-created designations of political and geographic territories, Earth coordinates, senselessly mixed-in Latin phrases and references to the Barbary Treaties. See Murakush- Amexem, F. Supp. 2d , 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51887 at *49-58. Addressing the insufficiency of the litigants' IFP application, this Court explained:
[T]he Court notes its concern with the members of Murakush-Amexem initial attempt to be "creative" by submitting . . . a homemade "bond" [instead of an actual and duly completed IFP form, since] such "creativity" suggests only mockery of the Court rather than suitability for IFP status.
Detailing other problems associated with this type of submissions, the Court observed:
The history of [this type of cases in this District] and other district cases . . . indicate[s] that [the federal judiciary] faces an apparent challenge in [controlling these actions]. This ...