Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Jackson Hewitt, Inc. v. Djsg Utah Tax Service

February 17, 2011


The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. Dennis M. Cavanaugh




This matter comes before the Court upon motion by several of the named Defendants in this consolidated matter, DJSG Utah Tax Service, Donald Godbehere and Sheila Godbehere ("Defendants") asking this Court to reconsider its January 10, 2011 Order imposing temporary restraints on Defendants pursuant to L. Civ. R. 7.1. Defendants have also filed a motion to request Certification for Interlocutory Appeal to the Third Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) with a corresponding Motion to Stay. In the alternative, they have filed a Motion to Sever the DJSG claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. For the reasons contained herein, the motion for reconsideration is denied. Defendant's motion for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal is also denied, as is the Motion to Stay, and the Court declines to sever the DJSG claims,*fn1 or allow for an enlargement of time in which to answer.


Plaintiff Jackson Hewitt is a Virginia corporation with its principal place of business located in Parsippany, New Jersey. Defendant DJSG Utah Tax Service is a limited liability corporation with its principal place of business in Utah. Defendants Sheila and Donald Godbehere were co-guarantors of the franchise agreement between Jackson Hewitt and DJSG Utah Tax Service. The franchise agreements entered into between Jackson Hewitt and Defendants gave Defendants the right to operate 37 tax return businesses in Utah and Arizona using Plaintiff's trade names, trademarks and service marks, logos, as well as Plaintiff's proprietary business methods and software.

On December 6, 2010 Jackson Hewitt commenced action against Defendants by way of an Order to Show Cause, seeking a preliminary injunction compelling these Defendants, amongst others, to adhere to their post-termination obligations pursuant to the parties' franchise agreements. The injunctive relief sought by Jackson Hewitt fell generally into four categories: (1) removal of Jackson Hewitt signage, (2) transfer of all Jackson Hewitt telephone numbers owned by Defendants to Jackson Hewitt, and notification by Defendants to the telephone company that Defendants no longer have the right to use such telephone numbers, (3) adherence to the two year non-compete provision of the franchise agreements, and (4) return to Jackson Hewitt of all client files. The Court instructed all the parties in the underlying action to appear before U.S. Magistrate Judge Joseph A. Dickson in the hope that this matter could be resolved. On January 10, 2011 this Court issued an Opinion and Order granting Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary restraining order, and denying Defendants' cross-motion. The instant motions followed thereafter.


A. Reconsideration

Motions for reconsideration are governed by L. Civ. R. 7.1(i). See U.S. v. Compaction Sys. Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 339, 345 (D.N.J. 1999). A motion pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(i) may be granted if (1) an intervening change in the controlling law has occurred; (2) evidence not previously available has become available; or (3) it is necessary to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice. Database Am., Inc. v. Bellsouth Adver. & Pub. Corp., 825 F. Supp. 1216, 1220 (D.N.J. 1993). Such relief is "an extraordinary remedy" that is to be granted "very sparingly." See NL Indus. Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 935 F. Supp. 513, 516 (D.N.J. 1996). Local Rule 7.1(i) does not contemplate a recapitulation of arguments considered by the Court before rendering its original decision. See Bermingham v. Sony Corp. Of Am., Inc., 820 F. Supp. 834, 856 (D.N.J. 1992), aff'd, 37 F.3d 1485 (3d Cir. 1994). In other words, a motion for reconsideration is not an appeal. It is improper on a motion for reconsideration to "ask the court to rethink what it ha[s] already thought through." Oritani Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 744 F. Supp. 1311, 1314 (D.N.J. 1990).

B. Certification of Interlocutory Appeal; 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)

A court may exercise its discretion to grant leave to file an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) only if its order: (1) involves a "controlling question of law," (2) offers "substantial ground for difference of opinion" as to its correctness, and (3) if appealed immediately, "materially advance[s] the ultimate termination of the litigation." Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 754 (3d Cir.1974). With respect to the first factor, the Third Circuit has defined a "controlling question of law" to "encompass at the very least every order which, if erroneous, would be reversible error on final appeal." Id. at 755. All three conditions must be met before a court may certify an order for interlocutory appeal. Aparicio v. Swan Lake, 643 F.2d 1109, 1110 n. 2 (5th Cir.1981). Moreover, a court should certify decisions for interlocutory review only in exceptional circumstances. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 474-75, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978); Milbert v. Bison Labs., Inc., 260 F.2d 431, 433 (3d Cir.1958); AstenJohnson v. Columbia Cas. Co., No. 03-CV-1552, 2006 WL 1805979, at *1 (E.D.Pa. June 29, 2006). 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) provides that a district court may certify an interlocutory order for appeal if it is of the opinion that (1) the order "involves a controlling question of law;" (2) "as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion;" and (3) "that an immediate appeal of the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The determination of whether § 1292(b) certification is appropriate under these standards lies within the discretion of the district court. See, e.g., Ferraro v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F.Supp. 978, 979 (E.D.N.Y.1992) (collecting cases and citations).

Interlocutory appeals under Section 1292(b) are an exception to the general policy against piecemeal appellate review embodied in the final judgment rule, and only "exceptional circumstances [will] justify a departure from the basic policy of postponing appellate review until after the entry of a final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978); see also Flor v. BOT Fin. Corp., 79 F.3d 281, 284 (2d Cir.1996) (per curiam) (collecting cases). Because piecemeal litigation is *600 generally discouraged, the Court of Appeals has repeatedly emphasized that a district court is to "exercise great care in making a § 1292(b) certification." Westwood Pharm., Inc. v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 964 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir.1992) see also Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 921 F.2d 21, 25 (2d Cir.1990) ("The power to grant an interlocutory appeal must be strictly limited to the precise conditions stated in the law.") (internal alteration omitted) (quoting Gottesman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194, 196 (2d Cir.1959)). Section 1292(b) was not intended "to open the floodgates to a vast number of appeals from interlocutory orders in ordinary litigation," Telectronics Proprietary, Ltd. v. Medtronic, Inc., 690 F.Supp. 170, 172 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (internal quotation marks omitted), or to be a "vehicle to provide early review of difficult rulings in hard cases." German v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 896 F.Supp. 1385, 1398 (S.D.N.Y.1995); see also Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 552 F.Supp. 364, 366 (S.D.N.Y.1982); McCann v. Communications Design Corp., 775 F.Supp. 1506, 1534 (D.Conn.1991). Rather certification is warranted only in "exceptional cases," where early appellate review "might avoid protracted and expensive litigation." Telectronics, 690 F.Supp. at 172; see also In re Buspirone Patent Litigation, 210 F.R.D. 43, 49 (S.D.N.Y.2002); German, 896 F.Supp. at 1398.

C. Severance "A district court has broad discretion in deciding whether to sever a party pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21." Boyer v. Johnson Matthey, Inc., No. 02-8382, 2004 WL 835082, at *1 (E.D.Pa. Apr.16, 2004) (citing Fanning v. Black & Decker, Inc., No. 98-6141, 1999 WL 163628, at *1 (E.D.Pa. Mar.18, 1999)). Rule 21 states: "Misjoinder of parties is not a ground for dismissing an action. On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party." Fed.R.Civ.P. 21. The court may also sever any claim against a party. ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.