The opinion of the court was delivered by: Mary L. Cooper United States District Judge
THE COURT, in response to a motion seeking injunctive relief and a stay ("Stay Motion"), ordered the parties to show cause why such relief should not be granted pending the disposition of an appeal brought in this Court from an order of the United States Bankruptcy Court. (Dkt. entry no. 3, Appellant's Mot.; dkt. entry no. 4, Order To Show Cause.) The Court has reviewed all papers filed in support of and in opposition to the Stay Motion and the Order To Show Cause. The Court will deny the Stay Motion.*fn1
The appellant pro se filed a Notice Of Appeal from an order of the Bankruptcy Court, entered February 3, 2011 ("February 3 Order"), which, inter alia, denied the appellant's motion to have a deed remanded in this matter concerning state court orders of foreclosure and for a Sheriff's sale of property. (Dkt. entry no. 1, Notice Of Appeal.) The Bankruptcy Court thereafter denied the appellant's motion to stay the February 3 Order. See In re Madeline Ferreri, Bankr. Pet. No. 10-48901 (MBK), dkt. entry no. 52, First 2-4-11 Order; id., dkt. entry no. 53, Second 2-4-11 Order.
The appellant now seeks in this Court to stay the transfer of the deed, the sale of the property at issue, and all related foreclosure proceedings until the appeal is determined. (Appellant's Mot.) Although not cited by the appellant, it appears that such relief could be available under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8005. As noted in the Order To Show Cause, the appellant's papers were handwritten, stained, and presented in a disorganized manner.
STANDARD FOR AWARD OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy to be granted only in limited circumstances. Novartis Consumer Health v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., 290 F.3d 578, 586 (3d Cir. 2002). To obtain such relief, a movant must demonstrate both a likelihood of success on the merits and the probability of irreparable harm absent the injunction. Frank's GMC Truck Ctr. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988). The Court, in considering whether to issue a preliminary injunction, must consider whether (1) the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits, (2) the movant will be irreparably injured by denial of the relief, (3) granting the preliminary relief will result in even greater harm to the non-movant, and (4) granting the preliminary relief is in the public interest. ACLU of N.J. v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. Of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1477 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996). If the movant fails to establish any one of the four aforementioned elements, then it is inappropriate for a preliminary injunction to be granted. NutraSweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enters., 176 F.3d 151, 153 (3d Cir. 1999).
APPELLANT HAS NOT SHOWN REASONABLE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS ON MERITS
I. ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE
It appears at this juncture that the appellant is attempting to avoid orders issued by the state court. The proper way to do so would be to seek review through the state appellate process, and then seek certiorari directly to the United States Supreme Court. See D.C. Ct. of Apps. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414-16 (1923). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits adjudication of an action where the relief requested would require a federal court to either determine whether a state court's decision is wrong or void that decision, and thus would prevent a state court from enforcing its orders. See McAllister v. Allegheny Cnty. Fam. Div., 128 Fed.Appx. 901, 902 (3d Cir. 2005). This Court cannot directly or indirectly review, negate, void, or provide relief that would invalidate a decision in the state court concerning the foreclosure and sale of the appellant's property. See Moncrief v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 275 Fed.Appx. 149, 152-53 (3d Cir. 2008) (affirming judgment dismissing claims concerning state foreclosure action, inter alia, as barred by Rooker-Feldman doctrine because plaintiff sought redress from state court judgment); Ayres-Fountain v. E. Sav. Bank, 153 Fed.Appx. 91, 92 (3d Cir. 2005) (instructing district court to dismiss complaint concerning state foreclosure action under Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also El Ali v. Litton Loan Serv'g, 217 Fed.Appx. 115, 116 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007) (dismissing appeal; noting order dismissed claims concerning foreclosure action, inter alia, as barred by Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Shih-Ling Chen v. Rochford, 145 Fed.Appx. 723, 725 (3d Cir. 2005) (same); see also In re Knapper, 407 F.3d 573, 580-85 (3d Cir. 2005).
The appellant has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that the appeal will be found to be meritorious, in view of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, once the appeal is properly briefed.
It appears at this juncture that the civil actions concerning the foreclosure and sale of the appellant's property are ongoing. A federal court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction, pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine, when (1) a state-court action is ongoing, (2) important state interests are implicated, and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in state court. See Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 435 (1982); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971). This Court could not interfere with the ongoing state court actions. See Gray v. Pagano, 287 Fed.Appx. 155, 157-58 (3d Cir. 2008) (dismissing complaint filed in connection to ongoing state foreclosure action, inter alia, as barred by Younger ...