The opinion of the court was delivered by: Jerome B. Simandle United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes once again before the Court for pre-screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A upon filing by Plaintiff Reginald Mimms of his re-amended complaint, see Docket Entry No. 13, and it appearing that:
1. On March 23, 2009, the Clerk docketed Plaintiff's original complaint, which: (a) arrived unaccompanied by either Plaintiff's filing fee or his in forma pauperis application; and (b) raised challenges under the Privacy Act. See Docket Entry No. 1.
2. On March 31, 2009, the Court denied Plaintiff in forma pauperis status without prejudice and directed the Clerk to administratively terminate this matter subject to reopening in the event Plaintiff duly submits his filing fee or his in forma pauperis application. See Docket Entry No. 2.
3. On May 1, 2009, the Clerk docketed Plaintiff's in forma pauperis application. See Docket Entry No. 3.
4. On June 2, 2009, this Court entered an order granting Plaintiff in forma pauperis status and proceeding certain claims raised in Plaintiff's original complaint past sua sponte dismissal. See Docket Entry No. 5.
5. On the very same day, that is, on June 2, 2009, the Clerk received Plaintiff's amended complaint. See Docket Entry No. 4. While retaining the Privacy Act as Plaintiff's jurisdictional basis, the amended complaint raised a panoply of challenges wholly unrelated to the Privacy Act and no Privacy Act challenges whatsoever. See id. Moreover, Plaintiff's amended complaint presented a hard-to-comprehend document consisting of sixty-three paragraphs, stating allegations that appeared facially unrelated to each other and making numerous conclusions unsupported by factual grounds. See id.
6. On August 10, 2009, this Court issued an order ("August Order") construing the amended complaint as a superceding pleading and dismissing the amended complaint without prejudice. See Docket Entry No. 9. The August Order explained to Plaintiff that Plaintiff could not raise challenges unrelated to the Privacy Act in a matter where the Privacy Act was asserted as the sole jurisdictional basis. See id. at 5-6. In addition, the August Order clarified to Plaintiff that Rules 18 and 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure put certain limitations on the joinder of defendants and require transactional relationship for the purposes of joinder of claims. See id. at 6-8 (detailing the operation of the Rules). Furthermore, the August Order detailed to Plaintiff the pleading standard ensuing from Rule 8, as interpreted in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009), Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230-34 (3d Cir. 2008). See Docket Entry No. 9, at 8-11 (explaining pleading requirements, including the requirement of defendant's personal involvement in the alleged wrong, and explaining the insufficiency of factless or conclusory statements). The August Order directed Plaintiff to submit his re-amended complaint that would: (a) assert a proper jurisdictional basis; and (b) comply with the requirements of Rules 8, 18 and 20. See id. at 11-13 (pointing out the shortcomings of Plaintiff's amended complaint and stressing Plaintiff's obligation to file a clear, concise and pleading asserting transactionally related claims).
7. In response to the August Order, Plaintiff did not submit an amended complaint of any kind; rather, he submitted a letter, consisting of irrelevant rhetoric, expressions of Plaintiff's displeasure with this Court and statements that unspecified law professors at Harvard School of Law, New York University School of Law and "Sanford" Law School concluded that Plaintiff's complaint "was a very good document." See Docket Entry No. 10 (also asserting, inter alia, that the Rules of Civil Procedure are "bogus Rules placed in only to sidetrack Plaintiff," and expressed Plaintiff's belief that "the U.S. District Court clerk [is] practicing law from the court and the court [is] giving out bogus advice and incorrect rules under the name of [j]ustice, [w]hich is a high misdemeanor"). However, since Plaintiff's letter seemed to suggest Plaintiff's interest in asserting certain claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Court issued an order extending Plaintiff's period to file a re-amended complaint to set forth a claim for constitutional violation under Bivens. See Docket Entry No. 11.
8. On October 21, 2009, the Clerk docketed Plaintiff's re-amended complaint. See Docket Entry No. 13. Although the Court's August Order directed Plaintiff to file a clear and concise re-amended pleading complying with requirements of Rules 8, 18 and 20, Plaintiff's latest submission:
a. presented a rambling and patchy narrative consisting of the same number of paragraphs, that is, sixty-three paragraphs, see id., and
b. raised unrelated challenges, one line of which seems to relate at the events that took place when Plaintiff was confined at the Federal Correctional Facility at Allenwood ("Allenwood"), while another line seemed to be based on the events that took place after Plaintiff was transferred from Allenwood to the Federal Correctional Facility at Fort Dix ("Fort Dix"). See id. The third line of claims, stated even more vaguely, appears to relate to the events that took place at a Lewisburg prison facility ("Lewisburg").*fn1
9. This re-amended complaint named the following persons as Defendants:
a. Defendant Eobstel, allegedly the head of UNICOR (which, in turn, was defined by Plaintiff as a factory belonging to ...