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Coley v. County of Essex

August 4, 2010

POLICE OFFICER WILLIE COLEY, PLAINTIFF,
v.
COUNTY OF ESSEX, ESSEX COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, INVESTIGATOR QUOVELLA SPRUILL AND JOHN/JANE DOE, DEFENDANTS.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. William J. Martini

OPINION

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This action is brought by Plaintiff Willie Coley ("Coley") against the Essex County Prosecutor's Office (the "ECPO") and Investigator Quovella Spruill ("Spruill"). Plaintiff filed the Complaint on August 28, 2008. The Complaint alleges violations of Plaintiff's civil rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth*fn1 Amendments, in connection with a 2007 sexual molestation investigation, in which he was the suspect, and for which he was later arrested and incarcerated. He seeks redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He further alleges Defendants conspired to violate his civil rights during the investigation. Plaintiff additionally claims several New Jersey state law causes of action in relation to that investigation, including: (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (2) negligence; (3) malicious abuse of process; (4) false arrest; (5) false imprisonment; and (6) defamation. The state causes of action are brought pursuant to the Court's supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Motion"). The Court, for the reasons elaborated below, will GRANT Defendants' motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 1, 2007, following a report from the New Jersey Department of Human Services, Office of Children's Services ("DYFS"), Defendant Spruill interviewed A.H., a fifteen year old girl who accused Plaintiff of sexual assault. Pl. Supp. Statement of Disputed Material Facts ¶ 2. Subsequently, Spruill obtained two written statements from A.H. Allegations in these two statements were consistent with the previous conversations A.H. had had with her school friends, her school counselor, and statements made independently to three DYFS workers. See Spruill Decl. Exhs. 1, 2. A.H. alleged Plaintiff had sexually assaulted her for a period of seven years, a period of time during which Plaintiff had been dating A.H.'s mother. See Pl. Supp. Statement of Disputed Material Facts ¶ 2, Harvey Decl. Exh. D. A.H. alleged Plaintiff touched her breasts and buttocks, rubbed his genitalia on her thigh and, initially, A.H. also alleged that on multiple occasions Plaintiff Coley had penetrated her. Spruill Decl. Exhs. 1, 2.

Later that night, following the interview, A.H.'s mother and A.H. consented to a wiretap in consequence of which recording devices were placed on two phone calls. See Harvey Decl. Exh. E. One phone call was between Plaintiff and A.H., the purported victim, and a second was between Plaintiff and the victim's mother. In the call between Plaintiff and the victim's mother, Plaintiff acknowledged he knew of A.H.'s allegations, one of which was that Plaintiff had "touched" her, and he failed to firmly deny the allegations. A similar phone call took place between A.H. and Plaintiff during which he again failed to firmly deny the allegations. See Spruill Decl. Exh. 4. Using the victim's multiple corroborating statements, Spruill's observation of A.H.'s demeanor while providing the statements, and the lack of a firm denial by Plaintiff in the context of the intercepted phone calls, Spruill presented a report detailing the evidence to her supervisor, Lieutenant Karen Freels. See Harvey Decl. Exh. D. Reviewing the evidence detailed in the report, Assistant Prosecutor Mark Ali determined probable cause existed to arrest Coley and directed Spruill to sign complaints on various charges including sexual assault, attempted sexual assault, and endangering a minor. Pl. Supp. Statement of Disputed Material Facts ¶ 6. A Municipal Court judge reviewed the complaints, found probable cause and signed a warrant for Coley's arrest. See Harvey Decl. Exh. J. Furthermore, a Superior Court judge, also finding probable cause, signed additional arrest warrants. See Spruill Decl. Exh. 5. Thereafter, on March 2, 2007, one day after Spruill's initial interview with A.H., Plaintiff turned himself in to the Montclair police department, was arrested, and was placed in jail. Pl. Supp. Statement of Disputed Material Facts ¶ 7. Purportedly unable to post bail, he remained incarcerated for 37 days. Id. ¶ 9.

On March 15, 2007, fifteen days after the initial report, and fourteen days after Plaintiff's arrest, A.H. submitted to both physical and psychological examinations. Id. ¶ 19. The psychological evaluation of A.H. revealed characteristics consistent with the profile of a sexually victimized child. See Harvey Decl. Exh. M, N. Interestingly, the physical evaluation revealed A.H.'s hymen to be intact. Pl. Supp. Statement of Disputed Material Facts ¶ 20. On March 21, 2007, Detective Spruill received a phone call from A.H. in which A.H. revised her statements, asserting Plaintiff had only attempted sexual intercourse with her one time, but had touched her "a lot" within the seven-year period. See Harvey Decl. Exh. BB. Her revised statement seems to suggest there was no penetration during the attempt, and thus, is arguably consistent with the physical examination. See Spruill Decl. Exhs. CC, DD. That same day, Spruill filed a timely report alerting the prosecutor's office to A.H.'s partial recantation. See id. Exh. BB. Notwithstanding this partial recantation, the prosecutor's office did not drop the sexual assault charges against Plaintiff. Plaintiff was already incarcerated at the time the prosecutor's office received the physical and psychological reports, and at the time A.H. revised her statements. Plaintiff remained incarcerated for another eighteen days after A.H.'s partial recantation.

About ten months later, on January 28, 2008, A.H. and her mother visited the prosecutor's office and spoke to Detective Spruill. See id. Exh. EE. At that meeting, A.H. retracted her allegations, admitting she had lied for various reasons. See id. That same day, Spruill presented a report detailing the retraction to the prosecutor's office. See id.; cf. infra note 4. Nonetheless, on February 13, 2008, Assistant Prosecutor Ali sought to indict Plaintiff before a New Jersey grand jury. Pl. Supp. Statement of Disputed Material Facts ¶ 45. The grand jury entered a no bill decision, that is, the grand jury decided not to indict Plaintiff based upon the evidence it heard. Id. ¶ 48. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed this action.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, the discovery [including, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file] and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 340 (3d Cir. 1990). A factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, and is material if it will affect the outcome of the trial under governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). At the summary judgment stage, "the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477, U.S. at 249; see also Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (a court may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations). Rather, the court must consider all evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.2d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 2007).

To prevail on summary judgment, the moving party must affirmatively identify those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. The moving party can discharge the burden by showing that "on all the essential elements of its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party." In re Bressman, 327 F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. If the moving party meets this initial burden, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts," but must show sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict in its favor. Boyle v. County of Allegheny, 139 F.2d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). However, if the non-moving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [the non-movant's] case, and on which [the non-movant] will bear the burden of proof at trial," Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment because such a failure "necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23; Jakimas v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 777 (3d Cir. 2007).

III. ANALYSIS

Summary judgment in favor of the Defendants is appropriate on two grounds: (1) Eleventh Amendment immunity; and (2) the existence of probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity.The Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff's claims against the ECPO. The Eleventh Amendment protects non-consenting states from suits brought in federal court by private citizens seeking money damages. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). The protection extends to state agencies as long as the state is the "real party in interest." Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 658 (3d Cir. 1989). Under the Fitchik analysis, the Third Circuit has consistently held that county prosecutor's offices are agents of the state when performing classic law enforcement and investigative functions. See Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1505 (3d Cir. 1996).*fn2 In regard to the ...


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