UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
May 18, 2010
MARLON D. HARGIS, JR., PETITIONER,
CPT. COHEN, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Simandle, District Judge
This matter is before the court pursuant to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, filed by petitioner Marlon D. Hargis ("Hargis"), on or about February 9, 2010. The named respondents are Captain Cohen and the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey. Petitioner failed to pay the $5.00 filing fee, or submit a complete application to proceed in forma pauperis.*fn1
According to the allegations contained in the petition, Hargis alleges that he was arrested without probable cause on August 12, 2009.*fn2 Hargis claims that he did not receive a probable cause hearing.
Hargis also alleges that his bail was set at $500,000.00, which he claims is excessive because he is not a flight risk and because the crimes for which he is charged are second and third degree offenses.
Hargis does not allege that he has raised any of these claims in his pending state court criminal proceedings. He asks for his immediate release and dismissal of the state criminal charges.
A. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal
Section 2243 provides in relevant part as follows: A court, justice or judge entertaining an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.
Hargis brings his habeas petition as a pro se litigant. A pro se pleading is held to less stringent standards than more formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A pro se habeas petition and any supporting submissions must be construed liberally and with a measure of tolerance. See Royce v. Hahn, 151 F.3d 116, 118 (3d Cir. 1998); Lewis v. Attorney General, 878 F.2d 714, 721-22 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 912 (1970).
B. Jurisdictional Issue
Federal courts do have jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, to issue a writ of habeas corpus before a judgment is entered in a state criminal proceeding. Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 441-42 (3d Cir. 1975). Addressing whether a federal court should ever grant a pretrial writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held:
(1) federal courts have "pre-trial" habeas corpus jurisdiction;
(2) that jurisdiction without exhaustion should not be exercised at the pre-trial stage unless extraordinary circumstances are present...;
(3) where there are no extraordinary circumstances and where petitioner seeks to litigate the merits of a constitutional defense to a state criminal charge, the district court should exercise its "pre-trial" habeas jurisdiction only if petitioner makes a special showing of the need for such adjudication and has exhausted state remedies.
Id. at 443.
Here, Hargis seeks to have his state court criminal charges dismissed by this federal court on claims of false arrest without probable cause and excessive bail. Hargis has not alleged that he has exhausted his state remedies in this regard. Indeed, it is apparent from his petition that he has not raised these claims at all in his pending state criminal proceedings. Furthermore, Hargis does not allege any "extraordinary circumstances" that would justify intervention by a federal court. See Moore, 515 F.2d at 445-46 (there is nothing in the nature of the speedy trial right that qualifies it as a per se "extraordinary circumstance"). As the Court of Appeals explained in Moore,
Petitioner... will have an opportunity to raise his claimed denial of the right to a speedy trial during his state trial and in any subsequent appellate proceedings in the state courts. Once he has exhausted state court remedies, the federal courts will, of course, be open to him, if need be, to entertain any petition for habeas corpus relief which may be presented. These procedures amply serve to protect [Petitioner]'s constitutional rights without pre-trial federal intervention in the orderly functioning of state criminal processes.
Moore, 515 F.2d at 449; see also United States v. Castor, 937 F.2d 293, 296-97 (7th Cir.1991); Dickerson v. State of Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 225-27 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 956 (1987); Atkins v. State of Michigan, 644 F.2d 543, 545-47 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 964 (1981); Carden v. State of Montana, 626 F.2d 82 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1014 (1980). See also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)(constitutional challenges must be raised in pending state criminal cases; a federal court generally will not intercede to consider issues that plaintiffs have an opportunity to raise before the state court).*fn3
Hargis has an opportunity to litigate his claims in state court that there was no probable cause for his arrest and that his bail is excessive. Therefore, because Hargis has failed to exhaust these claims before the New Jersey state courts, and given the complete absence of any "exceptional circumstances" that would justify federal intervention in Hargis' pending state proceedings, this Court finds that the petition must be dismissed without prejudice at this time.
If Hargis were a convicted prisoner, which he clearly is not as admitted in his petition, his claims would be construed as an attack on his state court conviction, which is actionable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as asserted by Hargis here. However, § 2254 habeas petitions require exhaustion of state court remedies before proceeding in federal court. Here, it is apparent from the face of the petition, and petitioner's admission, that he has not been convicted or sentenced. Moreover, Hargis has not demonstrated that there is an absence of available state corrective processes before proceeding in this federal court.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). See also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982); Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 919 (2001). Exhaustion of state remedies has been required for more than a century, since the Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886). The exhaustion doctrine was first codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in 1948, see Rose, 455 U.S. at 516-18, and was the subject of significant revisions in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1217 (April 24, 1996). The exhaustion requirement is intended to allow state courts the first opportunity to pass upon federal constitutional claims, in furtherance of the policies of comity and federalism. Granberry v.. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987); Rose, 455 U.S. at 516-18. Exhaustion also has the practical effect of permitting development of a complete factual record in state court, to aid the federal courts in their review. Rose, 455 U.S. at 519.
Therefore, where Hargis has failed to exhaust his state court remedies before bringing this federal habeas petition under § 2254, his petition must be dismissed without prejudice.
III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken from a final order in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A certificate of appealability may issue "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). "A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 1537 U.S. 322 (2003). "When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
Here, jurists of reason would not find it debatable that this Court was correct in its procedural ruling that Hargis has failed to exhaust his state remedies and that he has not alleged facts demonstrating "extraordinary circumstances" that would justify pretrial intervention in Hargis' pending state criminal matters. Accordingly, no certificate of appealability will issue.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for habeas relief under either 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (as asserted by Hargis) or 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (as more properly construed by this Court) will be dismissed without prejudice. This Court makes no determination as to the merits of petitioner's claims. No certificate of appealability will issue. An appropriate Order follows.
JEROME B. SIMANDLE United States District Judge