The opinion of the court was delivered by: Jerome B. Simandle United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
1. On August 11, 2010, the Clerk received Petitioner's first § 2241 application and opened first Izac v. Norwood matter, indexed as Civil Action No. 10-4112 (D.N.J.) ("Izac-I").
2. Two weeks later, i.e., on August 25, 2010, the Clerk received Petitioner's second § 2241 application and opened second Izac v. Norwood matter, indexed as Civil Action No. 10-4366 (D.N.J.) ("Izac-II").
3. Later same day, i.e., still on August 25, 2010, the Clerk received Petitioner's third § 2241 application and opened third Izac v. Norwood matter, indexed as Civil Action No. 10-4367 (D.N.J.) ("Izac-III").
4. Twenty days later, i.e., on September 15, 2010, the Clerk received Petitioner's fourth § 2241 application and opened fourth Izac matter, Izac v. Zickefoose, indexed as Civil Action No. 10-4744 (D.N.J.) ("Izac-IV").
: Civil Action No. 10-5865 (JBS) Petitioner,
5. On September 23, 2010, Judge Renee M. Bumb, presiding over Izac-I, Izac-II, Izac-III and Izac-IV matters, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order ("Multi-action Order") dismissed all four Petitioner's § 2241 applications. See, e.g., Izac-I, Docket Entry No. 2. The Multi-action Order, stated, in relevant part, as follows:
In his Izac-I and Izac-II matters, Petitioner challenges his housing at a facility which has the level of security higher than minimum (or, in alternative or in conjunction, the delay he might be facing in being transferred to a minimum security facility). See Izac-I, Docket Entry No. 1, and Izac-II, Docket Entry No. 1. Petitioner's claims raised in Izac-I and Izac-II cannot be entertained in a habeas matter. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained the distinction between the availability of civil rights relief and the availability of habeas relief as follows:
[W]henever the challenge ultimately attacks the "core of habeas" - the validity of the continued conviction or the fact or length of the sentence - a challenge, however denominated and regardless of the relief sought, must be brought by way of a habeas corpus petition. Conversely, when the challenge is to a condition of confinement such that a finding in plaintiff's favor would not alter his sentence or undo his conviction, an action under § 1983 is appropriate.
Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2002). Therefore, a prisoner is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus only if he "seek[s] to invalidate the duration of [his] confinement - either directly through an injunction compelling speedier release or indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the [government's] custody." See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005). In contrast, if a judgment in the prisoner's favor would not affect the fact or duration of the prisoner's incarceration, habeas relief is unavailable and a civil complaint is the appropriate form of remedy. See, e.g., Ganim v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 235 Fed. App'x 882 (3rd Cir. 2007) (district court lacks jurisdiction under § 2241 to entertain prisoner's challenge to being placed in a particular federal prison); Bronson v. Demming, 56 Fed. App'x 551, 553-54 (3rd Cir. 2002) (habeas relief is unavailable to inmate seeking release from disciplinary segregation to general population). Therefore, Petitioner's Izac-I and Izac-II challenges will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; such dismissal will be without prejudice to Petitioner's filing of a timely civil complaint raising these challenges.
6. On November 8, 2010, the Clerk docketed a transfer order issued by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Virginia ("N.D. Va."). See Instant Matter, Docket Entry No. 4. The transfer order indicated that Petitioner initiated another § 2241 matter, Izac v. Norwood, Civil Action No. 10-4112 (N.D. Va.) ("Izac-V"); that matter was wrongly venued with the N.D. Va. Therefore, the N.D. Va. transferred the Izac-V matter to this District, pursuant to the holding of Rumsfield v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). See Instant Matter, Docket Entry No. 4. The docket sheet in Izac-V indicated that Petitioner initiated Izac-V on November 5, 2010, see Instant Matter, Docket Entry No. 5, at 1,
i.e., six weeks after Judge Bumb issued the Multi-action Order dismissing Izac-I, Izac-II, Izac-III and Izac-IV matters and detailing to Petitioner the critical ...