The opinion of the court was delivered by: Bumb, District Judge
Plaintiff, Jumar Collins, currently confined at the Atlantic County Justice Facility, Mays Landing, New Jersey, has submitted this civil complaint which alleges violations of his constitutional rights, and seeks damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has not paid the filing fee, and seeks permission to proceed in forma pauperis. Based on Plaintiff's affidavit of indigence, this Court will grant his request.
At this time, the Court must review the complaint to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). For the following reasons, the complaint will be dismissed.
Plaintiff seeks to sue the ACJF, as well as the warden of the facility. He claims that:
On 10-5-10 I requested out of the Atl. Co. Just. Fac.
West law/law library the rules and guidelines of the RICO act law, and was denied access to such documents cause I am not charged with such crimes. I am a New Jersey state parole violator, and I was violated [sic] the proper use of a law library or such documents. (Complaint, ¶ 4). Plaintiff asks this Court to order that all inmates have access to the law library regardless of what crimes they committed.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-134, § § 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires a district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity. The Court is required to identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under both 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, because plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding as an indigent.
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) and Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)). See also United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992). The Court must "accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). The Court need not, however, credit a pro se plaintiff's "bald assertions" or "legal conclusions." Id.
Recently, the Supreme Court refined this standard for summary
dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a claim in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). The Court examined Rule 8(a)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that a complaint must
contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).*fn1
Citing its recent
opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), for
the proposition that "[a] pleading that offers 'labels and
conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do,'" Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555), the Supreme Court held that, to prevent a summary
dismissal, a civil complaint must now allege "sufficient factual
matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. This then
"allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged." See id. at 1948. The Supreme