The opinion of the court was delivered by: Wolfson, United States District Judge
Presently before this Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), and in the alternative, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff Diane Nelligan ("Plaintiff") alleges in her Complaint that individual defendants James Kirchmeyer, Stephen Oliver,*fn1 Douglas Vincent and Mark Chapin (hereinafter "Defendants") engaged in actions that violate: (1) the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. §206(d); (2) the retaliation provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §215(a)(3); (3) the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.8; and (4) the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et. seq. She further alleges that these individual defendants aided and abetted their former, now-defunct employer, Zaoi, Inc., in discriminating against her. Lastly, Plaintiff brings a "breach of contract/promissory estoppel" claim. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss due to lack of personal jurisdiction over the Defendants.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
Plaintiff is, and was at all relevant times, a resident of the State
of New Jersey. (Compl. ¶
1). Plaintiff was hired by Zaio Inc.*fn2 in April
2007 as a consultant on a trial basis, and was offered a permanent
position as Director in or around June 2007. Id. at ¶ 16-18. As
Director, Plaintiff received an annual salary of $80,000, plus 4%
sales commission. Id. at ¶ 18. Defendants are all former employees of
Zaio Inc., and reside in different states: James Kirchmeyer
("Kirchmeyer") is a resident of the State of New York; Douglas Vincent
("Vincent") is a resident of the State of Texas; Mark Chapin
("Chapin") is a resident of the State of California; and Stephen
Oliver ("Oliver") is a resident of the State of Florida. Id.at ¶ 4-9.
Plaintiff claims that all four Defendants exercised supervisory
authority over her during her employment with Zaio.*fn3
Id.at ¶ 4-9.
The Court notes that Plaintiff's Complaint speaks in generalities by claiming throughout that "Defendants," rather than individual defendants, engaged in certain conduct. However, Plaintiff's Complaint does allege that during her time with Zaio, she was: (1) not a member of the executive or senior management team, and was excluded from senior level team building meetings despite her title of Director; (2) compensated less than her male subordinate; (3) promised an annual bonus of $20,000 that she never received; (4) "harassed, discriminated, and retaliated against" when she was removed from her position as Director and demoted to an inferior position; and (5) "harassed, discriminated, and retaliated against" when she was terminated in or around September 2008. Id. at ¶ 33-35.
After Plaintiff filed her initial Complaint, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(2), or in the alternative, pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). Subsequently, Defendants filed a declaration accompanied by Defendants' individual affidavits in support of the present motion. Plaintiff then filed Opposition, accompanied by a Certification of Diane Nelligan on July 6, 2010. The Court now rules upon Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and, accordingly, does not reach Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
The present motion challenges whether this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Once challenged, a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction. General Elec. Co. v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 150 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding the plaintiff must demonstrate "[a] nexus between the defendant, the forum and the litigation."). This Court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing; however, without such hearing, Plaintiff has the burden to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2004). For a prima facie case, Plaintiff must "establish with reasonable particularity sufficient contacts between the defendant and the forum state." Mellon Bank PSFS, Nat'l Ass'n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Provident Nat. Bank v. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 819 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1987)). Although Plaintiff bears this burden, in considering Defendants' Motion, this Court must take Plaintiff's allegations as true and resolves all factual disputes in Plaintiff's favor. Miller, 384 F.3d at 97.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k) requires a district court to exercise personal jurisdiction according to the law of the state where it sits. In this instance, the New Jersey long-arm statute establishes New Jersey's jurisdictional reach conterminous to that allowed for under the U.S. Constitution, subject only to due process of law. Thus, the central inquiry is whether Defendants have "certain minimum contacts with. . . .[New Jersey] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation omitted). The Plaintiff only asserts specific jurisdiction, and therefore, the Court will not apply a general jurisdiction analysis.*fn4
The inquiry as to whether specific jurisdiction exists has three parts. First, Defendants must have "purposefully directed [their] activities" at the forum state. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (quotation marks omitted). Second, the litigation must "arise out of or relate to" at least one of those activities. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414; Grimes v. Vitalink Commc'ns Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1559 (3d Cir. 1994). Finally, if the prior two requirements are met, the Court may consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction would offend "notions of fair play and substantial justice." Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
At the threshold level, the defendant must have "purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). Physical entrance is not required. See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476. But what is necessary is a deliberate targeting of the forum. O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., Ltd., 496 F.3d 312 (3d Cir. 2007). Thus, the "unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant" is insufficient. See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253. Further, contacts with a state's citizens that take place outside the state are not purposeful contacts with the state itself. See Gehling v. St. George's Sch. of Med., Ltd., 773 F.2d 539, 542-43 (3d Cir. 1985). Moreover, the jurisdictional nexus must also be the result of ...