The opinion of the court was delivered by: Jerome B. Simandle United States District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiff's filing of his re-re-amended complaint, see Docket Entry No. 15, and Plaintiff's application to appoint him pro bono counsel. See Docket Entry No. 16.
On March 23, 2009, the Clerk docketed Plaintiff's original complaint, which arrived unaccompanied by either Plaintiff's filing fee or his in forma pauperis application. See Docket Entry No. 1. The original complaint raised challenges under the Privacy Act. See id.
On March 31, 2009, the Court denied Plaintiff in forma pauperis status, without prejudice, and directed the Clerk to administratively terminate this matter subject to reopening in the event Plaintiff duly submits his filing fee or his in forma pauperis application. See Docket Entry No. 2. On May 1, 2009, the Clerk docketed Plaintiff's in forma pauperis application. See Docket Entry No. 3.
On June 2, 2009, this Court entered an order granting Plaintiff in forma pauperis status and proceeding certain claims raised in Plaintiff's original complaint past sua sponte dismissal. See Docket Entry No. 5. However, on the very same day (that is, on June 2, 2009), the Clerk received Plaintiff's amended complaint. See Docket Entry No. 4. While retaining the Privacy Act as Plaintiff's jurisdictional basis, the amended complaint raised a panoply of challenges wholly unrelated to the Privacy Act and no Privacy Act challenges whatsoever. See id. Moreover, Plaintiff's amended complaint presented a hard-to-comprehend document consisting of sixty-three paragraphs, stating allegations that appeared facially unrelated to each other and making numerous conclusions unsupported by factual grounds. See id.
On August 10, 2009, this Court issued an order ("August Order") construing the amended complaint as a superceding pleading and dismissing the amended complaint without prejudice. See Docket Entry No. 9. The August Order explained to Plaintiff that Plaintiff could not raise challenges unrelated to the Privacy Act in a matter where the Privacy Act was asserted as the sole jurisdictional basis. See id. at 5-6. In addition, the August Order clarified to Plaintiff that Rules 18 and 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure put certain limitations on the joinder of defendants and require transactional relationship for the purposes of joinder of claims. See id. at 6-8 (detailing the operation of the Rules). Furthermore, the August Order exhaustively detailed to Plaintiff the pleading standard ensuing from Rule 8, as interpreted in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009), Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230-34 (3d Cir. 2008). See Docket Entry No. 9, at 8-11. The August Order directed Plaintiff to submit his re-amended complaint that would assert a proper jurisdictional basis and comply with the requirements of Rules 8, 18 and 20. See id. at 11-13 (pointing out the shortcomings of Plaintiff's amended complaint and stressing Plaintiff's obligation to file a clear, concise and pleading asserting transactionally related claims).
In response to the August Order, Plaintiff did not submit an amended complaint of any kind; rather, he submitted a letter, dedicated to irrelevant rhetoric, expressions of Plaintiff's displeasure with this Court and to statements that unspecified law professors at Harvard School of Law, New York University School of Law and "Sanford" Law School concluded that Plaintiff's complaint "was a very good document." See Docket Entry No. 10 (also asserting, inter alia, that the Rules of Civil Procedure are "bogus Rules placed in only to sidetrack Plaintiff," and expressed Plaintiff's belief that "the U.S. District Court clerk [is] practicing law from the court and the court [is] giving out bogus advice and incorrect rules under the name of [j]ustice, [w]hich is a high misdemeanor"). However, since Plaintiff's letter seemed to suggest Plaintiff's interest in asserting certain claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Court issued an order extending Plaintiff's period to file a re-amended complaint. See Docket Entry No. 11.
On October 21, 2009, the Clerk docketed Plaintiff's re-amended complaint. See Docket Entry No. 13. Although the Court's August Order directed Plaintiff to file a clear and concise re-amended pleading complying with requirements of Rules 8, 18 and 20, Plaintiff's re-amended complaint presented a patchily-stated narrative consisting of the same number of paragraphs as his amended complaint (that is, sixty-three paragraphs, see id.) and raises seemingly unrelated challenges, one line of which seems to relate at the events that took place when Plaintiff was confined at the Federal Correctional Facility at Allenwood ("Allenwood"), while another line seemed to be based on the events that took place after Plaintiff was transferred from Allenwood to the Federal Correctional Facility at Fort Dix ("Fort Dix"). See id. The third line of claims, stated even more vaguely, appears to relate to the events that took place at a Lewisburg prison facility ("Lewisburg"). The re-amended complaint named the following persons as Defendants: (a) Defendant Eobstel ("Eobstel"), allegedly the head of UNICOR (which, in turn, was defined by Plaintiff as a factory belonging to the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP")); (b) Defendant Elias ("Elias"), allegedly an employee at UNICOR; (c) Defendant Mishika ("Mishika"), allegedly another employee at UNICOR; (d) Defendants Meyers, Lawhorn, Fisher and Patraw ("Meyers," "Lawhorn," "Fisher" and "Patraw," respectively), who were, allegedly, UNICOR employees acting in supervisory capacities; (e) UNICOR itself; (f) the BOP; and (g) certain unspecified "DOES 1-10."*fn1 See id. at 1-3.
The allegations stated in the re-amended complaint with at least some degree of clarity (i.e., the allegations that this Court was able to either glean or at least try to guess from the face of Plaintiff's re-amended complaint), appeared to assert the following four claims:
a. Sometimes during the fall of 2007, while Plaintiff was working at the UNICOR, certain officials at UNICOR decided not to promote Plaintiff to a higher position and eventually terminated Plaintiff's UNICOR employment (seemingly, sometimes during the spring of 2008). Plaintiff stated that such failure to promote and/or termination of his employ violated his constitutional rights.
b. Later on, seemingly in June of 2008, Plaintiff was transferred from Allenwood to Fort Dix. Plaintiff stated that such transfer, too, violated his constitutional rights.
c. Upon his arrival to Fort Dix, Plaintiff filed grievances challenging certain denial of medical care during the time he was incarcerated in Lewisburg. Plaintiff's re-amended complaint asserts that, on an unspecified day, Plaintiff was approached by an unspecified staff member (presumably, of the Fort Dix facility) who tried, through unspecified means, to "deter [Plaintiff] from filing on their co-workers." Also, according to the re-amended complaint, almost one year later (that is, on May 14, 2009), Plaintiff filed an administrative grievance against Defendant Meyers (presumably, complaining about his non-promotion at UNICOR and/or about the termination of his UNICOR employment), in response to which unspecified "Defendants banded together to make terroristic threats and other harassing acts to deter [P]laintiff from filing." Plaintiff also stated that such unspecified oral threats/harassment violated his constitutional rights.
d. According to the re-amended complaint, on May 6, 2009, Defendant Meyers retaliated against Plaintiff for Plaintiff's filing of an administrative grievance against Meyers: Meyers, allegedly, did so by filing a report, which Plaintiff qualified as a "false incident" report. Plaintiff claimed that such actions violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Docket Entry No. 13, at 4-6.
In addition to the foregoing, Plaintiff's re-amended complaint asserted, without underlying facts, that Plaintiff was stating a "failure-to-protect" claim. See id. at 6. Moreover, Plaintiff supplemented his allegations in the re-amended complaint with rhetoric which the Court either could not construe as factual allegations of any kind or has to presume that these allegations state Plaintiff's self-serving conjecture. See, e.g., id. at 6-8 (making the following statements: "The Police Code was put in effect!" "The Defendants under the Government direction is 'A State of Nature' is a condition where everyone runs wild," "[Defendants] falsely implicat[ed] Plaintiff in an offense [through] false reports, false e-mails, mail and wire by phone [sic.] mail fraud," "History has shown that Black Men in America had suffered from Racial Discrimination and Racial Hate, evil lies and false reports written by racist men"). Finally, Plaintiff's re-amended complaint arrived accompanied by another document, titled "KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS," see Docket Entry No. 13, at 21, a fourteen-paragraph single-spaced page of wholly factless conclusions, some of which had no meaning whatsoever.*fn2
On January 29, 2010, this Court issued a memorandum opinion and order ("January Order") dismissing Plaintiff's re-amended complaint. See Docket Entry No. 14. Specifically, the Court dismissed, without prejudice, all claims that were wholly factless, since these claims could not be addressed by this Court intelligibly. See id. at 9 (citing Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544; and Phillips, 515 F.3d at 230-34).
Plaintiff's claims against "Does 1-10" were similarly dismissed, although with prejudice, for failure to state any allegations against these Defendants. See id. (citing Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937). Plaintiff's claims against all ...