The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hillman, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon Petitioner's filing of a statement establishing his due exhaustion of administrative remedies for the purposes of his § 2241 petition at hand ("Petition"). See Docket Entry No. 5.
For the reasons detailed below, the Petition will be denied. In April 2008, Petitioner filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241; that filing gave rise to Galloway v. Warden of F.C.I. Fort Dix, Civil Action No. 08-5182 (D.N.J.).
This Court examined Petitioner's submission and gleaned the following information from the records of Petitioner's criminal proceedings: (a) "Petitioner is currently serving his 150 month federal sentence rendered in April 4, 2003, by Judge Richard L. Voorhees from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, Charlotte Division," Galloway v. Bureau of Prisons, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84942, at *3-4 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2008) (citing Galloway v. United States, 04-0070 (RLV) (W.D.N.C.) ("Galloway I"), Docket Entry No. 2, at 1 (filed on Mar. 3, 2004)); and (b) "initially, Petitioner was arrested by the State of Pennsylvania; that arrest took place on February 7, 2002. Petitioner did not post bond and remained in Pennsylvania custody while awaiting his state trial. Three months later, on May 7, 2002, Petitioner was indicted by the United States on the charges unrelated to his Pennsylvania charges." Galloway v. Warden of F.C.I., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9293 (D.N.J. Feb. 9, 2009).
At the heart of Petitioner's Civil Action No. 08-5182 laid Petitioner's challenges that "[t]he Bureau of Prisons ('BOP') gave [Petitioner] no credit for time in state custody, despite [the Pennsylvania] state court's contrary wishes." Galloway v. Warden of F.C.I. Fort Dix, 385 Fed. App'x 59 (3d Cir. 2010). This Court directed the respondents in that matter to answer Petitioner's challenges in light of the holdings of Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1990), Willis v. United States, 438 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1971), and Kayfez v. Gasele, 993 F. 2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1993), and the respondents duly complied. See Galloway, 385 Fed. App'x at 61. This Court determined that The respondents' answer and this Court's following decisions detailed to Petitioner facial inapplicability of Willis and Kayfez were inapplicable to Petitioner's circumstances, and affirmed the BOP's decision not to grant Petitioner Barden "credit." See id. This Court found no abuse of discretion with regard to BOP's Barden determination, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, setting out again the workings and limitations of Barden, Kayfez and Willis "credits." See generally, id.
One year after initiation of the above-mentioned Civil Action No. 08-5182, Petitioner filed another application for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241; that filing gave rise to Galloway v. Warden of F.C.I. Fort Dix, Civil Action No. 09-3692 (D.N.J.). At the heart of that Civil Action No. 09-3692, laid Petitioner['s] request [for] a downward reduction of his sentence, [since Petitioner alleged] as follows:
Petitioner moves this . . . Court to issue an order requiring the [BOP] to award Petitioner a two for one time credit for everyday [sic.] served in the U.S. Marshal hold at the Northeast Ohio Correctional Center ("NEOCC") because the conditions at the NEOCC borderlined . . . cruel and unusual punishment, and this has caused Petitioner to serve more onerous period of incarceration, than that which was contemplated by the sentencing court. . . . P]petitioner expressly concedes that he has not exhausted his administrative remedies. . . .
Galloway v. Warden of F.C.I. Fort Dix, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71201, at *3-4 (D.N.J. Aug. 12, 2009).*fn1
Judge Jerome B. Simandle ("Judge Simandle"), presiding over Petitioner's Civil Action No. 09-3692, dismissed Petitioner's challenges explaining that: (a) since the petition in that action was a de facto § 2255 motion, requesting a downward adjustment of Petitioner's sentence, Petitioner's Section 2241 challenges were subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, see id. at *4-11;
(b) even if the petition in that action were construed as a § 3582(c)(1)(A)(I) application, such application would, too, be subject to dismissal, since the Director of the BOP had not filed a motion seeking reduction of Petitioner's sentence, and -- even had such motion been filed by the Director of the BOP -- this District would, in any event, have no jurisdiction to grant Petitioner sentence reduction, see id. at *15-19 (detailing the governing legal regime and relevant case law); and, moreover, (c) in the event the petition in that action were construed as a Section 2241 application, it would still be subject to dismissal, as administratively unexhausted. See id. at *12-14.
Petitioner appealed Judge Simandle's determination. See Galloway v. Warden of F.C.I. Fort Dix, 358 Fed. App'x 301 (3d Cir. 2009). The Court of Appeals concluded that the construction of Petitioner's application requesting a downward adjustment of his sentence as a Section 2241 petition was the proper one, and affirmed Judge Simandle's dismissal of the same on the failure-to-exhaust grounds. See id.
A year passed by, and Petitioner commenced the § 2241 action at bar, repeating the very same challenges that were stated in his above-discussed Civil Action No. 09-3692 (D.N.J.), which was dismissed by Judge Simandle for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Instant Matter, Docket Entry No. 1. Since the Petition in this matter failed to indicate that Petitioner exhausted his administrative remedies, even though Petitioner had received guidance as to this aspect from both the Court of Appeals and Judge Simandle, this Court directed Petitioner to establish due exhaustion. See Instant Matter, Docket Entry No. 2. In response, Petitioner filed copies of his administrative record showing that he duly raised the issue before his warden, the Regional Office of the BOP and the BOP's Central Office. See Instant Matter, Docket Entry No. 5.
The administrative record provided by Petitioner indicates that, during his BOP proceedings, Petitioner did not specify any legal basis for his request: he only asserted that the period of his confinement at the NEOCC came "borderline close" to being "cruel and unusual punishment." Building on that unelaborated assertion, Petitioner requested downward adjustment of his federal sentence, asking that ...