The opinion of the court was delivered by: William J. Martini, U.S.D.J.:
OPINION HON. WILLIAM J. MARTINI
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Merial Limited‟s ("Merial") motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). There was no oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78. For the reasons stated below, Defendant‟s motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs‟ Amended Complaint ("Complaint") brings a putative class action on behalf of themselves and other purchasers and users of "spot on" flea and tick treatments manufactured by Defendant. Defendant Merial manufactures Frontline and Frontline Plus (together, "Frontline"), which are flea and tick control pesticide products containing the active ingredients finopril and methoprene. (Compl. ¶ 4.) Frontline is considered a "spot on" flea and tick treatment because the pesticide is applied directly to one or more localized areas on the body of the pet. (See Compl., Ex. D.)
On April 21, 2009, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), which regulates the safety of pesticides, issued a press release, reporting a "recent sharp increase in the number of incidents being reported from the use of spot-on pesticide products for flea and tick control for pets." (Compl., Ex. D.) In response, Merial issued a statement on April 22, 2009, addressing the EPA‟s concern and concluding, "[p]et owners can continue to trust FRONTLINE products for long-lasting and effective flea and tick control." (Compl., Ex. E.) Merial also issued a similar letter to veterinarians. (See Compl., Ex. F.)
Plaintiffs allege that Frontline is unsafe because it caused skin irritation and neurological problems for their pets. (Compl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff Sandy Smith, a resident of Tennessee, alleges that on or about 2007 she used Frontline on her two dogs and noticed that after each application, the dogs exhibited "seizure-like symptoms." (Compl. ¶¶ 32-33.) Plaintiff Kathleen Maxson, a resident of New Jersey, alleges that on November 28, 2009, she purchased and treated her cat once with Frontline, after which the cat "began to convulse and died." (Compl. ¶¶ 34-36.)
Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and other purchasers of Defendant‟s products, bring the following causes of action: (1) breach of express warranty (Count One); (2) breach of implied warranty of merchantability (Count Two); (3) unjust enrichment (Count Three); and (4) violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act ("NJCFA") (Count Four). Specifically, Plaintiffs seek economic damages based upon the difference between the amount they paid for the product and the diminished (or nonexistent) value of the product as a result of it being unsafe to apply to their pets.*fn1
A.Motion to Dismiss Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The moving party bears the burden of showing that no claim has been stated, Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005), and dismissal is appropriate only if, accepting all of the facts alleged in the complaint as true,*fn2 the plaintiff has failed to plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Serv., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008). Although a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, "a plaintiff‟s obligation to provide the "grounds‟ of his "entitlement to relief‟ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, the factual allegations must be sufficient to raise a plaintiff‟s right to relief above a speculative level, see id. at 570, such that the court may "draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). While "[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement‟ ... it asks for more than a sheer possibility..." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (2009).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider "undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff‟s claims are based on the [attached] document[s]." Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, "documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered." Pryor v. Nat'l Coll. Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002).
B.Choice of Law Principles
Since Plaintiffs‟ claims are all based on state law, at the outset the Court must determine which law to apply to Plaintiffs‟ claims. New Jersey‟s choice of law rules apply, as a federal court sitting in diversity must apply the forum state‟s choice of law rules. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 383 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). New Jersey has adopted the "most significant relationship" test of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws.
P. V. v. Camp Jaycee, 197 N.J. 132, 142-43, 962 A.2d 453 (2008).*fn3 This analysis, which must be performed on an issue-by-issue basis, is a two-step process. Id. at 143. The first step is to determine whether an actual conflict of law exists, for if no conflict exists, the law of the forum state applies. Id. Second, if a conflict does exist, the Court must determine which state has the "most significant relationship" to the claim, by "weigh[ing] the factors set forth in the Restatement section corresponding to the ...