On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Court, Cape May County, Docket No. FD-05-266-99.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Axelrad and Espinosa.
Plaintiff Sharon Marinozzi appeals from an order that denied her motion to modify the parenting-time schedule. We affirm.
Although her original motion only sought a modification of the parenting-time schedule, plaintiff sought a change in custody in her reply brief. Because this request was not the subject of the motion, it was not properly before the trial court, see R. 1:6-2(a), and will not be reviewed here. See also State v. Smith, 55 N.J. 476, 488 (1970).
By Order dated November 21, 2008, the court set a schedule that granted plaintiff parenting time every other weekend from Friday at 4:00 p.m. until Sunday at 9:00 p.m. when the parties' son, Eric, was not in school and until 7:30 p.m. on Sunday when Eric was in school. Plaintiff asked that the court modify this schedule so that Eric would stay with her for three months during the summer and for two weeks during the Christmas holiday.
The trial court denied this request without prejudice and noted its concerns about plaintiff's "precipitous and abrupt relocation to Texas" and the lack of information about her current living arrangements and how Eric would travel to and from Texas.
Plaintiff raises the following argument in her appeal:
PLAINTIFF'S RELOCATION TO THE STATE OF TEXAS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A BETTER ENVIRONMENT FOR HER CHILD CONSTITUTES PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY AND, THEREFORE, SHE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED ALL VISITATION AND/OR CUSTODY OF HER CHILD. THE RELATIONSHIP THE PLAINTIFF'S CHILD HAS WITH HIS STEPMOTHER IS SUCH THAT HE LIVES IN FEAR (PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME), BUT REQUESTS FOR THIRD-PARTY INTERVIEWS OF HER CHILD WERE NOT CARRIED OUT TO ESTABLISH WHAT HIS TRUE LIVING CONDITIONS ARE, OR THE EXTENT OF HARM VIA P.A.S.
Having reviewed the record and the briefs submitted by the parties, we are satisfied that plaintiff's argument lacks merit and that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying the relief sought. Therefore, we affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in the trial court's written opinion.