On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Cape May County, Docket No. L-538-90.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Lihotz and J. N. Harris.
Defendant, Michael W. Lloyd, appeals from the April 29, 2010 order permitting respondent Buckeye Retirement Co., LLC (Buckeye) to revive a December 1990 judgment, and from the August 27, 2010 order denying reconsideration. We affirm both orders.
This is not the first time this court has addressed aspects of the 1990 judgment. In First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A. v. Michael W. Lloyd, No. A-0402-06 (App. Div. Dec. 11, 2007), we affirmed the Law Division's declination to vacate the 1990 judgment and its enforcement of a post-judgment discovery order. The facts undergirding that matter and the instant appeal are virtually identical, and have not changed in the interim, except for Buckeye's effort to revive the judgment:
In a collection action in the Law Division, Cape May County, judgment by confession was entered against Lloyd and in favor of First Pennsylvania Bank in the amount of $627,548.18 on June 22, 1990 on the first three counts of First Pennsylvania's complaint. Thereafter, on December 3, 1990, a default judgment was entered against Lloyd and in favor of the Bank on the fourth count of the same complaint in the amount of $100,000 plus interest of $7,535.79, representing the amount of a promissory note given by Lloyd and payable on demand. Following the entry of judgment, the loan was assigned, in connection with a December 2002 asset sale agreement, by First Union National Bank, a successor to First Pennsylvania, to The Cadle Company, which in turn assigned the loan to Buckeye Retirement Co., LLC, Ltd.
In 2004, Buckeye instituted two state court actions on the note, one in New Jersey and one in Pennsylvania, both of which were dismissed without prejudice. Learning that the obligation on the note had been reduced to judgment, Buckeye then obtained an assignment on the judgment from First Union and, later, from its successor, Wachovia Bank, N.A. When Buckeye sought to enforce an order permitting discovery of Lloyd's assets, Lloyd moved pursuant to R. 4:50-1 to vacate the judgment, alleging payment, but failing to provide satisfactory proof of same. The judge did not accept Lloyd's argument, and denied Lloyd's motion, while enforcing his discovery obligations. [First Pa. Bank, N.A. v. Michael W. Lloyd, supra, slip op. at 2-3.]
Lloyd's arguments in the first appeal were the following:
(1) that the assignment of the judgment to Buckeye was "fraudulent" and that Buckeye lacks standing to seek its enforcement; (2) a verbal settlement between Buckeye and Lloyd in the prior Pennsylvania action bars Buckeye's enforcement action; (3) Buckeye is estopped from enforcing the judgment because it failed to timely inform Lloyd that it held that judgment; (4) the trial judge should have addressed Lloyd's claims of fraud and found it to exist; (5) the court erred in failing to find the assignments to be void; and (6) a plenary hearing should have been held. [Id. at 3.]
We rejected these claims, concluding "[i]n large measure, . . . Lloyd's arguments . . . lack sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in a written decision. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(A) and (E)." Id. at 4.
In March 2010, Buckeye filed a motion seeking an order to revive the 1990 judgment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:14-5. Lloyd opposed the revival, arguing that the 1990 judgment was illegal for a variety of reasons. The Law Division granted the revival application, writing: "[t]he defense to this motion was in disregard of the decision of the Appellate Division . ...