On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Essex County, Docket No. F-25618-07.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges A. A. Rodriguez and Reisner.
The Armand Group, PLLC, attorneys for appellant (Nelcida M. Armand, on the brief). Cleary Giacobbe Alfieri Jacobs, attorneys for respondent (Paul L. LaSalle, of counsel and on the brief).
Appellant Tommy R. Henderson challenges the September 9, 2008 judgment of foreclosure and sale by default in favor of Lynx Asset Services, LLC. We affirm.
Argent Mortgage (Argent) is the original holder of a note secured by a mortgage on Henderson's real property in South Orange. Argent assigned its rights to Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corporation (Citigroup). Citigroup assigned its rights to Lynx, the respondent in this appeal.
Less than one year after the date of the mortgage, Citigroup filed a judgment in foreclosure. Henderson did not file an answer and the matter proceeded to the entry of a Final Judgment of Foreclosure and a Sheriff's sale was scheduled. The trial court denied Henderson's application for a stay of the sale. We denied Henderson's request for a stay pending appeal, M-3029-09 (App. Div. January 22, 2010), as well his subsequent request for a stay of the writ of Possession Pending Appeal. M-1089-10 (App. Div. July 23, 2010).
On January 15, 2011, Henderson filed a notice of appeal contending that the judgment of foreclosure should be reversed because Lynx was not the holder of the mortgage and therefore lacked standing. Specifically, he argues that: "the court failed to determine whether respondent had produced a valid assignment of mortgage and thus was the holder of the note in due course"; "New Jersey courts have held that a mortgagor must provide evidence of a valid mortgage note in order to maintain a foreclosure action;" and that we "should definitively adopt the decisions of other states that have held a mortgagor who does not hold the note at the commencement of the foreclosure action does not have standing to sue."
We reject these arguments. First, we note that the notice of appeal was filed on January 15, 2011, which is more than forty-five days from the entry of the judgment. See R. 2:4-1. Thus, the appeal is time barred. Moreover, the appeal is moot. The Sheriff's sale occurred on March 16, 2010. A Sheriff's deed was issued to Lynx on that date. Therefore, the statutory redemption period has expired.
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