The opinion of the court was delivered by: Robert B. Kugler, United States District Judge
This matter comes before this Court upon the Clerk's receipt of two groups of submissions; both submissions were made on behalf of the same entity named as the plaintiff. See Murakush Caliphates of Amexem v. State of New Jersey ("Instant Matter"), Civ. Action No. 11-1317, and Murakush Caliphate of Amexem Inc. v. Simandle ("Caliphate"), Civ. Action No. 11-1316 (MLC). The Instant Matter was assigned to the undersigned. The initial submissions made in the Instant Matter consisted of six documents, see Instant Matter, Docket Entries Nos. 1, 1-1 to 1-4, and 2, with the document titled "Complaint" being the first in the package, see Docket Entry No. 1; these submissions were followed by a letter and prepayment of a filing fee. See Docket Entry No. 3 and Docket Entry of May 12, 2011. For the reasons expressed below: (a) the Complaint will be dismissed; and (b) limited orders of preclusion will be entered against the natural persons who executed the submissions in the Instant Matter and Caliphate, their associates and juridical entities actually registered or fathomed by these persons.
Since neither the content of the submissions at bar nor this Court's decision to issue limited orders of preclusion could be duly appreciated without a careful discussion of background of the Instant Matter and Caliphate, the Court finds it warranted to begin this Opinion with an outline of pertinent umbrella issues and specific facts implicated in this case.
A. MOORISH AND REDEMPTIONIST MOVEMENTS
Two concepts, which may or may not operate as interrelated, color the issues at hand. One of these concepts underlies the ethnic/religious identification movement of certain groups of individuals who refer to themselves as "Moors," while the other concept provides the basis for another movement of certain groups of individuals, which frequently produces these individuals' denouncement of United States citizenship, self-declaration of other, imaginary "citizenship" and accompanying self-declaration of equally imaginary "diplomatic immunity."
In 1998, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit -- being one of the first courts to detail the concept of Moorish movement, observed as follows:
[The Moorish Science Temple of America is a] black Islamic sect . . ..
[T]hree-fourths of its temples (congregations) are inside prisons. The Moors, as adherents to the Moorish Science Temple are called, have their own version of the Koran and a list of prophets that includes, in addition to the prophets recognized by orthodox Islam, Buddha, Confucius, and the founder . . . of the Moorish Science Temple . . . . Two groups vie for leadership of the sect: one in Mt. Clemens, Michigan, headed by [someone referred to as] Grand Sheik/Moderator Brother R. Love-El, and one in St. Louis headed by [someone referred to as] Grand Sheik Jerry Lewis-Bey. (The suffixes "El" and "Bey" refer to the African tribes from which the Moors believe black people are descended.)
2. "Redemptionism," "Paper Terrorism" and Related Concepts
Shortly after the concept of the Moorish movement was outlined by the Seventh Circuit, discussions of another movement appeared on the pages of legal opinions issued by the federal judiciary; that other movement was dubbed a "sovereign citizenship" movement. This movement was fostered by a loosely organized collection of groups and individuals who have adopted a right-wing anarchist ideology originating in the theories of a group called the Posse Comitatus in the 1970s. Its adherents believe that virtually all existing government in the United States is illegitimate . . . . [Therefore, such] "sovereign citizens" wage war against the government and other forms of authority using "paper terrorism" harassment and intimidation tactics, and occasionally resorting to [physical] violence.
Sovereign Citizen Movement, Anti-Defamation League, at http://www.adl.org/Learn/ext_us/ SCM.asp?LEARN_Cat=Extremism&LEARN_SubCat=Extremism_in_America&xpicked=4&ite m=sov (visited on Mar. 31, 2011).*fn2
Consequently, a decade after the Seventh Circuit's issuance of Bey v. Lane, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted a stream of government actions aimed at controlling the "paper terrorism" activities of sovereign citizens, which -- by then -- matured into a wide-spread criminal scheme, where the scheme participants' "self-legitimized" their names for the purposes of initiating fraudulent legal transactions. The Court of Appeals explained:
Evidently, [adherents of this scheme have been] filing [fraudulent] financing statements under Article 9 of the UCC, which sets forth a process for perfecting security interests in property. These liens and judgments, accessible on financing statement forms, are easy to file. Once registered, however, the fraudulent liens are very burdensome to remove. For example, in a New Jersey incident, [one group] registered a fraudulent $14.5 million lien with the New Jersey Department of Revenue against a federal prosecutor and a $3.5 million lien against a federal judge for using [the group participants'] "copyrighted" names in court papers and hearings . . . . [Adherents of this scheme] have filed these commercial liens with state departments of revenue, departments of state, or other the state agencies responsible for receiving and recording these financial instruments. Further investigation revealed that various publications were advocating the exploitation of the UCC filing process and provided explicit instructions on how to perfect these fraudulent security interests, including sample financing statements forms. [These publications built on] the "Redemptionist" theory, which propounds that a person has a split personality: a real person and a fictional person called the "strawman." . . . Redemptionists claim that government has power only over the strawman and not over the live person, who remains free [and, thus,] individuals can free themselves by filing UCC financing statements, thereby acquiring an interest in their strawman. Thereafter, [pursuant to this "theory,"] the real person can demand that government officials pay enormous sums of money to use the strawman's name or, in the case of prisoners, to keep him in custody. If government officials refuse, [adherents of this scheme] file liens against [government officials] . Adherents of this scheme also advocate that [they] copyright their names to justify filing liens against officials using their names in public records such as indictments or court papers.
Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 203 and nn. 3 and 4 (3d Cir. 2008); accord Roche, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 5773, at 2 (noting that the "sovereign citizen" litigant elected to present the district court's dismissal of his petition as a "contract" between the court and the litigant).
The "strawman" concept is, occasionally, presented/exploited somewhat differently by those redemptionists who claim that -- at the moment of their (self-)denouncement of United States citizenship and/or their accompanying self-grant of imaginary alternative citizenship -- their "strawman" incarnation became "deceased," and their live persons quasi-expatriated from the U.S. (while continuing their actual physical residence in the United States). In connection with this quasi-deceased/expatriation scheme, such redemptionists claim that their live persons:
(a) hold "estates" in the form of actual physical bodies of their respective "quasi-deceased" strawmen;*fn3 and (b) reside in geographic locales they "self-claimed away" from the United States to "self-declare" them territories of the ancient Sultanate of Morocco (or territories over which the ancient Sultanate of Morocco should have control roughly similar to that of suzerainty).
3. Interplay Between Moorish and Sovereign Citizenship Movements
It does not appear that one's Moorish ethnic roots (or Moorish religious convictions, or both) have any reason to go hand-in-hand with one's adhesion to the sovereign citizenship movement (or with one's professing the theory of redemptionism, or with one's practice of "paper terrorism," claims of self- granted "diplomatic immunity," etc.). However, and unfortunately enough, certain groups of individuals began merging these concepts by building on their alleged ancestry in ancient Moors (and/or on their alleged or actual adhesion to Moorish religious convictions) for the purposes of committing criminal offenses and/or initiating frivolous legal actions on the grounds of their self-granted "diplomatic immunity," which these individuals deduce either from their self-granted "Moorish citizenship" and from their correspondingly-produced homemade "Moorish" documents (or from correspondingly-obtained "world passports") or from a multitude of other, equally non-cognizable under the law, bases, which these individuals keep creating in order to support their allegations of "diplomatic immunity."*fn4
B. PRIOR "MARRAKUSH" LITIGATIONS IN THIS AND OTHER COURTS
1. Marrakush Society Cases and Other Courts' Actions Detected in 2009
During May, June and July of 2009, nineteen actions (hereinafter, collectively, "Marrakush Society Cases") were initiated in this District, all naming as the plaintiff -- or implicating, directly or indirectly -- a certain entity designated as the "Marrakush Society." See Marrakush Society v. Township of Newfield, Civil Action No. 09-3591 (D.N.J.) (initiated on July 20, 2009); Marrakush Society v. Township of New Jersey State Police, Civil Action No. 09-3590 (D.N.J.) (initiated on July 20 2009); Marrakush Society v. Township of Vineland, Civil Action No. 09-3589 (D.N.J.) (initiated on July 20, 2009); Marrakush Society v. Township of Willingboro, Civil Action No. 09-3392 (D.N.J.) (initiated on July 10, 2009); El. v. Cox, Civil Action No. 09-3372 (D.N.J.) (initiated on July 10, 2009); El. v. Cox, Civil Action No. 09-3371 (D.N.J.) (initiated on July 6, 2009); Marrakush Society v. Township of Mount Laurel, Civil Action No. 09-3507 (D.N.J.) (initiated on June 5, 2009); Marrakush Society v. Superior Court of New Jersey, Civil Action No. 09-3506 (D.N.J.) (initiated on June 5, 2009); Marrakush Society v. Township of Mansfield, Civil Action No. 09-3505 (D.N.J.) (initiated on June 5, 2009); Marrakush Society v. Burlington County Jail, Civil Action No. 09-3504 (D.N.J.) (initiated on June 5, 2009); Marrakush Society v. Township of Willingboro, Civil Action No. 09-3503
Opinion for the Solicitor General of June 12, 2000, . . . ; Marks v. Esperdy, 315 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1963) . . . ; and (b) even if the Court were to hypothesize that Plaintiffs duly expatriated, the fact of expatriation has no effect on the state court's jurisdiction to conduct Plaintiffs' criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Cohen v. Little Six, Inc., 543 N.W.2d 376 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); see also Cara S. O'Driscoll, The Execution of Foreign Nationals in Arizona, 32 Ariz. St. L.J. 323 (2000); [accord] Casanova v. Fitzpatrick, 214 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) . . . . (D.N.J.) (initiated on June 5, 2009); Marrakush Society v. Township of Pennsville, Civil Action No. 09-3502 (D.N.J.) (initiated on June 5, 2009); Marrakush Society v. Township of Westampton, Civil Action No. 09-3442 (D.N.J.) (initiated on June 5, 2009); Marrakush Society v. Township of Westampton, Civil Action No. 09-3441 (D.N.J.) (initiated on July 5, 2009); Marrakush Society v. Township of Willingboro, Civil Action No. 09-2522 (D.N.J.) (initiated on May 22, 2009); Marrakush Society v. Township of Westampton, Civil Action No. 09-2521 (D.N.J.) (initiated on May 22, 2009); Marrakush Society v. Township of Mount Laurel, Civil Action No. 09-2520 (D.N.J.) (initiated on May 22, 2009); Marrakush Society v. Township of Pennsville, Civil Action No. 09-2519 (D.N.J.) (initiated on May 22, 2009); and Marrakush Society v. New Jersey State Police, Civil Action No. 09-2518 (D.N.J.) (initiated on May 22, 2009). The Marrakush Society Cases were assigned to Judge Jerome B. Simandle ("Judge Simandle"). Accord Local Civ. R. 40.1(c) (directing assignment of related cases to the same judge in order to prevent undue judge-shopping by proliferating litigants). Two actions among the Marrakush Society Cases were styled as habeas matters, while the remaining seventeen were purporting to present civil rights litigation.
Commencement of the Marrakush Society Cases in this District coincided, time-wise, with initiation of analogous matters in the United States District Courts for the Southern District of Florida, Eastern District of New York, District of Delaware and, perhaps, other district courts. See, e.g., Aboriginal Law Firm v. Bock (Florida Action - I"), Civil Action No. 09-80067 (DTKH) (S.D. Fla.), (initiated on January 20, 2009); El v. State of Delaware ("Delaware Action"), Civil Action No. 09-00144 (SLR) (D. Del.) (initiated on March 5, 2009); Marrakush Society v. City of Hollywood, Inc. ("Florida Action - II "), Civil Action No. 09-60828 (ASG) (S.D. Fla.) (initiated on June 3, 2009); Marrakush Society v. Broward Sheriff's Office ("Florida Action - III "), Civil Action No. 09-60829 (ASG) (S.D. Fla.) (initiated on June 3, 2009); Inter-Continental Aboriginal Union Marrakush Society v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc. ("Florida Action - IV "), Civil Action No. 09-60830 (ASG) (S.D. Fla.) (initiated on June 3, 2009); Inter-Continental Aboriginal Union Marrakush Society v. The Washington Post Company, ("Florida Action - V "), Civil Action No. 09-60831 (UU) (S.D. Fla.) (initiated on June 3, 2009); Marrakush Society v. City of Dania Beach, Inc. ("Florida Action - VI "), Civil Action No. 09-60866 (WPD) (S.D. Fla.) (initiated on June 9, 2009); and In re El ("New York Action "), Civil Action No. 09-406 (E.D.N.Y) (initiated on June 26, 2009).
On July 30, 2009, Judge Simandle issued an order ("Marrakush-Order") and accompanying opinion ("Marrakush-Opinion") addressing the entirety of the Marrakush Society Cases. See, e.g., Marrakush Society v. Township of Newfield, Civil Action No. 09-3591 (D.N.J.), Docket Entries Nos. 3 and 4 (replicating Marrakush-Order and Marrakush-Opinion in the docket entries); see also Marrakush Soc'y v. N.J. State Police, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68057, at *134-48 (D.N.J. July 30, 2009) (replicating the text of Marrakush-Order online); see id. at *3-134 (replicating the text of Marrakush-Opinion online).
a. Plaintiff(s)/Petitioner(s) in the Marrakush Society Cases
The submissions made in the Marrakush Society Cases were signed by three litigants. One of these litigants referred to himself as "Noble Emer Shyaam M.K. El" ("M.K."), another referred to himself as "Noble Emer Shyaam K.S. El" ("K.S"), and the third one referred to himself as "Universal Supreme Allah Bey" ("Bey").*fn5
Moreover, in their submissions, these litigants made frequent assertions that they: (a) were representing the interests of their juridical entity, i.e., the "Marrakush Society"; and (b) were represented by legal counsel in the form of so-called Aboriginal Law Firm ("Aboriginal Law Firm").
Addressing the litigants' references to the "Marrakush Society" and "Aboriginal Law Firm," Judge Simandle noted that:
a. it was unclear from the face of the pleadings submitted in the Marrakush Society Cases whether the Marrakush Society was an actual juridical entity or a social group of individuals, although it was certain that this group maintained a social webpage, which:
(i) asserted that the Marrakush Society was located at "Marankokush Principality, Timbuctoo Territory, Samal Shariq, MA," a non-existing geographic designation;
(ii) was adorned with images of and references to different Middle Eastern and North and Western African antique symbols, architectural monuments and medieval geo-political bodies, such as Egyptian "Eye of Ra," Malian Sankore Mosque, ancient city of Marrakesh, etc.; and
(iii) utilized Arabic terminology, frequently distorted in its English transcription. See Marrakush Soc'y, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68057, at *6-10.
b. the "Aboriginal Law Firm," an entity not registered with the Office of Attorney Ethics ("OAE") as a provider of legal services in the State of New Jersey, also maintained social webpages (adorned, inter alia, with Themis' blind-folded head impaled on the Scales of Justice and the symbol of the Moorish Science Temple of America). On these webpages, the Aboriginal Law Firm advertised its "services," which included seemingly lawyerly tasks (such as corporate dissolution), tasks that could not be performed by any private legal practitioner (such as execution of "Notices to the Bar," "Baptismal Records," "Federal Criminal Complaints," etc.) and tasks that made no sense whatsoever (such as execution of "Nationality Proclamations," "Records of Aboriginality," "National and International Bills of Exchange," "Certificates of Nativity," etc.). See id. at 10-21.
b. Mode of Submissions Made in the Marrakush Society Cases
Since the "Aboriginal Law Firm" was not a legal counsel duly admitted to practice, M.K., K.S. and Bey made pro se appearances on behalf of both the Marrakush Society and Aboriginal Law Firm and, in addition, applied for in forma pauperis status of behalf of these questionably existing juridical entities. In conjunction with these applications, M.K., K.S. and Bey submitted for filing in the nineteen Marrakush Society Cases:
a. over four dozen pleadings,*fn6 discussing M.K., K.S. and Bey's classification of ethnicities within the black race; these statements were heavily peppered by references to the Barbary Treaties, United Nations documents, United States Constitution, United States Supreme Court Justices, the FBI, United States President, etc., and
b. dozens of copies of such documents as the Barbary Treaties, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, etc., and, also
c. hundreds of pages of homemade quasi-documents, bearing such titles as "records certifications by body custodian," "trademark notices," "verified declarations in the nature of an affidavit of truth in commerce, and contract for waiver of tort/trademark notice/affidavit of fact," "All Rights to Travel Reserved," "criminal complaint warrants," "color of law - misconduct complaint" warrants, "civil application - misconduct complaint" warrants, "trade dress infringement civil action warrants," "civil action-trade dress infringement-complaint-warrants," etc., and, still in addition to the above, d. flocks of apostles certifying unspecified documents, hand-made sketches resembling the Hobo-Dyre Equal Area Projection map,*fn7 and analogous incomprehensible paperwork. All these submissions were heavily laden with Arabic and quasi-Arabic terminology, designations of geographic locales composed merely of Earth coordinates combined with references to imaginary "principalities" and "territories," Hijri calendar dates,*fn8 and riddle-like, self-created "Marrakush" argot.*fn9 Providing an example of one of such "complaints" incorporated in these submissions, Judge Simandle quoted the following excerpt:
On the Twenty Seventh day of Shawwal, in the year One Thousand Four Hundred and Twenty Nine, Murakush calendar, . . . between 2100 Hours and 0200 Hours, I was accosted while traveling North East in a Mobile Vessel, within the Marankokush Principality, in the Timbuctoo Territory, of the Samal Shariq Abeka Region, Samal Marika, at approximately between Earth Coordinates 40 [degrees] 2'41.83"N. 74[E] 50'3.44"W, and 40[E] 7'17.16"N. 74[E] 43'8.09"W; at a Sea Level of approximately 15.24 Meters, to 21.336 Meters, by an unidentified STATE OF NEW JERSEY Driver and Agent for the Defendant the NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE for the Defendant the STATE Of NEW JERSEY (Herein after referred to as JOHN DOE). JOHN DOE engaged the Mobile Vessel I was commandeering, and demanded to see a "Drivers License, Registration, and Insurance Card". I presented JOHN DOE with a World Service Administration Passport, issued from World Service Authority; relative to my Identification, and Insurance and Registration of the Mobile Vessel, I was traveling in. I asked JOHN DOE "what is the probable cause?" JOHN DOE stated that the probable cause for interrupting my travels was that he believed he saw me talking on a Cellular Telecommunication Device. JOHN DOE maneuvered his way to the Vessel or conveyance he was driving, along with the Instruments that I presented to him. JOHN DOE returned in the Mobile Vessel or Conveyance that I was commandeering, and said "step out of the car." I replied "what for"? JOHN DOE replied "step out of the car sir." Under Threat, Duress, and Coercion I exited the Mobile Vessel for the reason and purpose of not being physically harmed, battered and abused. Upon exiting the Mobile Vessel, JOHN DOE, and another unidentified agent for the Defendant the NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE, grabbed the arms of my Solar Vessel and chained the Carpomedicarpols of my Solar Vessel together. My Solar Vessel was trafficked to the right side of a Vessel or conveyance, bearing the Corporate Name "NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE". While being harbored on the right side of the Vessel or conveyance bearing the Corporate Name "NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE" I asked JOHN DOE why he was arresting me? He stated that there was a warrant under the "Name" Shyaam and began to use his hands to examine the pockets attached to the trousers and coat covering my Solar Vessel. He also used his hands to examine the Indigenous genital areas of my Solar Vessel. Upon completion of his examination, my Solar Vessel was then forced into the back of a Vessel or conveyance bearing the Corporate Name "NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE", and trafficked to a fixture being administered by the Defendant the NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE: domiciled within the Shecabee Principality in the Zankikan Territory, of the Samal Shariq Abeka Region; Samal Marika. at approximalely Earth Coordinates: 40[E] 8'59.78"N. 74[E] 42'2.49"W at a Sea Level of approximately 18.8976 Meters. My Solar Vessel was trafficked to a room within the fixture being administered by the Defendant the NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE. The Carpomedicarpols of my Solar Vessel were chained, and shackled to a small wooded rail within this room. Soon after, JOHN DOE used his hands in examine the clothing on my Solar Vessel, and the Indigenous genital areas of my Solar Vessel again without my consent. After a few minutes JOHN DOE entered the small room, and gave me a small carded instrument to read. He demanded that I read it. I declined, and then he exited the room. I sat on the wooded rail . . . and then my Solar Vessel was trafficked to a fixture domiciled within the Marankokush Principality, in the Timbuctoo Territory, of the Samal Shariq Abeka Region, Samal Marika, at Earth Coordinates: 39[E] 59'45.73"N, 74[E] 4727.25"W; at a Sea Level of precisely 10.0584 Meters, being administered by the BURLINGTON COUNTY JAIL or BURLINGTON COUNTY DETENTION CENTER.*fn10
Marrakush Soc'y, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68057, at *72-75 (punctuation and capitalization preserved from the original Marrakush Society Cases submission).
c. Judge Simandle's Determinations
As noted supra, Judge Simandle dismissed the entire compilation of the Marrakush Society Cases; duplicative submissions were dismissed with prejudice, while all others were dismissed with leave to cure their respective deficiencies.
Detailing these deficiencies, Judge Simandle first took judicial notice of the submissions made and rulings entered in the New York Action, Delaware Action and Florida Actions - I to
VI. See Marrakush Soc'y, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68057, at *25-50 (extensively detailing systemic abuses of the federal legal system by M.K. and other persons, who referred to themselves as "the Aboriginal Indigenous Grand Sheik, Ambassador, and Consular of the Marrakush Science Temple, of the Timucua Principality of the Tekesta Territory, Noble Emer A.M. El," "Sheik Shaman Raz Amun Ra El," "High Priestess Empress T.M. El Bey," etc. and who also asserted that, in addition to acting on behalf of the Marrakush Society, they were also representing a certain "Intercontinental Aboriginal Union");*fn11 accord Jackson v. Broad. Music, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3960, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2006) ("the court may take judicial notice of public records[,] . . . pleadings and other documents . . . filed by a party in other judicial proceedings"). After deciphering, wherever possible, the gist of the Marrakush Society's claims, see Marrakush Soc'y, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68057, at *50-85, Judge Simandle concluded as follows:
The . . . submissions made in the [Marrakush Society Cases] suffer of numerous deficiencies. For instance, in complete disregard of the guidance provided to [these litigants] by the judges in the Southern District of Florida, [they] keep filing their civil complaints naming the Marrakush Society as the plaintiff but without submission of filing fees: they substitute the filing fees with in forma pauperis applications of private persons. . . . Furthermore, all applications are submitted on the letterhead or with a reference to the Aboriginal Law Firm, creating an impression that the Aboriginal Law Firm is the [litigants'] counsel. However, notices of appearance by attorneys actually admitted to the bar and to practice before this Court have not been submitted, and the information released by the Aboriginal Law Firm in public domain causes substantial doubts even as to the legitimacy of the Aboriginal Law Firm as a juridical entity. . . . Additional concerns are raised by the Marrakush Society's allegations that assert claims of third parties. Moreover, a number of actions at hand contains . . . up to fourteen . . . sets of pleadings, in violation of Local Rule 7 (specifying that an action must be commenced by the filing of "a" complaint, in singular). Furthermore, even if these complaints are construed as parts of the same submission, they fail to meet the requirements posed by Rules 18 and 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. . . . In addition, the civil complaints docketed in these matters systemically seek arrest of the defendants and initiation of criminal proceedings against them. Finally, the complaints are executed in a nearly incomprehensible made-up, foreign and obscure language, contain factless self-serving conclusory statements and fail to meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8 (even though these requirements were explained and re-explained to [these litigants] by the Southern District of Florida) . . . . In light of the foregoing, the Court finds it useful to provide [these litigants] with guidance as to the aforesaid deficiencies in order to: (a) allow [them] an opportunity to cure their legal practices; and (b) to put [them] on notice of what the courts expect from their legal submissions and the likely dire consequences of [their] failure to meet these expectations.
Toward that end, Judge Simandle provided M.K., K.S., Bey, the Marrakush Society, Aboriginal Law Firm and their associates with an explanation that:
a. a juridical entity, such as the Marrakush Society or Aboriginal Law Firm, cannot prosecute a legal action while appearing in forma pauperis. See id. at *88-92 and nn. 43-45 (noting that this point had already been clarified to these litigants six times over by other federal district courts but stressing that the litigants who are impoverished natural persons may apply for in forma pauperis status);
b. "[s]ince [these litigants] were already [explained] by the judges in the Southern District of Florida that any juridical entity (meaning, any fictitious/artificial/legal person) cannot appear in legal proceedings pro se, [Judge Simandle's] repetition of the same point [would be] trite at best." See id. at *93-96 and n. 46 (expressly pointing out that the Marrakush Society, Aboriginal Law Firm or any other juridical entity "must -- if they desire to litigate -- obtain a duly admitted attorney as their legal counsel to commence an action. While, in some limited circumstances, the Court can appoint a pro bono counsel to represent a litigant in a civil matter, such appointment is not available to [juridical entities] because . . . these 'entities' [cannot] qualify for in forma pauperis status) (citing United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 958 (1982));
c. "[i]n order to be a litigant in legal proceedings, the litigant -- regardless of whether it is a juridical entity or a natural person -- must . . . have standing to sue." Id. at *96-102 and nn. 47-48 (detailing the roots of the "standing to sue" concept in the Article III and also expressly spelling out that "the Court is not required to guess the identity of a plaintiff, since Local Rule[s] require that the initial pleading 'shall state in the first paragraph the street and post office address of each named party to the case or, if the party is not a natural person, the address of its principal place of business," and "[a] complaint that supplies a pseudonym for a party or a nonsensical address for that party (or for the party's counsel) does not meet these simple requirements and cannot be filed") (quoting Local Civil Rule 10.1(a));
d. the rigorous requirements of the "next friend" doctrine create a very "narrow exception to the 'case or controversy' requirement set forth in the Article III of Constitution." Id. at 103-04 (detailing the two-prong jus tertii test articulated in Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154-55 (1990));
e. additional limitations are imposed by Rule 18 upon a plaintiff's ability to join claims, and this requirement is preceded by the transactional-relation requirement of Rule 20. See id. at *104-09 (detailing the gist and quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 18 and 20, as also quoting the guidance provided in George v. Smith, 507 F. 3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007));
f. the pleading requirements of Rule 8, as elaborated upon in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), obligate the plaintiff to submit a clear and concise statement of facts showing he/she/it is entitled to relief. See Marrakush Soc'y, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68057, at *110-21 (detailing, inter alia, general pleading requirements as well as requirements with regard to pleading claims against municipalities and supervising officials); and
g. "[i]t is well within the broad scope of the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), for a district court to issue an order restricting the filing of meritless cases by a litigant whose manifold complaints aim to subject defendants to unwarranted harassment, and raise concern for maintaining order in the court's dockets." Id. at 131-33 (explaining, in no ambiguous terms, that litigants cannot abuse legal process through means of recreation litigation). Judge Simandle concluded his discussion by stating:
The Court . . . strongly urges [these litigants] to treat their future litigations in this District (and in other courts) with utmost seriousness. This [District] will not tolerate frivolous litigation that wastes judicial resources. While the Court will give [these litigants'] instant applications the benefit of the doubt and will administratively terminate the actions commenced by [them] with leave to have [some] of these matters reopened upon submission of proper documents, [this District] will deem [these litigants] charged with knowledge of all legal guidance provided to [them] in [the Marrakush-Opinion] and the guidance provided to the [them] by the judges in the Southern District of Florida. The Court expressly warns [these litigants] that any future abuse of legal process (be it with regard the matters currently before the Court or with regard to any other action [they] commence in this District) would trigger sanctions and/or an imposition of severe limitations on the ability to file a case in the future.
d. Judgment Entered in the Marrakush Society Cases
Upon providing M.K., K.S. and Bey with the above-summarized guidance, Judge Simandle issued the Marrakush-Order, pursuant to which:
a. El. v. Cox, Civil Action No. 09-3372 (N.J.D.), was administratively terminated without leave to reopen, as duplicative of the matter El. v. Cox, Civil Action No. 09-3371 (N.J.D.);
b. El. v. Cox, Civil Action No. 09-3371 (N.J.D.), was administratively terminated with leave to amend;
c. Marrakush Society v. Township of Willingboro, Civil Action No. 09-2522 (N.J.D.), was administratively terminated with leave to amend as to the first complaint out of the nine complaints submitted in that matter, while the remaining complaints were dismissed as duplicative of those filed in other Marrakush Society Cases;
d. Marrakush Society v. Township of Willingboro, Civil Action No. 09-3503 (N.J.D.), was administratively terminated with leave to amend as to the eighth complaint out of the fourteen complaints submitted in that matter, while the remaining complaints were dismissed as duplicative of those filed in other Marrakush Society Cases;
e. Marrakush Society v. Township of Westampton, Civil Action No. 09-25219 (N.J.D.), was administratively terminated with leave to amend as to the first complaint out of the two complaints submitted in that matter, while the second complaint was dismissed as duplicative of its numerous replications filed in other Marrakush Society Cases;
f. Marrakush Society v. Township of Westampton, Civil Action No. 09-3441 (N.J.D.), was administratively terminated without leave to amend, as duplicative of the first complaint submitted in Marrakush Society v. Township of Westampton, Civil Action No. 09-2521 (N.J.D.);
g. Marrakush Society v. Township of Pennsville, Civil Action No. 09-3502 (N.J.D.), was administratively terminated without leave to amend, as duplicative of the first complaint submitted in Marrakush Society v. Township of Pennsville, Civil Action No. 09-2519 (N.J.D.);
h. Marrakush Society v. Township of Westampton, Civil Action No. 09-2521 (N.J.D.), was administratively terminated with leave to amend as to the second complaint submitted in that matter, while the remaining complaints were dismissed as duplicative of those filed in other Marrakush Society Cases;
i. Marrakush Society v.Township of Mansfield, Civil Action No. 09-3505 (N.J.D.), was administratively terminated without leave to amend, as duplicative of Marrakush Society v. New Jersey State Police, Civil Action No. 09-2518 (N.J.D.);
j. Marrakush Society v. New Jersey State Police, Civil Action No. 09-2518 (N.J.D.); Marrakush Society v. Township of Pennsville, Civil Action No. 09-2519 (N.J.D.); Marrakush Society v. Township of Willingboro, Civil Action No. 09-3392 (N.J.D.); Marrakush Society v. Township of Westampton, Civil Action No. 09-3442 (N.J.D.); Marrakush Society v. Burlington County Jail, Civil Action No. 09-3504 (N.J.D.); Marrakush Society v. Superior Court of New Jersey, Civil Action No. 09-3506 (N.J.D.); Marrakush Society v. Township of Mount Laurel, Civil Action No. 09-3507 (N.J.D.); Marrakush Society v. Township of Vineland, Civil Action No. 09-3589 (N.J.D.); Marrakush Society v. Township of New Jersey State Police, Civil Action No. 09-3590 (N.J.D.); and Marrakush Society v. Township of Newfield, Civil Action No. 09-3591 (N.J.D.), were administratively terminated with leave to amend; and
k. the Marrakush Society and/or the Aboriginal Law Firm could have their cases reopened upon submission of: (i) a filing fee of $350; (ii) a clear and concise complaint, executed by (iii) legal counsel duly admitted to appear in this District, while
l. natural persons like M.K., K.S. and Bey could have their cases reopened upon timely submission of: (i) either a duly executed application to proceed in forma pauperis or filing fee of $350; and (ii) a clear and concise complaint, signed by the plaintiff(s) pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and requirements of the Local Rules.
See Marrakush-Order (also directing complimentary service of the Marrakush-Opinion on the OAE and other district courts affected by the Marrakush Society/Aboriginal Law Firms actions).
As noted supra, Judge Simandle's decision was entered on July 30, 2009. No submissions of in forma pauperis applications or amended pleadings, appearances of counsel, prepayment of filing fee etc., were ever made in the Marrakish Society Cases. Rather, all leaves to amend provided-for in the Marrakush-Order expired unused at the end of August 2009, about a year and a half prior to initiation of the Instant Matter and Califate proceedings.
2. The Estate Case and Another Court's Action Detected in 2009
Just ten days after Judge Simandle's issuance of the Marrakush-Opinion and accompanying Marrakush-Order, the Clerk received another submission from "Divine Minister Plenipotentiary Noble Emer" M.K. See Estate of Brandon Casimir v. State of New Jersey ("Estate Case"), Civil Action No. 09-4004 (N.J.D.). In addition to M.K., three other litigants were named as plaintiffs in that submission, one of these litigants was referred to as "Divine Minister Plenipotentiary Noble Emer Kernel C. El," while the two others were referred to as "Estate of Brandon Casimir, Expatriate Decedent" and "Estate of Cornell Hall/Dixon, Expatriate Decedent."*fn12 See id.
The submission: (a) indicated M.K. and K.C.'s interest in removal of their then-pending state criminal proceedings to this District;*fn13 (b) included K.C.'s application to proceed in forma pauperis; but (c) simultaneously asserted that the State of New Jersey and townships of Mount Laurel and Willingboro owed K.C. $60 million. Substantively, the submission made in the Estate Case mirrored those made in Thompson v. Delaware, 09-00446 (SLR) (D. Del.) ("Delaware Action-II"), where M.K. and K.C. also sought removal of their, seemingly different, state-court criminal prosecution to the United States District Court for the District of Delaware.
Same as Judge Robinson of the District of Delaware in the Delaware Action-II, Judge Simandle denied K.S. and M.C.' application for removal, re-explaining once again that:
a. fictitious aliases unassociated with actual names and actual addresses cannot be litigants since "a name is not an entity that can initiate a legal suit." Estate of Casimir v. New Jersey, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78113, at *8-9 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2009) (citing Marrakush Cases, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68057, at *96-102 (citing, in turn, Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378-79 (1992), and Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004)));
b. fictitious "estates of decedents" similarly cannot be litigants since their existence is not supported by a finding of probate court, which is needed to give these "estate" juridical existence, and -- in any event -- the physical body of a decedent cannot be the subject of any "estate." See id. at *9;
c. a juridical entity cannot proceed in a legal matter pro se. See id. at 10; and
d. juridical entities cannot proceed in forma pauperis. See id. at *11. Estate of Casimir, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78113, at *8-12.
Upon so re-explaining, Judge Simandle turned to K.S. and M.C.' application for removal, denied it on various procedural and jurisdictional grounds, and remanded the Estate Case to the state courts, while observing that M.K. and K.C.'s "Notice of Removal amounts to a sham pleading filed in disregard of well-settled legal principles." See id. at *12-22.
II. CURRENT ROUND OF SUBMISSIONS
The submissions the Instant Matter and Califate were made of the same date, i.e., March 8, 2011, and were largely analogous as far as the content of initial packages was concerned.
A. CONTENT OF THE SUBMISSIONS MADE IN THE INSTANT MATTER
Six documents were initially submitted in the Instant Matter, all asserting that "Murakush Caliphates of Amexem" ("Murakush-Amexem") is the sole plaintiff in this action. Only four of these documents conveyed any meaning: the "Complaint," application to proceed without prepayment of filing fee, motion for appointment of pro bono counsel and "Order" directing injunctive relief.
a. Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Filing Fee
Murakush-Amexem's application to proceed in the Instant Matter without prepayment of filing fee read, in relevant part, as follows:
I, Caliph: Shyaam M. K. El am the Chief Executive Officer of the plaintiff in the above entitled case. This is a motion to proceed without being required to prepay fees or cost . . . .
1. Presently I, the Ministers, and Members of the Murakush Caliphate currently does not receive any salary for the discharge of our duties and obligations as Ministers and Members of the Murakush Caliphate of Amexem.
6. The past incarcerations of many members of this entity are a circumstance this court should ...