January 21, 2011
DONNA HERRMANN, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
STEVEN J. HERRMANN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County, Docket No. FM-14-1200-07.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Submitted January 4, 2011
Before Judges Parrillo and Espinosa.
Defendant Steven J. Herrmann appeals from a January 15, 2010 post-divorce judgment order of the Family Part denying his motion to remove the bench warrant provision of a child support order. We affirm.
Briefly, by way of background, defendant and plaintiff Donna Herrmann were divorced by a dual final judgment of divorce on April 9, 2008. By court order, defendant's support obligations are fixed at $200 per week for the parties' only child and $69.23 per week for alimony. As of November 20, 2009, defendant's arrearages totaled $7,007.33. Pursuant to plaintiff's motion in aid of litigant's rights, the Family Part judge ordered that defendant pay $50 weekly towards the arrearages amount, bringing defendant's total weekly obligation to $319.23. The November 20, 2009 order also provided that, in the event defendant misses two or more consecutive payments, a bench warrant for his arrest may issue without notice. The order further lifted the suspension of defendant's driver's license that resulted from his previous non-payment of child support.
Defendant's weekly wages are garnished pursuant to the support order. Fearing loss of his driving privileges and consequent inability to work upon issuance of a bench warrant, on December 1, 2009, defendant moved to eliminate the arrears payments and to remove the bench warrant provision of the November 20, 2009 order. The Family Part judge denied the motion, holding that defendant's concerns were unfounded.
Defendant appealed and the matter was referred to our Civil Appeals Settlement Program (CASP), wherein plaintiff supposedly agreed not to oppose a motion by defendant to reconsider his application for removal of the bench warrant provision. When, apparently, plaintiff's consent was not thereafter forthcoming, the matter was not returned to the Family Part as originally recommended by the CASP judge and defendant now proceeds with this appeal.
We have considered the issue raised by defendant in light of the record and the applicable law and conclude that it is without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
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