On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Cumberland County, Docket No. L-931-07.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Skillman, Gilroy and Simonelli.
Plaintiff appeals from a November 14, 2008 order of the Law Division, which provides in relevant part:
1. This matter is remanded to the City of Vineland Construction Board of Appeals for it to verify that it was properly constituted in accordance with N.J.A.C. 5:23A-1.3 at the time of the August 9, 2007 hearing herein. If it indicates that it was, the parties will notify this court, transcripts will be ordered and the matter will be returned to this court for a final determination on that issue as well as the Board's findings relating to Conditions 1 and 2 of its December 20, 2006 decision.
2. If the Board was not properly constituted in accordance with N.J.A.C. 5:23A-1.3 at the time of the August 9, 2007 hearing, it will conduct a new hearing with a properly constituted Board to review the alleged violations of Conditions 1 and 2 of its December 20, 2006 decision.
5. The remand hearing shall take place within 30 days of the date of this Order.
It is evident on the face of this order that it does not decide the issue of whether "the City of Vineland Construction Board of Appeals... was properly constituted in accordance with N.J.A.C. 5:23A-1.3 at the time of the August 9, 2007 hearing." Instead, the Law Division remanded this issue for initial determination by the Construction Board of Appeals.*fn1 It is also evident that the Law Division retained jurisdiction for the purpose of "a final determination on that issue" if the Board determined that it was properly constituted as well as a final determination regarding "the Board's findings relating to Condition 1 and 2 in its December 20, 2006 decision."
"Under Rule 2:2-3(a)(1), an appeal may be taken to the Appellate Division only from a 'final judgment.'" Janicky v. Point Bay Fuel, Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 545, 549 (App. Div. 2007).
"To be a final judgment, an order generally must 'dispose of all claims against all parties.'" Ibid. (quoting S.N. Golden Estates, Inc. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 317 N.J. Super. 82, 87 (App. Div. 1998)).
The November 14, 2008 order from which this appeal has been taken transparently fails to dispose of all claims asserted in the action. Therefore, the order was interlocutory and only reviewable by leave of this court in accordance with Rule 2:2-4.
Moreover, the November 14, 2008 order was not the kind of order that would have warranted interlocutory review. Accordingly, the ...