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Mt Holly Citizens In Action, Inc., et al v. Township of Mount Holly


January 3, 2011


The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hillman, District Judge


This case involves the redevelopment of the Mount Holly Gardens neighborhood (the "Gardens") in Mount Holly, New Jersey. Plaintiffs are low-income, African-American, Hispanic and "white" residents of the Gardens, who object to the plan because they claim they are being forcibly removed from their homes, which are being replaced in large part with new, much higher-priced market rate homes.

Currently before this Court are defendants' motions for summary judgment, which had been converted from motions to dismiss on four of plaintiffs' claims.*fn1 The Court provided the plaintiffs with additional time to respond to the converted motions, and then allowed defendants to file reply briefs. The supplemental briefing is completed, and the remaining claims that are now ready for final resolution are plaintiffs' claims for violations of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (the Fair Housing Act or FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (Count One against all defendants); the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (Count Two against the Township); the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count Three against the Township); and Equal Protection Clause of the New Jersey State Constitution (Count Five against the Township), as well a claim for punitive damages.

As this Court previously expressed on several occasions, we recognize that the Gardens redevelopment has had an effect on low-income families, and, correspondingly, minority families. The Court also recognizes that being forced from one's home is a difficult and emotional issue, compounded by the fear of being unable to afford a comparable place to live. However, as the Court has also expressed previously, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the Township, or the entities assisting the Township in the redevelopment and relocation services, has implemented a plan that has a disparate impact on the Gardens residents as the law defines it. Nor have they shown that the defendants have not been proceeding pursuant to a legitimate governmental interest in the least restrictive way, or have otherwise acted with discriminatory intent. Consequently, as explained more fully below, defendants' motions will be granted, and the case will be closed.


A. Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate where the Court is satisfied that "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

An issue is "genuine" if it is supported by evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the nonmoving party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is "material" if, under the governing substantive law, a dispute about the fact might affect the outcome of the suit. Id. In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving party's evidence "is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Marino v. Industrial Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004)(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).

Initially, the moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must identify, by affidavits or otherwise, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. Thus, to withstand a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must identify specific facts and affirmative evidence that contradict those offered by the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57. A party opposing summary judgment must do more than just rest upon mere allegations, general denials, or vague statements. Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001).

B. Analysis

1. Count One - Fair Housing Act

This Court has already analyzed plaintiffs' Fair Housing Act claim substantively in the context of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. That analysis was adopted in the Court's most recent Opinion, which converted defendants' motions to dismiss into ones for summary judgment. That analysis found that plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the redevelopment has had a disparate impact on a protected group, or that defendants did not have a legitimate interest in the redevelopment, or that no alternative course of action would have a lesser impact. Recognizing that plaintiffs' Fair Housing Act claim had only been considered in the context of a preliminary injunction, the Court afforded plaintiffs time to gather specific facts to show a genuine issue for trial on these issues. The Court now affirms its prior decision on plaintiffs' FHA claim because plaintiffs have not provided the requisite proof to take the issues to a jury.

As a preliminary matter, plaintiffs argue that they should be afforded time for discovery, and are prejudiced in their ability to oppose the converted motions because of the lack of discovery. Plaintiffs contend that they require a look into the defendants' state of mind and intentions, as well as documents that are only within the control of defendants and, thus, unavailable to plaintiffs. Without this information, plaintiffs argue that summary judgment is premature, which is further evidenced by the fact that defendants have not even filed their answers to plaintiffs' complaint.

Although the Court recognizes the peculiar procedural history that has led to the resolution of summary judgment motions without the filing of answers or the undertaking of formal discovery, this is not a case where plaintiffs are neophytes filing an initial challenge to the Gardens redevelopment plan. Not only has there been extensive proceedings over two years in this Court, most of these issues have been thoroughly litigated in New Jersey state court over the course of several years preceding this case.*fn3 As pointed out by defendants, plaintiffs have already had the ability to obtain the information they seek through Open Public Records Act requests, as well as through the previous state court litigation. Further, much of the information is available by other means, including from the residents themselves or the Public Advocate, who undertook an investigation of the Township's relocation practices.*fn4

Moreover, plaintiffs do not specifically identify what information defendants hold to support their claims, and instead request discovery generally, such as depositions of key officials in order to acquire testimony as to their intent to "rid [the Township] of a minority community." (Pomar Cert., Docket No. 106-41) ("Residents are severely prejudiced by being unable to probe, at a deposition, the attitudes, intent, and motives of the Township officials who made the critical decisions to pursue the Gardens redevelopment project."). Discovery, however, cannot serve as a fishing expedition through which plaintiffs search for evidence to support conclusory speculations. Giovanelli v. D. Simmons General Contracting, 2010 WL 988544, *5 (D.N.J. 2010). Further, such depositions may be barred by a privilege afforded to decision-making government officials. See, e.g., U.S. v. Sensient Colors, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 2d 309, 316 (D.N.J. 2009).*fn5

Overriding all these points with specific reference to plaintiffs' FHA claim, however, is that in order to prove their claim, none of the discovery plaintiffs claim they lack would save their allegations, as plaintiffs must present their own proof of disparate impact and a more-viable alternative. Stated several times before, Section 3604(a) of the Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful to "refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (emphasis added). The FHA can be violated by either intentional discrimination or if a practice has a disparate impact on a protected class. Community Services, Inc. v. Wind Gap Mun. Authority, 421 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir. 2005).

Plaintiffs here contend that the Gardens redevelopment plan has a disparate impact on the minorities living in the Gardens. In order to prove their claim, plaintiffs must first establish a prima facie case of disparate impact. Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148 (3d Cir. 1977). To show disparate impact, plaintiffs must show that the Township's actions have had a greater adverse impact on the protected groups (here, African-Americans and Hispanics) than on others. Lapid-Laurel, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Tp. of Scotch Plains, 284 F.3d 442, 466-67 (3d Cir. 2002).

If a plaintiff establishes his prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate justification. The "justification must serve, in theory and practice, a legitimate, bona fide interest of the Title VIII defendant, and the defendant must show that no other alternative course of action could be adopted that would enable that interest to be served with less discriminatory impact." Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 149. Finally, "[i]f the defendant does introduce evidence that no such alternative course of action can be adopted, the burden will once again shift to the Plaintiff to demonstrate that other practices are available." Id. at 149 n.37. "If the Title VIII prima facie case is not rebutted, a violation is proved." Id. at 149.

Thus, it is plaintiffs' burden to show disparate impact, and if they do, it is their burden to rebut the Township's position*fn6 and demonstrate a more-viable alternative course of action. Plaintiffs have done neither.

To support disparate impact, plaintiffs argue that the redevelopment more negatively affects minorities in Mt. Holly than non-minority residents because the redevelopment is driving out the minority population of Mt. Holly. Plaintiffs also argue that the redevelopment plan has a disparate impact on minorities because the plan is targeted at an area that is populated by mostly minorities. To support their position, plaintiffs had previously presented a report of a demographic and statistical expert, Andrew A. Beveridge, Ph.D. Dr. Beveridge opined that the redevelopment of the Gardens effectively and significantly reduces the minority population in Mt. Holly.

The Court had rejected that proof. The Court explained,

Even though plaintiffs have pointed out that the redevelopment of the Gardens has reduced the minority population of Mt. Holly, they have not accounted for how many minorities will move into the new housing. Furthermore, and more importantly for the plaintiffs' FHA claim of disparate impact, the redevelopment plan does not apply differently to minorities than non-minorities. Several plaintiffs classify themselves as "white," yet the plan affects them in the exact same way as their minority neighbors. The real effect of the Gardens redevelopment is that there will be less lower-income housing in Mt. Holly. Although the Township may have some obligation with regard to providing a certain number of low-income housing pursuant to other law, the reduction of low-income housing is not a violation of the FHA. The FHA prohibits the Township from making unavailable a dwelling to any person because of race--it does not speak to income. Redevelopment of blighted, low-income housing is not, without more, a violation of the FHA. Here, where fourteen homes are occupied by African-American plaintiffs, thirteen homes are occupied by Hispanic plaintiffs, and six homes are occupied by "white" plaintiffs, and all are affected in the same way by the redevelopment, the Court cannot find, on the current record at this preliminary injunction stage, that plaintiffs will succeed on their disparate impact FHA claim.

(Feb. 13, 2009 Op. at 7-8.)

In their opposition to the converted motions, plaintiffs present the same statistics, and further argue that there is disparate impact on minorities because the displaced plaintiffs will not be able to afford the new $200,000 homes, or the $1,300 to rent these same properties.*fn7 As explained before, however, if none of the plaintiffs can afford the new homes, it is not just the African-American and Hispanic plaintiffs who are impacted by the increased housing prices--it is all Gardens residents, including the Caucasian residents.*fn8 Additionally, as also explained before, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the Township is preventing minorities from purchasing or moving into the new homes, or otherwise limiting the new residents to non-minorities. Plaintiffs have not provided any proof or statistics to suggest that the new homes created by the redevelopment will be financially out-of-reach for all or most minorities.*fn9

Furthermore, under plaintiffs' logic, any action by the Township to do anything with regard to the Gardens would result in a disparate impact, simply because of the racial composition of the Gardens. The FHA (or any other civil rights law) does not contemplate that a town will never be permitted to ameliorate a blighted area inhabited mainly by minorities simply because it will affect minorities. See, e.g., City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 128 (1981) ("Because urban neighborhoods are so frequently characterized by a common ethnic or racial heritage, a regulation's adverse impact on a particular neighborhood will often have a disparate effect on an identifiable ethnic or racial group. To regard an inevitable consequence of that kind as a form of stigma so severe as to violate the Thirteenth Amendment would trivialize the great purpose of that charter of freedom.").

Finally, it is important to point out that none of the plaintiffs has been forced out of their homes by the Township without the offer of relocation services. The FHA makes it unlawful to otherwise make unavailable or deny a dwelling to any person because of race. The Township has advised the residents not to move until directed by the Township so that they will be eligible for relocation assistance. All plaintiffs, save for one who was told to leave by her landlord, are still residing in the Gardens. Thus, on this basis alone, plaintiffs' FHA claim fails.

But even if plaintiffs were able to establish their prima facie case, they have not rebutted the Township's legitimate interest in the redevelopment, and they have not shown how an alternative course of action would have a lesser impact. Plaintiffs cannot refute that redevelopment of the community to remove blight conditions is a bona fide interest of the state, as explained previously by this Court and by the New Jersey Appellate Division. (See Feb. 13, 2009 Op. at 9, citing Wilson v. City of Long Branch, 142 A.2d 837, 842 (N.J. 1958) ("Community redevelopment is a modern facet of municipal government. Soundly planned redevelopment can make the difference between continued stagnation and decline and a resurgence of healthy growth. It provides the means of removing the decadent effect of slums and blight on neighboring property values, of opening up new areas for residence and industry."); Citizens In Action v. Township Of Mt. Holly, 2007 WL 1930457, *13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 5, 2007) (finding that "[t]he dilapidated, overcrowded, poorly designed community [the Gardens], in addition to the high level of crime in the area, is clearly detrimental to the safety, health, morals and welfare of the community").) It is clear that the Township has a legitimate interest in the redevelopment of the Gardens.

With regard to alternatives, plaintiffs have not identified disputed issues of fact concerning whether the Township failed to show "that no alternative course of action could be adopted that would enable that interest to be served with less discriminatory impact." Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 149. The adequacy of the redevelopment plan, as opposed the rehabilitation plan advocated by Plaintiffs, was extensively analyzed in New Jersey state court. See Citizens In Action v. Township Of Mt. Holly, 2007 WL 1930457, 14 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (finding that "the redevelopment designation is based on a record that provides substantial evidence in support of the determination").*fn10

Plaintiffs have not presented any plan more viable than the one implemented by the Township.*fn11 They advocate rehabilitation, but have proposed a plan, as pointed out by defendants, that relies upon governmental subsidies and upon costs based on property conditions in 1989. It also does not take into account rehabilitation costs to rehab owner-occupied homes, which is an additional $2.5 million, and it does not account for temporary relocation costs.*fn12 Simply because the properties could have been rehabilitated does not mean that rehabilitation was the feasible option.*fn13

In short, Plaintiffs have failed to show an impermissible disparate impact. Even if they have made such a showing, they have failed to offer sufficient evidence to rebut the Township's legitimate governmental purpose or demonstrate illegitimate discriminatory intent. Therefore, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that material disputed facts exist as to their FHA claim. Accordingly, summary judgment must be entered in favor of defendants on this claim.*fn14

2. Counts Two, Three, Five - Civil Rights Act and State and Federal Equal Protection Clause

Plaintiffs claim that the Township violated the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Equal Protection Clause of the New Jersey State Constitution. In order to prove such claims, plaintiffs must show that they were the target of intentional, purposeful discrimination by the Township. City of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio v. Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, 538 U.S. 188, 194 (2003) (citation omitted) ("'Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required' to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause."); Bradley v. U.S., 299 F.3d 197, 205 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that in order to establish a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff needs to prove that the actions (1) had a discriminatory effect and (2) were motivated by a discriminatory purpose); Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2001) (citations and quotations omitted) ("In order to bring an action under § 1982, a plaintiff must allege with specificity facts sufficient to show or raise a plausible inference of (1) the defendant's racial animus; (2) intentional discrimination; and (3) that the defendant deprived plaintiff of his rights because of race."); Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 494 A.2d 294, 308 (N.J. 1985) (stating that if a law is facially neutral, "an equal protection claim could succeed only if the statute had an invidious purpose").

Plaintiffs claim that through the redevelopment plan the Township is intentionally seeking to deprive plaintiffs and other African-Americans and Hispanics of the right to property and equal protection under the law. In the Court's prior Opinion denying plaintiffs' request for preliminary injunction, the Court found that plaintiffs did not demonstrate that the Township "implemented the development plan to intentionally or effectively drive out the minority population of Mt. Holly." (Feb. 9, 2009 Op. at 7.) Thus, as with their FHA claim, the Township's motion to dismiss these claims was converted to one for summary judgment, and the Court afforded plaintiffs the opportunity to provide other proof to support their claims of intentional discrimination.

In their response, plaintiffs have failed to provide such proof. As discussed above, plaintiffs first argue that summary judgment is premature, because their ability to prove these intentional discrimination claims is thwarted by the lack of discovery--namely, the depositions of Township officials. As also discussed above, however, even if such depositions were permitted, the Court doubts that any Township official will testify to his or her "discriminatory purpose" in approving the redevelopment plan. See, e.g., Smith v. Town of Clarkton, N.C., 682 F.2d 1055, 1064-65 (4th Cir. 1982) (in an FHA case, stating, "Municipal officials acting in their official capacities seldom, if ever, announce on the record that they are pursuing a particular course of action because of their desire to discriminate against a racial minority. Even individuals acting from invidious motivations realize the unattractiveness of their prejudices when faced with their perpetuation in the public record. It is only in private conversation, with individuals assumed to share their bigotry, that open statements of discrimination are made, so it is rare that these statements can be captured for purposes of proving racial discrimination in a case such as this.").

With regard to other methods for proving discriminatory intent, plaintiffs have had years to gather such proof, including obtaining affidavits from Gardens residents or other people who have been involved in the Gardens redevelopment process. Instead, plaintiffs' brief details the Township's alleged discriminatory actions, but none of the claims are supported by any documentary or other evidence.*fn15 Rather, plaintiffs tell a story, long on accusations and suppositions but short on proof, of the Township's ten-year, insidious desire to displace the minority population of Mt. Holly. If there were merit to these claims, plaintiffs would be able to annotate their allegations with factual evidence that would infer such discriminatory motive.*fn16 They have not done so. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-67 (1977) (explaining that the determination as to "whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available," and identifying objective factors that may be probative of racially discriminatory intent: (1) the racial impact of an official action; (2) the historical background of the decision; (3) the sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision, including departures from normal procedures and usual substantive norms; and (4) the legislative or administrative history of the decision). Incidentally, these affidavits relate the plaintiffs' extensive participation in numerous meetings with the Township and the builders over the years.

In contrast, the Township provides transcripts of town council and planning board meetings, where concerned citizens and council members discussed the plans for the Gardens. The Township has also provided letters and affidavits from former Gardens residents, as well as certifications from individuals involved with the redevelopment plan implementation and relocation process. These documents range in date from 2002 through early 2010. The documents show that from the very beginning, the planning board was aware of the sensitive issues that would arise as they undertook the process, the desire to have direct communication with Gardens' residents, and the Township's consideration of the residents' concerns. (See, e.g., Sept. 8, 2003 Town Council meeting transcript at 36-44, Def Ex. B.) Although many viewpoints were expressed by the Gardens' residents and community activists, with some being supportive and hopeful, while other disenfranchised residents speaking emphatically and eloquently on their negative opinion on the redevelopment plan, their input was welcomed and encouraged.*fn17

Furthermore, nowhere in plaintiffs' recitation of the Township's motives do plaintiffs specifically acknowledge the extensive deterioration, crime, and overall unsafe living conditions the Township was endeavoring to cure. Although plaintiffs feel that the Township simply wishes to remove all minorities from the town, evidence in the record supports an opposing viewpoint--that but-for the significant concern for the Gardens' resident's welfare, and the desire to make the Township as a whole a safe and pleasant town for all of its citizens, minority and non-minority, the Township would have never undertaken the long-overdue project, particularly considering the challenges that the redevelopment would, and did, inspire.*fn18

Additionally, as noted above and previously, evidence in the record shows that many relocated residents have been pleased with the process, and are now in a much better place as a result.

It also cannot be forgotten that the redevelopment plan has gone through three machinations, from the Gardens Area Redevelopment Plan ("GARP") in 2003, to the West Rancocas Redevelopment Plan ("WRRP") in 2005, and then to the Revised West Rancocas Redevelopment Plan in September 2008. For each of these plans, the Township Council and the builder heard extensive public comment, testimony, and written objections (as intricately detailed in plaintiffs' complaint), and even though the 2005 WRRP was approved by the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs and affirmed by the New Jersey state trial and appellate courts, the Township and redevelopers conducted a reevaluation of the plan which resulted in the 2008 Revised WRRP. Despite plaintiffs' claims that all the plans were adopted without meaningful consideration of the residents' objections, it seems specious to believe that the Township extensively reevaluated and revised its plans while entertaining numerous opportunities for public comment and objection simply as a ruse to mask its ultimate purpose of "ridding" Mt. Holly of its minority population.

The Court acknowledges that for every governmental action, people will object, for personal reasons, or as a champion for those who cannot speak out for themselves. The Court also acknowledges that governing officials are often not the most efficient or pragmatic in their decision-making process. When people's homes are at stake, and when issues concerning race and economic status are involved, the emotions of everyone are amplified. This is evidenced not only by the 10-year litigation concerning the Gardens' redevelopment, but by the voices of the residents who have expressed the extremes of satisfaction and displeasure with the plan. In addition to the people who feel benefitted by the Township, it is undisputable that people have felt unjustifiably wronged by the Township, which has had to make some hard decisions along the way.

The Court, however, must view the case under the legal framework that constrains this Court's consideration of these issues, rather than under the emotional contours of the situation. At this summary judgment stage in the context of what proof has been provided, and in deciding what material issues of fact need to be resolved, the weight of the record evidence demonstrates that no reasonable juror could find that the Township acted with intentional discrimination in the development and implementation of the Gardens' redevelopment plan. Moreover, no additional discovery appears calculated or even remotely likely to provide the missing proofs. Consequently, summary judgment must be entered in favor of the Township on plaintiffs' intentional discrimination claims.

3. Punitive damage claims

Plaintiffs are also seeking punitive damages for all of their claims. The Township had moved to dismiss plaintiffs' request for punitive damages, arguing that under various legal principles, punitive damages cannot be imposed against a municipality. In the Court's previous Opinion, all of plaintiffs' punitive damages requests were dismissed, except for those relating to plaintiffs' FHA and Civil Rights Act claims (Counts One and Two). The Court reserved decision on these two claims pending consideration of the converted motions.

Even though "punitive damages can be awarded in a civil rights case where a jury finds a constitutional violation, even when the jury has not awarded compensatory or nominal damages," Alexander v. Riga, 208 F.3d 419, 430 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974)) (both discussing FHA claims), a finding of a violation is a mandatory prerequisite to any possibility of punitive damages. Because the Court has not found defendants to be liable for plaintiffs' FHA and civil rights claims, plaintiffs' punitive damages claims fail as well.*fn19


For the reasons expressed above, defendants' converted motions for summary judgment shall be granted on the four remaining claims in plaintiffs' complaint. An appropriate Order will be entered.


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