The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. Dennis M. Cavanaugh
DENNIS M. CAVANAUGH, U.S.D.J.:
This matter comes before the Court upon the motions of Unum Group ("Unum"), CIGNA Corporation ("CIGNA"), Life Insurance Company of North America ("LINA"), and Schering-Plough Corporation ("Schering-Plough") (collectively "the Defendants") to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Unum and CIGNA also move to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2), respectively. Plaintiff John N. Bukuvalas ("Plaintiff") has filed a cross-motion for leave to amend the Amended Complaint. No oral argument was heard pursuant to Rule 78. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motions are granted and Plaintiff's motion is granted in part.
The facts, as relayed in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint are sparse. Plaintiff is a disabled former employee of Schering-Plough and his disability insurance payments under the company's benefits plan were terminated on December 3, 2008 by CIGNA's subsidiary LINA. Am. Compl.¶
1. Plaintiff initiated the present class action in the Superior Court of New Jersey on behalf of "[a]ll residents of the State of New Jersey who are insured under disability insurance policies covered by N.J.A.C. 11:4-58.1-4." Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4-5. The action was subsequently removed to this Court. It is Plaintiff's contention that "[o]n information and belief" Defendants "knowingly and intentionally ignored, avoided and acted in violation of N.J.A.C. 11:4-58.1-4." Am. Compl. ¶ 3. Those sections of the New Jersey Administrative Code discuss and prohibit the use of discretionary clauses in insurance policies. See N.J. Admin. Code § 11:4-58.1 (2010) ("The purpose of this subchapter is to prohibit the use of discretionary clauses in all life, health and long-term care insurance policies and contracts, and all annuity contracts . . . .").*fn2
The term "discretionary clause" is defined as a clause that "provides the carrier with sole substantial justice.'" Provident Nat'l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 819 F.2d 434, 436-37 (3d Cir. 1987) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
A. Standing "Absent Article III standing, a federal court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to address a plaintiff's claims, and they must be dismissed." Common Cause of Pa. v. Pennsylvania, 558 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because they are the parties invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts, plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing their standing. Id. The district court must accept the complaint's allegations as true and "'general allegations of injury resulting from the defendants' conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss [it is] presume[d] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.'" Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)).
Pursuant to Rule 4(e), a district court may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to the extent permitted by the law of the state where the district court sits. See Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 96 (3d Cir. 2004) ("A federal court sitting in New Jersey has jurisdiction over parties to the extent provided under New Jersey state law."). "New Jersey's long arm statute confers jurisdiction over nonresidents to the extent allowed under the United States Constitution." Horton v. Martin, 133 Fed. Appx. 859, 860 (3d Cir. June 15, 2005). The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution "limits the reach of long-arm statutes so that a court may not assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who does not have certain minimum contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits under the policy or contract and to interpret the terms and provisions of the policy or contract." N.J. Admin. Code § 11:4-58.2.
For a court to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant must have specific or general contacts with the forum. See Horton, 133 Fed. Appx. at 860. General jurisdiction exists when the defendant has "continuous and systematic conduct in the forum that is unrelated to the subject matter of the lawsuit." Associated Bus. Tel. Sys. Corp. v. Danihels, 829 F. Supp. 707, 711. Specific jurisdiction exists "when the particular cause of action at issue arose out of the defendant's contacts with the forum." Id. "Once a defendant raises the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction." Horton, 133 Fed. Appx. at 860. While "[a] court must accept as true the allegations in the complaint and resolve disputed issues of fact in favor of the plaintiff. . . . the plaintiff cannot rely on the pleadings alone but must provide actual proofs." Ameripay, LLC v. Ameripay Payroll, Ltd., 334 F. Supp. 2d 629, 633 (D.N.J. 2004). If minimum contacts are established, "the burden shifts to the defendant, who must show that the assertion of jurisdiction would be unreasonable." Id.
C. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court is "required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences in the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the [Plaintiff]." Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). "[A] complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However, the Plaintiff's "obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. "[A court is] not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, ...