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In re Application of Telfair

October 15, 2010


The opinion of the court was delivered by: Garrett E. Brown, Jr. Chief Judge United States District Court



BROWN, Chief Judge

Ultimately, this matter comes before the Court upon Petitioner Tommie H. Teflair's ("Telfair") submission of two filings, see Docket Entries Nos. 5 and 6, which Petitioner qualified, jointly, as his motion for reconsideration ("Motion") of the Court's prior decision entered in the instant matter. For the reasons detailed below, Telfair's present motion will be granted in form.*fn1

However, the Court's prior disposition of Telfair's claims will not change. Additionally, also for the reasons detailed below, a limited order of preclusion will be entered with regard to all prospective pro se filings executed by Telfair in this District, in the currently pending, closed and future matters.

A meaningful discussion of the issues at hand is not feasible without a careful examination of Petitioners' (that is, Telfair and Catrina R. Gatling's)*fn2 prior actions in this District. This chain of prior actions will be subdivided into two groups: (a) the criminal matter being prosecuted against Gatling; and (b) the actions initiated against or by Telfair (that group, in turn, is comprised of two distinct categories, i.e.: (1) the matters initiated in connection with Telfair's currently ongoing criminal prosecution; and (2) the civil actions initiated by Telfair seemingly in response to his -- and, perhaps, Gatling's -- prosecution).


A. Telfair's Criminal Prosecution

It appears that the relevant events began to unfold about half a decade ago when,

[o]n . . . September 5, 2006, officers of the Newark Police Department were dispatched to a residence at 185 Parker Street, Newark, New Jersey, to investigate a report of gunfire. Upon arriving at the scene, officers were met by two occupants of the residence who stated that they had heard gunshots fired at the backdoor of the home. Law enforcement officers investigated the rear entrance to the home and discovered several bullet holes in the back door and empty shell casings nearby. After entering the residence with the apparent consent of the two occupants, law enforcement officers observed bullet holes in the front of a refrigerator in the kitchen. An officer then examined and opened the refrigerator, finding a projectile in the bottom of the refrigerator. While searching for other projectiles and evidence of the shooting, the officer discovered in plain view clear plastic containers holding a substance resembling cocaine base. The officers subsequently discovered an additional substance that field tested positive for the presence of heroin, as well as several small bags containing quantities of heroin. On the following day, agents from the Drug Enforcement Administration (the "DEA") interviewed the two occupants, who stated that the heroin discovered in the residence belonged to an individual named "Hassan Gatling," an apparent alias for [Telfair]. The two occupants stated that they packaged certain quantities of heroin discovered at the residence at the direction of [Telfair] for the purpose of distribution. The two occupants further stated that they had received payment, in the form of cash and goods, from Defendant for preparing and packaging the heroin for distribution. A complaint and an arrest warrant were allegedly issued for [Telfair] on or about September 8, 2006. On January 23, 2007, [Telfair] was arrested at the home of his girlfriend, [who was] Gatling. . . . During a post-arrest interview with law enforcement, [Telfair] apparently admitted that he had engaged in criminal conduct and narcotics trafficking with several individuals on numerous occasions in the State of New Jersey and elsewhere. After extensive questioning, [Telfair] requested to speak with [an] attorney [Telfair knew], Paul Bergrin. Law enforcement officers allegedly complied with [Telfair's] request and ceased questioning him. After a brief continuance following [Telfair's] arrest, a one-count criminal indictment was filed on March 29, 2007 charging [him] with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin . . . . A superseding indictment was filed on May 7, 2007[,] . . . charging [him] with conspiracy to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin . . . . [That] superseding indictment was dismissed without prejudice [and Telfair] was arraigned on a [new superseding] two-count indictment . . . charging conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute 1 kilogram or more of heroin . . . and distribution and possession with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin.

USA v. Telfair ("Telfair-DMC"), 08-cr-0757 (DMC), Docket Entry No. 14 (slip opinion, hereinafter "DMC"), at 2-4.

Telfair's subsequent criminal proceedings were conducted in this District and presided over by the Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh ("Judge Cavanaugh"). Telfair proved to be a prolific pro selitigant. For instance, during the short (two-month) period from the time of his second re-indictment to Judge Cavanaugh's entry of the DMC decision, Telfair:

made roughly ten separate pro se filings . . . contain[ing] multiple and repetitive requests. From these filings, [Judge Cavanaugh] identified ten substantive motions upon which it appear[ed] that [Telfair was] seek[ing] relief, including: a motion to dismiss the second superseding indictment; a motion to be released on bail; a motion to suppress statements made and evidence seized; a motion for production of Jencks materials; a motion for production of Rule 404(b) evidence; a motion for production of exculpatory and impeachment materials; a motion requesting that the Government preserve notes of government agents; a motion for a polygraph test; and a motion for a change of venue [ -- these motions were made even though] many of these exact motions and arguments were [already] considered and decided by [Judge Cavanaugh] in a hearing on April 7, 2008[,] and a related Order issued on May 20, 2008 . . . .

DMC, at 4-5 and n.2 (the language of footnote 2 is incorporated, in part, in the main text).

Addressing all Telfair's motions anew, Judge Cavanaugh denied the bulk of these motions, while granting -- in full -- Telfair's applications for production of Rule 404(b) evidence and preservation of notes of government agents, and also granting -- in part -- his motions for polygraph test and for production of exculpatory and impeachment materials. See id. at 15. Judge Cavanaugh's order and accompanying DMC opinion to that effect were entered on December 10, 2008. See Telfair-DMC, Docket Entries 14 and 15.

While only three weeks passed since the entry of the DMC opinion and accompanying order, during that time Telfair flooded Judge Cavanaugh's chambers with new applications and caused Judge Cavanaugh to hold a conference with regard to then-existing state of affairs in Telfair's criminal proceedings. See Telfair-DMC, Docket Entry No. 19. Upon finding Telfair's new submissions frivolous, Judge Cavanaugh entered an order dated January 9, 2010, directing the Clerk to refuse acceptance of any pro semotion from Telfair until further notice. See Docket Entry No. 16. However, as the discussion below illustrates, Judge Cavanaugh's order had no apparent effect on Telfair's prolific pro se filings.

It appears that, at that juncture, Telfair was represented by a certain Mr. Kimball (a Criminal Justice Act panel attorney who, apparently, being duly appointed by Judge Cavanaugh, replaced Bergrin upon Telfair's request for termination of Bergrin's representation): the record in Telfair- DMC reflects Telfair's pro se submission made with regard to Kimball, Telfair-DMC, Docket Entry No. 17; that submission was filed less than a week after Judge Cavanaugh's directive barring Telfair's pro se filings. See id. The submission made with regard to Kimball read, in its entirety, as follows:

Dear Mr. Kimball,

I hope that by now you have come to understand that I don't plan to quit fighting, even if that means firing you. My life, and the life of my family, is all that matters to me, not your job not the D.A. just me and my family. So I'm kindly warning you, to do what needs to be done so that all these violations of law(s) can and will be addressed, rather by way of my present appeal, or by starting to actually put up a fight in my case. Listen, I am far from stupid, I now know what my past present counsel was/is suppose to have done, and what now needs to be done. For example: the word, supersede simply means, to make void, or repeal by taking the place of. Now what is bothering me is that you have allowed this error in facts and/or errors in laws to go uncontested, as it pertains to my now newly 2-count indictment which is a serious double jeopardy violation, and is the reckless act of multiplicity in the first instance. But of cores [sic] you already know that, the attempted innocent misrepresentation is costing my legal process to endure way to much judicial abuse. So I will keep this easily to the point, pursuant to[] rule 18 U.S.C.A. 30064 3006A, you really need to get my forensic specialist, and my investigator, and get me that polygraph test and the polygraph test specialist, I want to see the documentations/credentials of all parties being requested, and for the record I know that the federal government has the money, and is obligated to provide every aspect of effective representation, even if it is not you per se. In closing, I hope we have a proper understanding counselor, I'll see you on or about the week of January 16th, 2009!

Respectfully Submitted, Mr. Tommie H Telfair Pro-se Litigant Cc File: Tommie H Telfair Clerk of the Courts Honorable Judge Dennis M. Cavanaugh Murray & Kimball's Law Offices Clerks of the Appeals Court

Telfair-DMC, Docket Entry No. 17 ("Letter-Kimball") (original bolding, underlining and capitalization removed).

Five days later, Telfair filed a "notice an[d] request to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit" challenging Judge Cavanaugh's decision to deny some of his motions that were addressed in the DMC opinion. See Telfair-DMC, Docket Entry No. 18 ("Telfair-Appeal"). In addition, six days later, Telfair filed a lengthy letter addressed to Judge Cavanaugh; the letter asserted that Telfair "struggle[d] in this very serious life threatening circumstance," scolded Judge Cavanaugh for seeking to bar Telfair's pro se filings, asserted "prejudicial and judicial abuse/neglect" on the part of another judge in this District, Honorable William J. Martini ("Judge Martini")*fn3 and requested assignment of another court-appointed counsel (in place of Kimball) to represent Telfair. See Telfair-DMC, Docket Entry No. 20. Seemingly aiming to re-stress his points to Judge Cavanaugh, Telfair -- two weeks later -- repeated the very same filing, supplementing it with another copy of his Letter-Kimball. See Telfair-DMC, Docket Entries Nos. 21 and 22.

Within three following weeks (during which Judge Cavanaugh held a conference addressing the then-pending procedural aspects of Telfair's criminal proceeding and entered an order addressing the then-pending pre-trial motions and request for discovery, see Telfair-DMC, Docket Entries Nos. 23 and 24), Telfair's counsel was replaced again: Judge Cavanaugh appointed -- to the position no longer held by Kimball -- Mr. Michael N. Pedicini ("Pedicini"). See Telfair-DMC, Docket Entry No. 25.

During the next half year, while Telfair's criminal proceedings moved forward, see TelfairDMC, Docket Entries Nos. 26, 28, 31 and 32, Telfair filed:

(a) a letter requesting -- on the grounds of his "being procedurally repressed due to the contributory negligence of counsel [and the operation of what he qualified as] prejudic[ial] appellate rule 31.3" -- production of "documentation and proof of documentation" of all records submitted to the Court of Appeals with regard to Telfair-Appeal, see Telfair-DMC, Docket Entry No. 27; and

(b) a document titled "Attorney & Client Arrangement(s)" in which Telfair notified Pedicini of Telfair's opinion that his prior defense counsel performed "constructive fraud [and] misconduct in Office, & Rules of Professional Conduct/Responsibility and the violations thereof" and demanded from Pedicini "arrangement(s)" in the form of twenty-nine items, the list of which was comprised, inter alia, of such irrelevant (either to the facts underlying Telfair's prosecution or to the duties of his counsel), and/or confusing utterances as: "investigator and forensic expert," "the filing of the pertinent motions," "memorandum in support of laws and erred fact," "motion to remove a.k.a. [i.e., to remove the abbreviation of the 'also known as' designation]," "appellant type motions," "silver platter doctrine violations," "bill of rights violations," "spoliation," "falsus in uno," "mens rea," "stare decisis doctrine," "address DEA fraud & misconduct/fraud of the prosecutor(s) (via) office of professional conduct and responsibility in Washington," "protection type order for the client & client's family," "address the illegitimate dates and/or info on all paperwork," etc. See Telfair-DMC, Docket Entry No. 30 (use of parenthetical and "&" sign in original, asystemic bolding, capitalization, italization and underlining removed). The "Attorney & Client Arrangement(s)" concluded with Telfair's directive to Pedicini to seek recusal of Judge Cavanaugh on the grounds of Telfair's opinion that Judge Cavanaugh was biased against Telfair. See id. at 2-3.

Apparently complying with the wishes of his client, Pedicini moved for recusal of Judge Cavanaugh, see Telfair-DMC, Docket Entry No. 33, clarifying that he was making that application upon Telfair's directive and explaining that Telfair's opinion about Judge Cavanaugh's "bias" was derived from Telfair's displeasure with those prosecutorial actions which Telfair qualified as "misconduct" and from Telfair's disappointment with Judge Cavanaugh's finding that the venue of Telfair's prosecution need not be changed. See Telfair-DMC, Docket Entry No. 33-1. Pencini's application for recusal was denied by Judge Cavanaugh, who continued presiding over Telfair's prosecution, conducted a chain of conferences and issued numerous orders propelling Telfair's criminal proceedings. See Telfair-DMC, Docket Entries Nos. 35, 36, 44 and 45.

In response to Judge Cavanaugh's actions, Telfair generated new filings, such as:

(a) an eleven-page single-spaced document titled "Urgent Consideration Required" aiming, apparently, to teach Judge Cavanaugh procedural and substantive law, see Telfair-DMC, Docket Entry No. 37;

(b) a thirty-six-page document titled "Conditional Application or Alternative Petition" asserting that Judge Cavanaugh's decisions propelling Telfair's criminal action were a result of a collective plot, allegedly perpetrated by all prosecutors and all Telfair's defense attorneys, Telfair-DMC, Docket Entry No. 38;

(c) a twenty-eight-page document virtually identical to the prior one, Telfair-DMC, Docket Entry No. 39;

(d) a five-page "Affidavit of Merit(s)" asserting that the DEA "agents and/or prosecution did knowingly threaten [Telfair] physically, mentally, and emotionally . . . by way of using [Telfair's] children(s) mom as leverage," see Telfair-DMC, Docket Entry No. 40;

(e) a twenty-eight-page single-space motion seeking to use Telfair's "polygraph-test examiner as [Telfair's] character witness," see Telfair-DMC, Docket Entry No. 46;

(f) a two-part seventy-seven-page application seeking, again, dismissal of indictment on the grounds on the ineffectiveness of Telfair's counsel (presumably, Pedicini); that requests was accompanied by Telfair's opinion that his prosecutors were committing "prosecutorial misconduct, constitutional-tort and impeachable-offenses," see Telfair-DMC, Docket Entries Nos. 48 and 48-1;

(g) a forty-page "motion to dismiss due to the government's vindictiveness, selectiveness, and bad faith prosecution, double jeopardy, equal protection violation(s)," see Telfair-DMC, Docket Entry No. 49; etc.

While Telfair's flood of motions accumulated before Judge Cavanaugh, Telfair's criminal trial began. See Telfair-DMC, Docket Entry No. 50 (indicating that the trial began on February 15, 2010). Thereafter, Telfair filed an application seeking Judge Cavanaugh's appointment of Telfair as his own co-counsel (on the grounds that -- in Telfair's opinion -- Pedicini was "refus[ing] to follow his client's instructions" by not "explosing [sic] misconduct in office, scheme to defraud, police-corruption, conspiracy to the deprivation of rights, conflict in law & facts, illegal-cohesion," etc.). See Telfair-DMC, Docket Entry No. 51. That latest application was filed on February 19, 2010 (that is, four days into Telfair's trial) and -- its merits or lack thereof regardless -- was moot upon receipt, as on that date Telfair was found guilty by the jurors empaneled for his trial. See Telfair-DMC, Docket Entries Nos. 53 and 54; see also Docket Entry No. 56, at 2 (denying Telfair's request to "co-counsel").

Having been found guilty, Telfair swiftly produced another flood of voluminous applications, including:

(a) a notice of appeal;

(b) a twenty-seven-page motion to "take judicial notice" of "improper joinder of offenses";

(c) a two-part sixty-seven-page "amended version" of the same;

(d) a motion to "appoint new counsel" asserting that Telfair was "procedurally deprived" by Pedicini's "intentional neglect(s) [and] contributory-negligence," and informing the court that Telfair filed a legal malpractice action against Pedicini, see Telfair-DMC, Docket Entries Nos. 57-61 (and Docket Entry No. 71, at 10, replicating the summons in the action Telfair initiated against Pedicini), etc.

These flocks of filings, in turn, prompted: (a) Judge Cavanaugh's entry of another order directing the Clerk not to accept any further pro se filings from Telfair, see Telfair-DMC, Docket Entry No. 56, which -- same as the previous Judge Cavanaugh's order to that effect -- was of no avail, and did not halt Telfair's exercises in pro se litigation; and (b) Pedicini's application to Judge Cavanaugh asking to relieve him from the duty of representing Telfair (in that application, Pedicini clarified that he was requesting relief in order to avoid the danger of representation while under conflict of interest). See Telfair-DMC, Docket Entry No. 72 (order granting Pedicini's request).

Finally, as Telfair began awaiting his sentencing, he submitted another (fifty-page) letter to the Court of Appeals seeking to prompt the resolution of Telfair-Appeal, see Telfair-DMC, Docket Entry No. 71; in response to which the Court of Appeals satisfied Telfair's desire for a speedy review. See Telfair-DMC, Docket Entry No. 73 (denying Telfair's appeal as interlocatory).

B. Telfair's Civil Actions in this District

While the dockets in the actions comprising Telfair's criminal prosecution appear rather lengthy,*fn4 the cumulative of these dockets pales in comparison with Telfair's activity this Court detected in the civil actions Telfair initiated in this District.

1. Proceedings Before Judge Martini

As noted supra, one of Telfair's submissions addressed to Judge Cavanaugh asserted "prejudicial and judicial abuse/neglect" by Judge Martini. See Telfair-DMC, Docket Entry No. 20. That assertion was seemingly made in reference to Telfair's civil action Telfair v. Tandy ("TelfairWJM"), 08-cv-0731 (WJM).

Telfair-WJM was initiated by Telfair's submission of a civil complaint, executed pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,403 U.S. 388 (1971); that complaint (a nine-page single-spaced narrative) was received by the Clerk on February 7, 2008, see TelfairWJM, Docket Entry No. 1, at 1, that is, one week after Judge Cavanaugh appointed Kimball (who replaced Bergrin) as Telfair's defense counsel. See USA v. Telfair, 07-0272 (DMC) (reflecting the pertinent time line). Assessing Telfair's Bivens complaint, Judge Martini observed as follows:

Telfair, a federal prisoner currently confined at the Hudson County Correctional Center in South Kearny, New Jersey, . . . brings a civil rights complaint against the following defendants: Karen P. Tandy, Administrator of the . . . DEA; Gerard P. McAleer, Director [of the] DEA in Newark; 1-50 unknown DEA agents; 1-50 unknown federal agents; Ray McCarthy, Chief of Police [in] Newark; Murad Muhammed [an officer with the] Newark Police . . . ; 1-50 unknown police officers; Paul W. Ber[g]rin, Esq.; and Christopher Christie, United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey. . . . Telfair alleges that on January 23, 2007, he was taken into custody by DEA agents, who used terroristic threats to force [him] to admit to drug trafficking crimes or cooperate with the agents in their investigation. . . . Telfair further alleges that he had repeatedly requested an attorney during his custodial interrogation, but his request was denied. . . . Telfair alleges that he was pressured to take the Government's plea offer, and not to make any motions with respect to the criminal charges against him. . . . Telfair claims that the defendants violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Namely, he asserts claims of false arrest, unlawful search and seizure, falsifying documents and evidence, intimidation, criminal threats, coercion, denial of his Miranda rights, denial of medical treatment, theft or conversion of personal property, denial of due process and equal protection, selective and malicious prosecution, and denial of his right to a speedy trial.

Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 14, at 1-5.

Since, at the time of Judge Martini's entering his decision, the Supreme Court of the United States was yet to decide its pivotal standard-of-review case, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009), which unambiguously articulated the applicability of the standard of review set forth in an antitrust case, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), to civil rights claims, Judge Martini employed, out of abundance of caution, the test set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), which was conclusively archived in Iqbal. See Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 14, at 8 (relying on Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), for reading of the Twombly standard as a test compatible with and substantively identical -- for the purposes of civil rights challenges -- to that in Conley).

So assessing Telfair's claims, Judge Martini concluded that Telfair's false arrest claims were viable based on Telfair's conclusion "that the DEA agents and other police officers had no reasonable suspicion or probable cause to arrest him."*fn5 See Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 14, at 14. Therefore, Judge Martini concluded that Telfair's false arrest claim should survive sua sponte dismissal. See id. However, pursuant to the holdings of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and Wallace v. Kato, 127 S.Ct. 1091 (2007), Judge Martini also concluded that this false arrest claim should be stayed. Then, switching to Telfair's conclusion that the DEA agents and Newark police officers conducted an unlawful search, Judge Martini ruled that this claim, too, was subject to stay under Wallace v. Kato. See Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 14, at 19.

Upon so concluding, Judge Martini turned to the remainder of Telfair's claims. Specifically, he dismissed Telfair's claims against Bergrin (for failure to meet the color-of-law requirement), see id. at 21, as well as Telfair's claims against prosecutors (on the grounds of prosecutorial immunity), see id. at 23, and also dismissed the claim of malicious prosecution (as premature). See id. at 24.

So finding, Judge Martini switched to Telfair's claims based on the unelaborated allegation that "his Miranda rights were violated," see id. at 25, and dismissed these claims (on the grounds that police questioning without a Miranda warning cannot give rise to a cognizable Bivens claim). See id. at 25-26. Similarly dismissing Telfair's due process, speedy trial and equal protection claims, see id. at 26-27, and his property claims barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act, see id. at 29, Judge Martini directed service solely as to a single Telfair's claim that was not subject to dismissal or stay, i.e., the claim based on Telfair's unelaborated assertion that Telfair was "denied medical treatment" for his allegedly broken hand. See id. at 27-28.

Since Judge Martini made express findings only with regard to Telfair's claims (without addressing Telfair's allegations as they applied to each particular defendant named in the caption of Telfair's civil complaint), the Clerk correctly discerned that Telfair's claims against Christie and Bergrin were dismissed. However, since the discussion provided in Judge Martini's decision did not expressly correlate the identities of other defendants with any other Telfair claim, the Clerk -- out of abundance of caution -- served process on all remaining defendants. i.e., on Ms. Tandy and Messrs. McAleer, McCarthy and Muhammad. See Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 16.

Eventually, Tandy and McAleer moved for summary judgment asserting, inter alia, that Telfair's claims had to be dismissed as based solely on Tandy and McAleer's supervisory positions. See Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 30 (making the argument the correctness of which has become self-evident in light of the Supreme Court's 2009 decision, Iqbal). Judge Martini granted Tandy and McAller summary judgment (pointing out that Telfair's pleadings -- both the original complaint and the amended one -- were barren of any allegations as to Tandy and McAller's personal involvement in any alleged wrong). See Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 41.

However, neither Tandy and McAleer's successful Rule 56 motions (nor the decisions that Judge Martini entered addressing Telfair's claims) renders Telfair-WJM a remarkable proceeding. Rather, the flood of submissions Telfair packed into that action renders that matter an anomaly.

Indeed, in addition to his original and amended complaints, Telfair filed, inter alia:

(a) a ten-page single-spaced "petition in support of civil motion," to Judge Martini, see TelfairWJM, Docket Entry No. 12;

(b) a nineteen-page "memorandum of law in support of bail motion and due process violations," to Judge Martini but also addressing issues not raised in Telfair's original or amended pleadings, see Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 13;

(c) an appeal with regard to Judge Martini's decision (asserting that "while [Telfair] struggle[s] in the fight for [his] life," Judge Martini improperly erred in his conclusions by dismissing Telfair's claims on such a petty basis as Telfair's failure to assert sufficient grounds for Telfair's claims), see Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 20;

(d) another letter asserting that, while Telfair "struggle[s] in this very serious legal circumstance[, he is] being forced between a rock and a hard place" by Judge Martini's "sabotaging [his] case intentionally [and] allow[ing] much miscarriage of justice to be swept under the rug," see Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 25;

(e) a letter apparently related to Telfair's legal malpractice action against Bergrin,*fn6 putting Judge Martini on notice of Telfair's opinion that Bergrin was "intentionally stalling these proceedings with which [Bergrin] is causing serious additional injury to [Telfair's] legal process," see Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 31;

(f) a "declaration in support of plaintiff-petitioner(s) civil-action," in which he "respectfully request[ed Judge Martini to] offer [Telfair] the constitutionally fair administration of justice," see Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 32;

(g) a "declaration in support of petitioner(s)," stating effectively the same, see Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 33;

(h) one more "declaration," asserting -- again -- the same, see Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 34;

(i) a letter aiming to prompt the Court of Appeals to reach a speedier decision with regard to Telfair's Appeal of Judge Martini's screening of the complaint in Telfair-WJM, see TelfairWJM, Docket Entry No. 37;

(j) a Rule 60 motion, see Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 38;

(k) a copy of Telfair's "Attorney & Client Arrangement(s)" aimed at Pedicini, the counsel representing Telfair in Telfair-DMC, see Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 39;

(l) a letter notifying Judge Martini that Telfair was applying for certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, see Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 43;

(m) a letter providing Judge Martini with details of Telfair's application for certiorari, see Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 44;

(n) a thirty-page correspondence comprised of a potpourri of documents created with regard to Telfair's criminal prosecution, see Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 45;

(o) a thirty-six-page three-part "conditional application or alternative petition," informing Judge Martini of Telfair's opinion that, with regard to his criminal proceedings, "the government and state officials have conspired to the malicious manifest deprivation of rights and the perpetration of a fraud tantamount to impeachable-offenses," see Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 46;

(p) an "affidavit of merit in lieu of certification in support of legal-matter(s)," reciting those questions that were asked during Telfair's polygraph test administered in connection with Telfair-DMC, see Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 47;

(q) a twenty-nine-page three-part "joinder tort complaint & motion to consolidate" asserting that Telfair's "prosecutions . . . have been initiated with unethical conduct and character, and with purpose of covering for state & government fraud and/or corruption, tantamount to wrongful arrest and the perpetration of a fraud & bad faith prosecution," see Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 48;

(r) another, this time thirty-one-page and six-part "joinder tort complaint," alleging the very same, see Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 49;

(s) a thirty-one-page letter reciting the same, once again, see Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 50;

(t) a thirty-three-page letter, still elaborating on the same, see Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 51;

(u) a thirty-six-page five-part repeat of the same, progressing to the language that asserted "government and state vexatious, frivolous and/or capricious bad faith prosecution and outrageous official misconduct," see Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 52;

(v) a sixty-one-page six-part "conditional application or alternative petition for review (amended) in conjunction with . . . affidavit of merit(s) in support of civil/tort action," which was still maintaining the same, see Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 53;

(w) another copy of the same "conditional application," see Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 54;

(x) an application for "emergent" relief seeking immediate trial in Telfair-WJM, that is, in the action where the responsive papers were yet to be filed by the two non-dismissed defendants, McCarthy and Muhammad, see Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 55;

(y) one more copy of the same "emergent" application, see Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 56;

(z) a "conditional application for order to show cause," requesting Judge Martini to issue an order directing the United States Attorney General, the United States Solicitor General, the undersigned and all not dismissed (and also all dismissed) defendants in Telfair-WJM to "show cause as to why the hereof pleadings should not issue against them in accordance with prayer of said pleadings," see Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 58;

(aa) a "corrected" version of the same, which -- nonetheless -- was alleging exactly the same, see Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 59,

(bb) as well as another motion for reconsideration, another "petition issuance for order to show cause," one more "petition issuance for order to show cause," petition for de novo review, application for leave to file another "oversized brief," a notice seeking joinder of claims, a letter seeking the same, etc. See Telfair-WJM, Docket Entries Nos. 61-68.

Judge Martini, the Court of Appeals, the United Stated Supreme Court and even counsel for defendants in Telfair-WJM did not ignore Telfair's submissions. Indeed, the Court of Appeals dismissed Telfair's appeal without reaching the issue of procedural propriety or the merits of his appeal: the dismissal was for failure to prosecute as a result of Telfair's refusal to pay the requisite filing fee. See Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 40. The Supreme Court, too, addressed Telfair's challenges by issuing six decisions, first denying Telfair's application for a writ of mandamus, see In re Telfair, 130 S.Ct. 511, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 7902 (2009), then denying his request for a writ of prohibition, see In re Telfair, 130 S.Ct. 511, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 7924 (2009), then denying his application for certiorari, see In re Telfair, 130 S.Ct. 511, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 8176 (2009), after which denying his application for rehearing, see In re Telfair, 130 S.Ct. 1044 (2009), following that decision with another denial of request for rehearing, see In re Telfair, 130 S.Ct. 1045, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 8957 (2009), and concluding with the third round of denial of rehearing, see In re Telfair, 130 S.Ct. 1045, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 8958 (2009, entered on December 14). Meanwhile, counsel for the long-dismissed Telfair-WJM defendants Tandy and McAller filed a letter addressed to Judge Martini, seeking the Court's assistance in stopping Telfair from referring, in each and every application Telfasir was filing in Telfair-WJM, to Tandy and McAleer as actual defendants. See Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 57. In response, Judge Martini issued an order explaining to Telfair that Telfair's latest flood of submissions was virtually incomprehensible and, to the extent Telfair wished to raise any claims on behalf of Gatling, these claims were improperly asserted since Telfair lacked standing to raise challenges on Gatling's behalf. See Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 60.

Apparently taking notice of the fact that his submissions were read and responded to, Telfair increased his litigious efforts by filing six submissions during just the month of June, i.e.:

(a) a twenty-two page motion for reconsideration asserting that, in his claims related to Gatling, he should have been deemed to have standing to sue because he was conducting what he qualified as his own "chief litigation" of "tortuous-conduct . . . tantamount to ex post facto violation(s)," see Telfair-WJM, Docket Entry No. 61;

(b) a twenty-five page "de novo conditional application for issuance of order to show cause," see ...

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