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Victor Gonzalez v. Gabriel Camarero

August 19, 2011

VICTOR GONZALEZ,
PLAINTIFF,
v.
GABRIEL CAMARERO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Bumb, District Judge:

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

Plaintiff, Victor Gonzalez, a prisoner incarcerated at Camden County Correctional Facility in New Jersey, seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This Court will grant Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis and direct the Clerk to file the Complaint without prepayment of the filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Having reviewed Plaintiff's allegations, as required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, this Court will dismiss the federal claims raised in the Complaint and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims arising under state law.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff asserts violation of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Gabriel Camarero and Jose Aparicio, who are Probation Officers in Hartford, Connecticut, Northampton County Prison, and Northampton County Courts. Plaintiff asserts:

On 7/11/2008 I was sentenced to 1 yr probation. On 2/5/10 I was violated against that 1 yr probation and served 1 yr in Northampton County Prison. This was a violation of my Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process of law which resulted in cruel and unusual punishment for my unlawful detainment.

My assigned Probation Officer is Gabriel Camarero. Northampton County courts had sent me an appointment for 8/11/2009. I wanted to report to her that I had to leave the state to report to my appointment. Instead of speaking to her I was given a substitute officer, Jose Aparicio. I was told that I could not go to the assigned appointment in Northampton County. Northampton County courts then put a failure to appear warrant against me. I was sentenced to one year probation for a DUI charge on 7/11/2008. I was arrested on 1/26/2010 for a separate charge which was later dropped. On 2/5/2010 my one year probation was revoked and I was forced to serve one year in Northampton County Prison, even though I had completed my year of probation. So in actuality I served two years instead of one. (Dkt. 1 at 4, 7.)

For relief, Plaintiff seeks "restitution for my lost time due to my unlawful detainment. Also I am seeking lost wages during my unlawful detainment and punitive damages and pain and suffering." (Dkt. 1 at 8.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires a District Court to screen a complaint in a civil action in which a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis or a prisoner is seeking redress against a government employee or entity, and to sua sponte dismiss any claim if the Court determines that it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A.

The pleading standard under Rule 8 was refined by the United States Supreme Court in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), where the Supreme Court clarified as follows:

Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice . . . . Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not "show[n]"-"that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).

In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should ...


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