The opinion of the court was delivered by: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson District Judge
On November 15, 2010,*fn1 New Jersey's recent amendment to its Unclaimed Property Law, 2010 N.J. Laws Chapter 25 ("Chapter 25" or "the Act"), will take effect. Chapter 25, inter alia, amends New Jersey's unclaimed property statute, N.J.S.A. 46:30B-1, et seq. ("Unclaimed Property Act"), modifying the presumptive abandonment period for travelers checks from fifteen years to three years, and, for the first time, Chapter 25 provides for the custodial escheat of stored value cards. See Chapter 25, §§ 2, 5. Plaintiffs American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. ("Amex"), New Jersey Retail Merchants Association ("Retail Merchants"), New Jersey Food Council ("Food Council"), and American Express Prepaid Card Management Corporation ("AMEX Prepaid") (collectively, "Plaintiffs")*fn2 , bring this action to enjoin Defendants Andrew P. SidamonEristoff ("the Treasurer"), Treasurer of the State of New Jersey, Steven R. Harris, Administrator of Unclaimed Property of the State of New Jersey, and the State of New Jersey (collectively, "Defendants," "State of New Jersey" or "State") from enforcing Chapter 25.*fn3 In their respective complaints, Plaintiffs raise several constitutional challenges under the doctrines of federal preemption, the Contract Clause, the Takings Clause, Substantive Due Process, the Commerce Clause, and the Full Faith & Credit Clause.
In the instant matter, Plaintiffs move to preliminarily enjoin Defendants from implementing Chapter 25 during the pendency of these cases.*fn4 In response, Defendants oppose the motion and move to dismiss the complaints on the grounds of immunity and abstention.*fn5 Because the issues raised by the parties involve similar legal and factual analysis, the Court will address them in this Consolidated Opinion. For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants in part and denies in part Plaintiffs' requests for a preliminary injunction. Specifically, the Court enjoins the State of New Jersey from enforcing the place-of-purchase presumption found in Chapter 25 and Guidances issued by the Treasurer. The Court further enjoins the State from enforcing Chapter 25 retroactively against issuers of stored value cards with existing stored value card contracts that obligate the issuers to redeem the cards solely for merchandise or services.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Since the parties' motions raise constitutional challenges to Chapter 25, the Court will only recount uncontroverted facts of this case insofar as they provide an understanding of the instant disputes.
I. Travelers Cheques by Amex
Amex's Travelers Cheques ("TCs") are preprinted "checks," each bearing a serial number, in fixed amounts, ranging from $20 - $100. Amex is the sole issuer of travelers checks. On its face, a TC states that it will never expire, and therefore, it is not subject to dormancy charges and, until cashed or used, always retains its full face value. Amex sells TCs for the face amount without charging any fee. See Campbell Decl. at ¶¶ 13-16. When a TC is sold, the seller transmits the funds to Amex, and provides Amex with the serial number of the TC, its amount, and the date and place of the sale, but does not provide the name, address, or any other identifying information about the purchaser. When Amex sells TCs directly to consumers, it retains only the same information that it receives from third party sellers. Id. at ¶ 20.
According to Amex, it has been able to sell TCs without charging a fee based on its contractual relationship with TC owners, which gives Amex the right to retain, use and invest funds from the sale of TCs from the date of sale until the date the TCs are cashed or used. Amex submits that it invests the funds in instruments with varying maturities to obtain the highest yield. Id. at ¶ 21. Amex further asserts that it relies on these invested funds, which are integral to the contract between TC and Amex, to remain profitable in the TC business. Id. at ¶ 21.
Because TCs never expire, Amex maintains that it cannot be relieved of its contractual obligation to honor TCs presented for payment after the amount has been paid as "presumed abandoned" to a state. In other words, when used, a TC becomes a negotiable instrument, which Amex pays upon presentation regardless of whether it has been paid to the state as unclaimed property.
SVCs are a relatively recent form of electronic payments. SVCs come in two varieties: "closed loop" and "open loop" cards.*fn6 Closed loop cards may be redeemed only for merchandise or services at and by the retailer who issued the card. An example of such a card would be a gift card issued by a bookstore and redeemable only at that bookstore for books or other merchandise. These sorts of cards are issued by members of Plaintiff New Jersey Retail Merchants Association and Plaintiff New Jersey Food Council. Open loop cards, also referred to as gift cards, may be redeemed at a host of brick-and-mortar and internet-based locations not affiliated with the issuer of the card. "In the current economic climate, stored-value products are particularly important, as they enable the unbanked and underbanked to have access to the payment system and thus to have access to internet transactions." Juliet M. Moringiello, Survey of the Law of Cyberspace, 65 Bus. Law. 227, 227-28 (2009). These sort of cards are issued by Plaintiff American Express Prepaid Card Management Corporation. Happ Decl. at ¶¶ 3-4. While some open loop cards are redeemable for cash, most of the open loop cards issued by AMEX Prepaid are redeemable solely for goods or services. Id. at ¶6.
Under New Jersey law, gift cards are defined as a tangible device, whereon is embedded or encoded in an electronic or other format a value issued in exchange for payment, which promises to provide to the bearer merchandise of equal value to the remaining balance of the device. "Gift card" does not include a prepaid telecommunications or technology card, prepaid bank card or rewards card; N.J.S.A. 56:8-110c (emphasis added). According to Plaintiff Retail Merchants, the funds for gift cards are not necessarily stored on the card itself, but are "held in a bank account maintained by the card issuers." Rowe Afft. at ¶ 12. Other issuers maintain their gift card balances in a database. Watson Decl. at ¶ 12. Some issuers issue the cards directly, while others use subsidiaries or cooperatives to issue and process the cards. "Once the retail gift card is used to make a purchase, each [issuer] recognizes a profit based on the difference between the [issuer's] cost of acquiring the goods or of offering the services, and the retail price paid by the customer to purchase the goods or services." Rowe Afft. at ¶ 17.
III. New Jersey's Unclaimed Property Law
Each of the 50 fifty states, including New Jersey, and the District of Columbia has a set of unclaimed property laws or escheat laws. These laws require that after property has been deemed "abandoned," the holder of the property, e.g., banks, belonging to a property owner, e.g., consumers, pay that property to the state. The laws of most states are based upon a version of the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act ("UUPA"). The Court notes that the purpose of enacting these escheat laws is to provide for the safekeeping of abandoned property and then reunite the abandoned property with its owner. In the usual course, when property is deemed abandoned, the holder of most types of property is required to attempt to contact the owner, using the name and last known address, and if possible, return the property. If the attempt is unsuccessful, the holder turns over the abandoned property to the state and provides the state with the name and last known address of the owner. Upon such payment, the holder is relieved of any liability to the owner. The state, in turn, makes the effort to reunite the owner with his/her property. New Jersey's Unclaimed Property Act is a custodial escheat statute. That is, when funds are turned over the State, the rightful owner may file a claim to recover the property at any time.
With respect to travelers checks, the issuer, Amex, does not obtain the name or address of purchasers of these checks. Thus, any requirement under state law to send notice to an apparent owner at the last known address before paying such property to the State does not apply to Amex. See N.J.S.A. 46:30B-5. In addition, in New Jersey, travelers checks issuers are exempted from the requirement to include the owner's name and last known address on unclaimed property reports. See N.J.S.A. 46:30B-47. Rather, when travelers checks are sent to the state as unclaimed property, only the serial number, the amount and date of sale are reported. Indeed, New Jersey also exempts travelers checks from being published in a mandated notice by the Treasurer. See N.J.S.A. 46:30B-51, -56. After a travelers check is cashed, Amex determines whether that particular check has been paid to any state as abandoned property. If it has, Amex seeks to reclaim those funds from that state. In New Jersey, while the time for processing such a claim is disputed, it is not disputed that the Treasurer returns the funds with interest.
Each version of the Unclaimed Property Act, enacted in a majority of the states, including New Jersey before the enactment of Chapter 25, includes a 15-year abandonment period for travelers checks.*fn7 However, on June 24, 2010, Bill A3002 was introduced in the New Jersey Legislature. According to the State, the purpose of the bill is "to protect New Jersey consumers from certain commercial dormancy fee practices and to modernize New Jersey's unclaimed property laws." See Assembly Budget Committee's statement. The Bill was signed into law six days later. Importantly, among other provisions, Chapter 25 shortened the abandonment period for travelers checks from 15 years to 3 years. See N.J.S.A. 46:30B-11. After an issuer transfers the presumed abandoned property, that property is administered through New Jersey's unclaimed property system. The State preserves the property in perpetuity for the owner, see N.J.S.A. 46:30B-9, or for another state that can prove a superior right of escheat. See N.J.S.A. 46:30B-81.
Prior to the recent enactment, gift certificates-the predecessor to stored value cards and gift cards-were not covered by New Jersey's escheat law. See In re November 8, 1996, Determination of the State of N.J., Dept. of the Treasury, Unclaimed Prop. Office, 309 N.J.Super. 272, 277-79 (App. Div. 1998). When the Unclaimed Property Act was initially enacted by the New Jersey legislature in 1989, all references to gift certificates were deleted from earlier drafts. Id. at 276. This was a departure from the UUPA, which did provide for the escheat of gift certificates. Under the 1981 UUPA, gift certificates "which remain[ed] unclaimed by the owner for more than 5 years after becoming payable or distributable [were] presumed abandoned." Id. (citing Section 14 of the 1981 Model Act). "[T]he amount presumed abandoned [wa]s the price paid by the purchaser for the gift certificate. In the case of a credit memo, the amount presumed abandoned [wa]s the amount credited to the recipient of the memo." Id.
A key reason that gift certificates were not escheated in New Jersey was that they were not redeemable for cash. As explained by the New Jersey Appellate Division in In re November 8, 1996,
All of the categories of intangible personal property expressly covered by the New Jersey Act or the 1981 Model Act, are, as a practical matter, claims for the payment of money . . . When any of these claims to the payment of money are transferred to the State, the obligors can readily discharge them by paying the State what they would have paid to the prior owners . . . The issuers of gift certificates, however, frequently do not bind themselves to pay money.
Chapter 25, thus, changes the legal landscape in New Jersey by providing for the escheat of stored value cards. There are several components to the statute. First, it defines stored value cards as a record that evidences a promise, made for monetary or other consideration, by the issuer or seller of the record that the owner of the record will be provided, solely or a combination of, merchandise, services, or cash in the value shown in the record, which is pre-funded and the value of which is reduced upon each redemption.
Chapter 25, § 1t (codified at N.J.S.A. 46:30B-6t). Hence, "stored value cards" include gift cards redeemable only for merchandise or services, as well as cards redeemable solely for cash.*fn8 Second, it places stored value cards in the section of the Unclaimed Property Act that addresses credits and overpayments. That section values credits at 100% face value, stating "in the case of credit balances . . . the amount presumed abandoned is the amount credited to the recipient." N.J.S.A. 46:30B-43. Third, Chapter 25 bans the imposition of dormancy, inactivity, escheat or similar charges on stored value cards. Finally, the statute grants the Treasurer authority to grant exemptions to certain classes of businesses based on good cause; the statute does not apply to SVCs issued by issuers that sold less than $250,000 worth of cards in the past year, and the statute does not apply to promotional cards issued in connection with customer loyalty programs. N.J.S.A. 46:30B-42.1e-f.
The SVC Plaintiffs focus primarily on section 5c of Chapter 25, which amends the Unclaimed Property Act to require issuers to transfer the face value of stored value cards to the State upon the expiration of a two-year abandonment period. The Act, further, requires issuers to "obtain the name and address of the purchaser or owner . . . and shall, at a minimum, maintain a record of the zip code of the owner or purchaser." Chapter 25, ¶ 5c (emphasis added). In addition, the Act provides
[i]f the issuer of a stored value carddoes not have the name and address of the purchaser or owner of the stored value card, the address of the owner or purchaser of the stored value card shall assume the address of the place where the stored value card was purchased or issued and shall be reported to New Jersey if the place of business where the stored value card was sold or issued is located in New Jersey.
Id., ¶ 5c (emphasis added); N.J.S.A. 46:30B-42.1c (emphasis added). The Court will refer to this provision as creating a "place of purchase presumption." As is apparent from its text, the statute makes no mention of the issuer's domicile or state of incorporation in connection with this place of purchase presumption.*fn9
After the statute was enacted, the Treasurer issued several guidances interpreting the statute. Portions of Treasury Guidance dated September 23, 2010, expound upon the place of purchase presumption found in the statute:
* If the issuer is domiciled in New Jersey, any unredeemed balances of stored value cards issued prior to the date of this announcement where the names and addresses or zip code of the purchasers or owners were not recorded must be reported to New Jersey.
* If the issuer is not domiciled in New Jersey, any unredeemed balances of stored value cards issued prior to the date of this announcement where the names and addresses or zip code of the purchasers or owners were not recorded should be reported to the state in which the issuer is domiciled in accordance with that state's unclaimed property laws.
* If the issuer is not domiciled in New Jersey and the issuer's state of domicile exempts this type of property from its unclaimed property statute, any unredeemed balances of stored value cards issued prior to the date of this announcement where the names and addresses or zip code of the purchasers or owners were not recorded must be reported to New Jersey if the cards were issued or sold in New Jersey. In these instances, the issuer must maintain the address of the business where the stored value card was purchased or issued.
Treasury Guidance dated Sept. 23, 2010 at 3 (emphasis added). As explained in more detail below, Plaintiffs contend that both the statute and the Guidances are unconstitutional.
Beginning in September 2010, Plaintiffs filed separate complaints alleging that Chapter 25 violated several constitutional provisions and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Subsequently, the Court issued Orders to Show Cause as to each of the plaintiff's filing. In addition to opposing Plaintiffs' motions for injunctive relief, Defendants move to dismiss the complaints on immunity and/or abstention grounds. On October 21, 2010, the Court held a hearing wherein all parties, except Memo, appeared.*fn10 In that hearing, the Court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss based upon immunity and abstention grounds. In this Consolidated Opinion, the Court addresses Plaintiffs' motions for injunctive relief and renders its written decision on the immunity and abstention issues.
The Court has federal question jurisdiction over this matter, in that Plaintiffs raise constitutional challenges to Chapter 25. For example, Plaintiffs seeks to enjoin enforcement of Chapter 25, asserting that the Federal CARD Act preempts that law. Such injunctive relief requests have been held to form the basis for federal question jurisdiction. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n. 14 (1983) ("A plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief from state regulation, on the ground that such regulation is pre-empted by a federal statute [over] which, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, must prevail, thus presents a federal question which the federal courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve."); St. Thomas-St. John Hotel & Tourism Ass'n, Inc. v. Government of U.S. Virgin Islands, 218 F.3d 232, 242 (3d Cir. 2000).
I. Sovereign Immunity under the Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment states: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another state, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Based on this language, a federal court may not adjudicate a lawsuit brought by a citizen against his own state. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1890); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974) ("[T]his Court has consistently held that an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State.").
However, the Eleventh Amendment does not prevent federal courts from hearing all lawsuits involving a state. It has long been established by the Supreme Court that the Eleventh Amendment does not preclude lawsuits against state officials in their official capacities to enjoin violations of federal law even where the remedy would enjoin enforcement and implementation of an official state policy. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). Since Ex Parte Young, the Supreme Court has extended this holding to violations of federal statutes as well as of the United States Constitution. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985); see, e.g., Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, n.10 (1989); Edelman, 415 U.S. at 660; Home Telephone & Telegraph v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913). To plead a cause of action under the strictures of Ex parte Young, a plaintiff must establish a present violation of federal law. B.H. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986)(Ex parte Young applies to those cases in which a violation of federal law is ongoing, not to those in which federal law was violated in the past). Furthermore, only prospective injunctive relief is available under Ex parte Young. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337 (1979); Edelman, 415 U.S. at 677; see also Pa. Fed'n of Sportsmen's Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2002).
Defendants claim that although Plaintiffs seek only injunctive relief in this suit, the Eleventh Amendment still bars this action because Plaintiffs seek to divest the State of its special sovereign interest in abandoned property in offense to the "dignity and respect afforded a State." For support, Defendants rely on the Supreme Court's decision in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) and the Third Circuit decision in MCI Telecommunication Corp. v. Bell Atlantic Pennsylvania, 271 F.3d 491 (3d Cir. 2001). In Coeur d'Alene, the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred an Indian tribe's lawsuit in federal court against the state of Idaho which sought to establish the tribe's ownership of submerged lands to which that state claimed title. The Court reasoned that "if the Tribe were to prevail, Idaho's sovereign interest in its lands and waters would be affected in a degree fully as intrusive as almost any conceivable retroactive levy upon funds in its Treasury. Under these particular and special circumstances, we find the Young exception inapplicable." 521 U.S. at 287. After Coeur d'Alene, the Third Circuit, in MCI, explained that the Ex Parte Young doctrine did not apply where a lawsuit affects "a unique or essential attribute of State sovereignty." 271 F.3d at 508. Using the language and holding of these two cases, Defendants cite to historical cases, within and outside the United States, that they contend establishes New Jersey's power to take possession of abandoned chattels as an essential and historical attribute that belongs to the State as a sovereign, and thus, the state officials are immune from this suit. Notwithstanding Defendants' novel assertion in the context of the facts of this case, the authorities on this issue weigh against Defendants' position.
This Court's analysis starts with the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Verizon Maryland Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635 (2002). In that case, having reviewed its prior precedent in Coeur d'Alene, the Supreme Court held that when "determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a 'straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.'" Id. at 645 (citations omitted). In that connection, while this Court does not find that Verizon Maryland expressly overruled the consideration of certain unique attributes of state sovereignty imposed by Coeur d'Alene, cases decided since Verizon Maryland, including the Third Circuit, endorse the "straightforward" inquiry when determining whether the Ex Parte Young doctrine applies. Notably, in Ameritech Corp v. McCann, 295 F. 3d 582, 588 (7th Cir. 2002), the Seventh Circuit expounded:
[defendant] also suggests that [plaintiff's] lawsuit cannot proceed because it impermissibly burdens the state's sovereign interest in law enforcement. In doing so, [defendant] urges this court--like the district court-- to examine the underlying nature of [plaintiff's] suit and its concomitant impact on the State's sovereign interests. While the Supreme Court in a relatively recent Eleventh Amendment case seemed to advocate this balancing approach, see Coeur d' Alene, 521 U.S. at 267-80 (principal opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C. J.), a majority of the Court in [Verizon Maryland] rejected it in favor of the straightforward inquiry described above . . . . As a result, we need not assess the precise nature of the State's sovereign interest in law enforcement--so long as [plaintiff's] complaint seeks prospective injunctive relief to cure an ongoing violation of federal law, the Eleventh Amendment poses no bar.
Id. at 588; Hill v. Kemp, 478 F.3d 1236, 1259 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1096 (2008)(instructed district courts to "not linger over the question whether 'special' or other sorts of sovereign interests are at stake before analyzing the nature of the relief sought"); see also Pennsylvania Federation of Sportsmen's Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 324 (3d Cir. 2002) ("[i]n determining whether the Ex parte Young doctrine avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar, the Supreme Court has made it quite clear that a court need only conduct a 'straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.'" (quotation omitted)).
Notwithstanding the limited value of Coeur d'Alene, Defendants maintain that based on a state's historical and universal rights towards lands integral to its territory, New Jersey's right to escheat is rooted in aspects of sovereignty tracing back to the ancient times. Defendants' analogy of a state's power to regulate its territory and its right to escheat abandoned property is inapt. Escheat laws, particularly those relating to intangible property rights, such as the ones at issue in this case, often implicate other states' property rights rather than the interest of one state. As such, cases addressing the constitutionality of unclaimed property law have rejected the defense of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Vega, 174 F.3d 870, 871 (7th Cir. 1999) (the Seventh Circuit, citing Coeur d'Alene, rejected an Eleventh Amendment defense to an action against an Illinois state official seeking to enjoin the application of Illinois's Unclaimed Property Act to pension benefits); American Petrofina Co. of Texas v. Nance, 859 F.2d 840, 841 (10th Cir. 1988); AmEx, 597 F.Supp. 2d at 722-23 (Eleventh Amendment did not bar action against Kentucky Treasurer who sought to enjoin enforcement of statute which shortened abandonment period of travelers checks from 15 years to seven years).
Having reviewed the aforementioned cases and their reasoning, the Court rejects Defendants' contention that New Jersey's ability to claim abandoned property and act as its custodian is a unique state sovereignty right deserving of immunity. The Court does not hold, because it need not, whether there are other essential state sovereign interests that could be afforded immunity by the Eleventh Amendment. Rather, in this case, the Court does not find that New Jersey's interest in claiming abandoned property rises to the level of unique state sovereignty as proclaimed in Coeur d'Alene. Instead, Plaintiffs' claims satisfy the "straightforward inquiry" because they seek injunctive and declaratory relief against defendant state officials' enforcement of Chapter 25, which Plaintiffs assert violates the federal Constitution. In that regard, Defendants' conduct is ongoing, and Plaintiffs only seek to have an injunction imposed prospectively. As such, Defendants are not immune from suit.
Pursuant to the Burford abstention doctrine, Defendants urge the Court to abstain from hearing the instant suits because timely state court review of Plaintiffs' claims is available, and the Complaint challenges central components of New Jersey's policy with regard to abandoned property. Defendants caution that federal review of Plaintiffs' claims will disrupt New Jersey's continued efforts to integrate Chapter 25 within a policy of protecting unclaimed property.
"The purpose of Burford is to 'avoid federal intrusion into matters of local concern and which are within the special competence of local courts.'" Matusow v. Trans-County Title Agency, LLC, 545 F.3d 241, 247-48 (3d Cir. 2008)(quoting Hi Tech Trans, LLC v. New Jersey, 382 F.3d 295, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2004)). In order to determine whether abstention under Burford is appropriate, the Third Circuit has instructed courts to employ a "two-step analysis." Id. (quotations and citations omitted). The first consideration is "whether timely and adequate state law review is available." Id. If such review is available, courts should abstain only if "the case . . . involves difficult questions of state law impacting on the state's public policy or . . . [the] exercise of jurisdiction would have a disruptive effect on the state's efforts to establish a coherent public policy on a matter of important state concern." Id. (citations and quotations omitted). Each of these factors need not be present to warrant abstention. Lac D'Amiante du Quebec, Ltee v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 864 F.2d 1033, 1043 (3d Cir. 1988).
Plaintiffs argue that this Court should not abstain because this case does not turn on any question of state law as the claims presented are only federal constitutional claims. However, as the Third Circuit has made clear, the focus of review is not whether the claims at issue are federal causes of action, but rather, whether the state law or regulation being reviewed involves matters of substantial public concern or whether it is of a complex technical scheme to which Burford is usually applied. Culinary Serv. of Del. Valley, Inc. v. Borough of Yardley, No. 09-4182, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 13485, at *21-22 (3d Cir. Jun. 30, 2010); see Rucci v. Cranberry Twp., 130 Fed. Appx. 572, 578 n.8 (3d Cir. 2005); Chiropractic Am. v. LaVecchia, 180 F.3d 99, 108 (3d Cir. 1999) (the "focus should not be on whether a federal claim has been presented, but rather on the nature of that claim."). In that regard, the Court will weigh the factors to determine whether abstention is appropriate.
The parties do not dispute that there could be adequate state law review; rather, Plaintiffs argue that there are no difficult questions of state law for the Court to address. To begin, the Court looks to Burford for guidance. In Burford, the Supreme Court acknowledged the complexity of the state administrative procedures that were in place to regulate the oil and gas industry in Texas, which it characterized "as [a] thorny problem as [it] has challenged the ingenuity and wisdom of legislatures." Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 318 (1943). Indeed, in the area of gas and drilling, courts unfamiliar with the industry would not be well-equipped to render decisions. See Mt. Holly Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Township of Mount Holly, No. 08-2584, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 87105, at *26 (D.N.J. Oct. 28, 2008). On the contrary, Chapter 25 is not difficult to review in the sense that it does not involve complex areas of expertise that should be left to the state. Instead, reviewing Chapter 25 "merely involve[s] reading and construing a statute, a task for which courts are best equipped." United Servs. Automobile Ass'n v. Muir, 792 F.2d 356, 365 (3d Cir. 1986) (Burford abstention did not apply because the interpretation of a statute prohibiting certain types of mergers did not require consideration of any other statute, did not require analysis of a complicated regulatory scheme and did not require peculiar local conditions or special expertise). Indeed, Burford abstention has no application when the Court is called upon to interpret an uncomplicated state statute. See, e.g., Mount Holly, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 87105 at *26-27 (finding that interpretation of the New Jersey Constitution, Local Redevelopment and Housing law and Open Public Meetings Act was not so difficult to warrant abstention under Burford); Tillery v. Hayman, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41656, at *10-11 (D.N.J. May 28, 2008)(regulatory scheme pertaining to custody in the Management Control Unit was not the sort of complex, technical regulatory scheme to which Burford is usually applied); Matusow, 545 F.3d at 248 (plaintiff's claims of violations of a statute governing title insurance polices and statute governing sheriff sales of property did "not involve any difficult questions of state law or implicate any complex state policies."). Accordingly, because no special expertise is needed in order for the Court to adjudicate the claims in this case and because Chapter 25 does not involve complex intertwined state laws, this factor is not implicated.
Next, Defendants contend that the challenged statute is an integral part of a detailed and exhaustive scheme to protect the interests of the rightful owners of the abandoned property. Notwithstanding Defendants' contention, Plaintiffs' claims do not attack any established New Jersey state policy. In that respect, Plaintiffs do not raise any objections regarding New Jersey's ability to escheat property for the benefit of its citizens. Rather, Plaintiffs challenge New Jersey's attempt to raise its own state revenue by enacting Chapter 25, which Plaintiffs claim runs afoul of the purpose of New Jersey's prior unclaimed property laws - to reunite abandoned property with its rightful owner. Indeed, the claims raised here only challenge the time period, both retroactively and prospectively, for which New Jersey could escheat certain abandoned property, as well as the additional administrative burden Chapter 25 imposes-these challenges hardly attack a detailed exhaustive policy scheme. Finally, for abstention purposes, the Court need not decide whether these matters involve substantial public concern.*fn11 Because the Court finds that the majority of the abstention factors are not implicated, that is, the claims in this case do not implicate a complex state regulatory scheme or New Jersey's ability to escheat property, abstention is not warranted.
Furthermore, with respect to plaintiffs, Food Council, Retail Association and AMEX Prepaid, an additional consideration for the Court is their claim that to the extent Chapter 25 regulates store valued cards, it is preempted by federal statute. Courts have held almost uniformly that "abstention is inappropriate when a federal plaintiff asserts a preemption/Supremacy Clause claim." See, e.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 491 U.S. 350, 362-363 (1989); Kentucky West Va. Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 791 F.2d 1111, 1115-1116 (3d Cir. 1986); Middle S. Energy, Inc. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 772 F.2d 404, 417 (8th Cir. 1985); Baggett v. Department of Professional Regulation, Bd. of Pilot Commissioners, 717 F.2d 521, 524 (11th Cir. 1983). This is because "supremacy clause claims are 'essentially ones of federal policy,' so that 'the federal courts are particularly appropriate bodies for the application of preemption principles.'" Kentucky West Va. Gas Co., 791 F.2d at 1115 (quoting Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 1980)). Although Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' assertion of preemption should be "well-founded" or should raise "substantial questions" of preemption, a reading of the Third Circuit precedent in Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. does not lead the Court to agree. To contrary, the circuit court, relying on sister circuit cases, held explicitly that where "Congress has created a statutory scheme . . . which arguably preempts the local regulation complained of, a fundamental element of Burford abstention is thrown into doubt . . . ." Id. at 1116 (emphasis added). Indeed, the court did not suggest that there must be an initial determination that the preemption claim has substantial merit. Here, Plaintiffs advance that those sections of Chapter 25 that address stored value cards violate the Supremacy Clause because those provisions are preempted by the federal CARD Act -- a congressional enactment specifically regulating stored value cards. Clearly, Plaintiffs, by having cited a congressional statutory scheme that arguably preempts the State's legislation, have satisfied their burden of showing that Burford abstention does not apply here. Accordingly, for the reasons already stated, as well as Plaintiffs' assertion of preemption, the Court will not abstain from hearing the merits of Plaintiffs' application for preliminary injunction.
Plaintiffs move to preliminarily enjoin the implementation of Chapter 25. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has outlined four factors that a court ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction must consider: (1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably injured by denial of the relief; (3) whether granting preliminary relief will result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the public interest. Crissman v. Dover Downs Entertainment Inc., 239 F.3d 357, 364 (3d Cir. 2001). The above factors merely "structure the inquiry" and no one element will necessarily determine the outcome. The court must engage in a delicate balancing of all the elements, and attempt to minimize the probable harm to legally protected interests between the time of the preliminary injunction to the final hearing on the merits. Constructors Association of Western Pa. v. Kreps, 573 F.2d 811, 815 (3d Cir.1978). The movant bears the burden of establishing these elements. Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 486 (3d Cir. 2000).
A. Substantive Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." The Supreme Court has long held that the clause has a substantive component. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1992) ("it is settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure") (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). The Third Circuit has explained that substantive due process "is an area of law 'famous for controversy, and not known for its simplicity.'" Nicholas v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 140 (3d Cir. 2000)(citations omitted). In that connection, the circuit clarified that the substantive due process encompasses at least two very different components. Id.
The first component of substantive due process is implicated when a plaintiff challenges the validity of a legislative act. Id. Typically, "a legislative act will withstand substantive due process challenge if the government 'identifies a legitimate state interest that the legislature could rationally conclude was served by the statute,' although legislative acts that burden certain 'fundamental' rights may be subject to stricter scrutiny." Id. (quotations and citations omitted); see Alexander v. Whitman, 114 F.3d 1392, 1403 (3d Cir. 1997). The second component, which is not implicated in this case, protects against certain types of non-legislative state action. To prevail on this claim, a plaintiff must first establish as a "threshold matter that [it] has a protected property interest to which Fourteenth Amendment's due process applies." Woodwind Estates, Ltd. v. Gretkowski, 205 F.3d 118, 123 (3d Cir. 2000). Here, Plaintiffs challenge the validity of Chapter 25 under the first component of substantive due process, and as such, the Court's discussion will be confined to this issue.
The first step in any substantive due process analysis is to determine the standard of review. "The choice of a standard of review . . . turns on whether a 'fundamental right' is implicated." Sammon v. New Jersey Bd. of Medical Examiners, 66 F.3d 639, 644 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). Here, the parties do not dispute that the rational basis test applies in this case.
Where rational basis review is appropriate, "a statute withstands a substantive due process challenge if the state identifies a legitimate state interest that the legislature rationally could conclude was served by the statute." Id. In determining whether a law comports with substantive due process, the inquiry is whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981). "The law need not be in every respect consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it." 616 F.2d at 689 (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955)); see also Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667, 682 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 984 (1992).
The Third Circuit has repeatedly cautioned that a court engaging in rational basis review is not entitled "to second guess the legislature on the factual assumptions or policy considerations underlying the statute. If the legislature has assumed that people will react to the statute in a given way or that it will serve the desired goal, the court is not authorized to determine whether people have reacted in the way predicted or whether the desired goal has been served." Sammon, 66 F.3d at 645. The sole question is "whether the legislature rationally might have believed the predicted reaction would occur or that the desired end would be served." Id. When legislation is being tested under rational basis review, "'those challenging the legislative judgment must convince the court that the legislative facts on which the classification [of the statute] is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived as true by the governmental decisionmaker.'" Id. (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979)); see also Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Township, 808 F.2d 1023, 1034-35 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987).
Indeed, "those attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden 'to negat[e] every conceivable basis which might support it.'" FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)); see, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993) (finding that laws scrutinized under rational basis review are "accorded a strong presumption of validity"); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-32 (1981). Ordinarily, that burden is insurmountable. "[C]courts are compelled under rational-basis review to accept a legislature's generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends. A classification does not fail rational basis review because it 'is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.'" Heller, 509 U.S. at 321 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Importantly, a state need not provide justification or rationale for its legislative decision. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that "legislative choice[s] [are] not subject to court factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data." Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 315l; see Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 989 (9th Cir. 2008) (state action survives rational basis review if "there is any reasonably conceivable [set]of facts that could provide a rational basis for the challenged law" (quoting Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 313 (internal quotation marks omitted))). The rationale for such a deferential standard is that the legislative process will, from time to time, yield imperfect results, but "[o]nly by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to function." Lehnhausen, 410 U.S. at 365 (quoting Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 510 (1937)). Nevertheless, the rational basis test is not a "toothless" one, Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976), and "it is the function of courts . . . to determine in each case whether circumstances vindicate the challenged regulation as a reasonable exertion of governmental authority or condemn it as arbitrary or discriminatory." Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536 (1934).
The Contracts Clause, found in Article I, § 10, of the Constitution, states that "No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." To ascertain whether there has been a Contract Clause violation, through retroactive application or otherwise, a court must first inquire whether the change in state law has "operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship." General Motors v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992) (citations omitted)(emphasis added); Nieves v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 819 F.2d 1237, 1243 (3d Cir. 1987); Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411 (1983).
In determining the degree to which an obligation has been impaired, one must be mindful that the Contracts Clause is designed to "enable individuals to order their personal and business affairs according to their particular needs and interests. Once arranged, those rights and obligations are binding under the law, and the parties are entitled to rely on them." The obligations protected by the clause "include [ ] not only the express terms [of the contract] but also the contemporaneous state law pertaining to interpretation and enforcement."
Legal Asset Funding, LLC v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 155 F.Supp. 2d 90, 99 (D.N.J. 2001) (quoting United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19-20 n. 17 (1977)). See also Transport Workers Union of America, Local 290 By and Through Fabio v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp., 145 F.3d 619, 621 (3d Cir. 1998). Thus, in sum, the "Contract Clause analysis requires three threshold inquiries: (1) whether there is a contractual relationship; (2) whether a change in a law has impaired that contractual relationship; and (3) whether the impairment is substantial." Transport Workers, 145 F.3d at 621.
If the court concludes that the challenged act works a substantial impairment, the court must then engage in a careful examination of "whether the law at issue has a legitimate and important public purpose." Id. Finally, the court must consider "whether the adjustment of the rights of the parties to the contractual relationship was reasonable and appropriate in light of that purpose." Id.; West Indian Co., Ltd. v. Government of Virgin Islands, 844 F.2d 1007, 1021 (3d Cir. 1988) ("Once a legitimate public purpose has been identified, the next inquiry is whether the adjustment of 'the rights and responsibilities of contracting parties [is based] upon reasonable conditions and [is] of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying [the legislation's] adoption.'" (quoting Energy Reserves Group,, 459 U.S. at 411-12)). That determination will necessarily depend upon whether the state is a party to the contract at issue. If it is not, "'as is customary in reviewing economic and social regulation, . . . courts properly defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure.'" Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 412-13 (quoting United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 22-23). If the state is a party to the contract, such deference is inappropriate, and the court may inquire whether a less drastic alteration of contract rights could achieve the same purpose and whether the law is reasonable in light of changed circumstances. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 25-26, 30-32. Generally, the standard of review applied to the court's review of the legislature's interests is more exacting than rational basis. See Legal Asset, 155 F.Supp.2d at 100-01 (citing Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 733 (1984)); Mercado-Boneta v. Administracion del Fondo de Compensacion al Paciete Through Ins. Com'r of Puerto Rico, 125 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1997) ("This inquiry is more searching than the rational basis review employed in Due Process or Equal Protection analysis. Although deference is due to the legislature, and weight is given to the legislature's own statement of purposes for the law, a court must undertake its own independent inquiry to determine the reasonableness of the law and the importance of the purpose behind it.").
The Takings Clause prohibits states from taking private property for public use without just compensation. U.S. Const. Amend. V, XIV; County Concrete Corp. v. Town of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159, 164 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 290 (3d Cir. 2001)). To succeed on a takings claim, a plaintiff must . . . demonstrate that the state's action affected its "legally cognizable property interest." Prometheus Radio Project v. F.C.C., 373 F.3d 372, 428 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985) and Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160-61 (1980)).
There is no "set formula' for determining when governmental action constitutes a taking ...." State of New Jersey v U.S., 91 F.3d 463, 468 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978). To the contrary, courts must engage in a factual inquiry to determine whether a taking has been effected. In ascertaining whether a taking has affected a property interest, "[r]elevant considerations include the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and . . . the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations." Id. (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124) (alterations in text omitted). The nature of the action is another relevant consideration. While "a physical invasion of land [is] more likely to constitute a taking, . . . a public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good, . . . ordinarily will not be compensable." Id.
Hence, it is not enough that an enactment "adversely affect recognized economic values." Id. The enactment must "interfere with interests that were sufficiently bound up with the reasonable expectations of the claimant to constitute 'property' for Fifth Amendment purposes." Id. Thus, legislation that prohibits the most beneficial use of property or even precludes an individual from operating his business does not necessarily violate the clause. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 125-27. This is true whether or not the individual suffers substantial economic harm. Id. at 125.
Where a taking has been effected, the Takings Clause does not prohibit the taking altogether, but merely requires that there be a "public purpose" for it, and that "just compensation" be paid. RLR Investments, LLC v. Town of Kearny, Civ. Action No. 09-3100, 2010 WL 2650478, *2 (3d Cir. Jul. 2, 2010). In terms of public purpose, "[s]tate legislatures have 'broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power,' Id. (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483 (2005)), and courts give 'great respect' to those determinations." Id. (citation omitted). In short, a taking is effected for a public use "'where the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose.'" Id. (quoting Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984)).
Moreover, courts equate the public use requirement as "coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers." Carole Media LLC v. New Jersey Transit Corp., 550 F.3d 302, 307 (3d Cir. 2008). A taking effected for a purely private purpose or under the pretext of a public purpose would not withstand constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 309. However, "that a taking creates incidental benefits for individual private parties does not condemn that taking as having only a private purpose." Id. (internal quotation mark and citation omitted). So, for example, economic regulation that effects a taking in order to encourage revitalization is a public use under the Takings Clause. Id. at 310. That a state legislature may also have revenue raising as one of its motives in enacting the challenged legislation does not render a taking unconstitutional. Id.
In the escheat context, several cases find no Takings Clause violation based on a state's retention of interest earned on the abandoned property while held in state custody. See Simon v. Weissman, 301 Fed.Appx. 107, 113 (3d Cir. 2008) (collecting cases). By way of example, the Seventh Circuit in In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 744 F.2d 1252 (7th Cir. 1984), rejected an owner-asserted takings claim, reasoning:
Since any legitimate claimant has been afforded an adequate remedy against the United States, there is no bar to interim governmental use of the escheated money deposited in the Treasury and to the credit of the United States.
Id. at 1255 (internal quotation marks omitted). These sorts of cases rely upon the Supreme Court's rationale in Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982), that "[i]t is the owner's failure to make any use of the property- and not the action of the State-that causes the lapse of the property right; there is no 'taking' that requires compensation." Texaco, 454 U.S. at 529. In other words, an owner that abandoned its property, also abandons his or her right to earn interest on that property ...