The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hillman, District Judge
Petitioner James A. Mitchell, a prisoner currently confined at FCI Fort Dix, has submitted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241*fn1 naming Donna Zickefoose as the sole respondent to the Petition. Based on Petitioner's affidavit of indigence, the Court granted Petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Respondent made an application for leave to file a Motion to Dismiss in Lieu of Answer. The Court granted Respondent's request and the motion was filed on June 16, 2010. Petitioner objected to the request to file the motion but has not responded to the motion itself. The Court has reviewed all documents submitted. Because this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this Petition, and because it is not in the interest of justice to transfer the Petition, this Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss and dismiss the Petition for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner is presently confined pursuant to a sentence imposed by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Petitioner pled guilty to 18 U.S.C. § 1951, interference with commerce by threat or violence and was sentenced on June 24, 1998 to 240 months and three years supervised release. Petitioner claims that his sentence was improperly enhanced.
On February 1, 2001, Petitioner filed a motion to correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 with the trial court, the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, under the caption Mitchell v. U.S.A., civil docket number 1:01-b cv-00796-TPG. That § 2255 motion was denied. On June 10, 2003, the Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's application for a certificate of appealability.
Petitioner brings his Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus as a pro se litigant. A pro se pleading is held to less stringent standards than more formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A pro se habeas petition and any supporting submissions must be construed liberally and with a measure of tolerance. See Royce v. Hahn, 151 F.3d 116, 118 (3d Cir. 1998); Lewis v. Attorney General, 878 F.2d 714, 721-22 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 912 (1970).
United States Code Title 28, Section 2244(b)(3)(A), provides that "Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application." If a second or successive petition is filed in the district court without such an order from the appropriate court of appeals, the district court may dismiss for want of jurisdiction or "shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action ... to any other such court in which the action ... could have been brought at the time it was filed." 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
Here, the case lacks cause of action under § 2241 since, as noted by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249 (3d Cir. 1997), Section 2255 has been the "usual avenue" for federal prisoners seeking to challenge the legality of their confinement. See also Chambers v. United States, 106 F.3d 472, 474 (2d Cir. 1997); Wright v. United States Bd. of Parole, 557 F.2d 74, 77 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Walker, 980 F.Supp. 144, 145-46 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (challenges to a sentence as imposed should be brought under § 2255, while challenges to the manner in which a sentence is executed should be brought under § 2241). Motions under § 2255 must be brought before the Court which imposed the sentence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Section 2255, however, contains a safety valve where "it appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [Petitioner's] detention." In Dorsainvil, the Third Circuit held that the remedy provided by § 2255 is "inadequate or ineffective," permitting resort to § 2241 (a statute without timeliness or successive petition limitations), where a prisoner who previously had filed a § 2255 motion on other grounds "had no earlier opportunity to challenge his conviction for a crime that an intervening change in substantive law may negate." 119 F.3d at 251. The court emphasized, however, that its holding was not intended to suggest that § 2255 would be considered "inadequate or ineffective" merely because a petitioner is unable to meet the stringent gatekeeping requirements of § 2255. Id. To the contrary, the court was persuaded that § 2255 was "inadequate or ineffective" in the unusual circumstances presented in Dorsainvil because it would have been a complete miscarriage of justice to confine a prisoner for conduct that, based upon an intervening interpretation of the statute of conviction by the United States Supreme Court, may not have been criminal conduct at all. Id. at 251-52.
Here, Petitioner does not allege facts bringing his conviction within the Dorsainvil exception. Rather, it appears that he explicitly seeks to avoid the gatekeeping requirements of § 2255, which strictly limit the circumstances under which a prisoner can file a second or successive motion. Petitioner can not demonstrate that his circumstances constitute the sort of "complete miscarriage of justice" that would ...