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John E. Reardon v. James Leason
September 7, 2011
JOHN E. REARDON, PLAINTIFF,
JAMES LEASON, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Mary L. Cooper United States District Judge
PLAINTIFF moving for relief from this Court's previous rulings
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 60(b)(4) and Rule
60(d)(3) (dkt. entry no. 171); and Plaintiff having previously moved
for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) (dkt. entry no. 144, 6-3-10
Mot.); and the Court having denied that motion (dkt. entry no. 157,
7-1-10 Order); and Plaintiff having appealed (dkt. entry no. 159, Not.
of Appeal); and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals having affirmed the
Court's decision (dkt. entry no. 160, 3d Cir. Op.);*fn1
and Plaintiff having moved again before this Court for relief
pursuant to Rule 60(b) (dkt. entry no. 161); and the Court having
treated the motion as a motion for reconsideration and having denied
the motion (dkt. entry no. 168, 5-31-11 Order); and the Court thus
intending, for the reasons stated in (1) the 5-31-11 Order, (2) the
Order, and (3) the 3d Cir. Op., to deny the current motion insofar as
it seeks relief under Rule 60(b)(4); and
THE COURT noting that Rule 60(d)(3) states that "[t]his rule does not limit a court's power to . . . set aside a judgment for fraud on the court," Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(d)(3); and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stating that the Court "did not enter judgment in [Plaintiff's] criminal case" (3d Cir. Op. at 4); and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals further noting that Plaintiff "is effectively asking the District Court to void a state court conviction," but that "he is barred from doing so under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine" (id. at n.3.); and the Court thus determining that, insofar as Plaintiff alleges fraud upon the state court in the underlying state court proceeding, he cannot use Rule 60(d)(3) to set aside a state court conviction (see 3d Cir. Op.), see Fed.R.Civ.P. 60; and
THE COURT further determining that, insofar as Plaintiff alleges fraud upon this Court, Plaintiff has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any egregious, intentionally fraudulent, conduct, see Gagliardi v. Courter, No. 02--2035, 2011 WL 710221, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2011) (noting a party must show by clear and convincing evidence: "(1) an intentional fraud; (2) by an officer of the court; (3) which is directed at the court itself; and (4) that in fact deceives the court," and that "[t]his is a 'demanding standard', reserved for 'egregious misconduct'") (citing Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384, 390 (3d Cir. 2005)); see also Rigaud v. Broward Gen. Med. Ctr., 404 Fed.Appx. 372, 373-74 (11th Cir. 2010) (discussing Rule 60(d)(3) and recusal); Parkhurst v. Pittsburgh Paints Inc., 399 Fed.Appx. 341, 342 (10th Cir. 2010) (same); and the Court thus also intending to deny the current motion insofar as it seeks relief under Rule 60(d)(3); and for good cause appearing:
IT IS THEREFORE on this 7th day of September, 2011, ORDERED that the Plaintiff's current motion for relief from this Court's previous rulings (dkt. entry no. 171) is DENIED.
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