The opinion of the court was delivered by: Irenas, Senior District Judge
HONORABLE JOSEPH E. IRENAS
This dispute arises out of an alleged altercation between Plaintiff Daniel Rothman and Defendant Officer Martin Peary on January 6, 2009. Rothman, along with his daughter, Samantha Lea, filed a complaint, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a number of constitutional violations.*fn1 Presently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), filed on behalf of Defendants Northfield School District, Northfield Board of Education, Dr. Richard Stepura and Linda Albright (collectively "the School District Defendants").*fn2
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1), the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the New Jersey state law claims alleged against the School District Defendants, because the claims raise novel and complex state law issues. Thus, the Second Amended Complaint with regards to the School District Defendants shall be dismissed without prejudice.
On January 6, 2009, when Rothman arrived at the Northfield Community School to drop his daughter off at Kindergarten, he found all of the handicapped parking spots occupied. Rothman, who is disabled, pulled his car over in "as unobtrusive a location as possible" to leave it there temporarily and escort his daughter into school. Brief Opposing Defendants Northfield Board of Education, Northfield School District, Superintendent Richard Stepura and Business Administrator Linda Albright's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, 3 (hereafter referred to as Plaintiffs' Opposition Br.). Before Rothman left his car, Officer Martin Peary, who was stationed at the Northfield Community School, instructed Rothman to move his car, as it was illegally parked. A physical altercation between Rothman and Officer Peary resulted. The complaint contends Officer Peary forcibly handcuffed and dragged Rothman to Peary's police vehicle before transporting him to the Police Station. Furthermore, the complaint alleges Samantha Lea was left "on the public sidewalk in front of a public school hysterically crying, exposed to the winter elements (cold, wind & rain), without any adult supervision from a parent, teacher or administrator of the school." Second Amended Complaint, Count Two, ¶2.
The First Amended Complaint was dismissed by this Court on September 30, 2009 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because the plaintiffs did not present enough factual specificity as to the School District Defendants, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The Court granted Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend and present more factual specifics as to the School District Defendants' role in the incident.
In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs do not raise the level of specificity in their factual contentions against the School District Defendants (as was expected) but instead only allege state law claims against the School District Defendants.*fn3 They specifically allege that the School District Defendants "grossly breached" their duty pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:4-207.9,*fn4 on January 6, 2009, "by allowing non-designated vehicles to occupy handicapped parking spaces." Second Amended Comp., Count 15, ¶4. This duty, Plaintiffs contend, represents a ministerial function pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:2-3(d)*fn5 for which a public entity can be held liable.
Plaintiffs also contend that the School District Defendants "directly and/or indirectly denied to Plaintiff . . . access to the Northfield Community School in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJ LAD"), N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f)(1)".*fn6
Second Amended Compl., Count 16, ¶5. Finally Plaintiffs contend Defendants Stepura and Albright "by their actions, aided and abetted the violations as set forth above in contravention to N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e)" and further, that the Northfield School District and the Northfield Board of Education are responsible for the acts of Stepura and Albright under the doctrine of Respondeat Superior. Id. Count 18, ¶2.
When a court has original jurisdiction over a case because of the federal constitutional claims alleged against a defendant, the court "has supplemental jurisdiction 'over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.'" Lentz v. Mason, 961 F. Supp. 709, 717 (D.N.J. 1997)(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)).
Congress provided district courts with the discretion to decline this supplemental jurisdiction in four specific circumstances. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), it is appropriate for a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if:(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominated over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. A district court, may, therefore, in its discretion, decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if the claims raise novel or complex issues of state law.*fn7 See Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts v. Mirage Resorts, 140 F.3d 478, 487 (3d Cir. 1998).
"[I]t is clear that this court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims involving defendants against whom no federal cause of action is stated, as long as a federal cause of action is stated against another defendant, and the state law claims satisfies the 'same case and controversy' requirement of Article III." Lentz, 961 F. Supp. at 717. "Nevertheless, when all federal claims against a party have been eliminated from a case, the district ...