The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hillman, District Judge
This putative class action case concerns plaintiff's claims that defendant charged excessive attorney's fees and costs in plaintiff's state court foreclosure action. Previously, when first considering defendant's motion to dismiss all of plaintiff's claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court discovered that subject matter jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act may be lacking, and ordered the parties to undertake jurisdictional discovery. Such discovery has been completed, and defendant has again moved to dismiss plaintiff's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. For the reasons expressed below, defendant's motion will be granted.
The following background was included in the Court's prior Opinion and will be restated here for reference: On October 25, 2001, Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation*fn1 instituted a foreclosure action against plaintiff Stacey Coleman in New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division. On August 1, 2002, the Chancery Court entered a final judgment in favor of Chase in the amount of $90401.53, plus interest and counsel fees, and ordered the sale of Coleman's home to satisfy the monies due. On November 4, 2005, Chase provided Coleman with reinstatement figures. On January 17, 2006, Coleman reinstated her mortgage by paying $18,658.24, which included $6691.73 for fees and costs. On January 20, 2006, the foreclosure action was dismissed without prejudice, with the Chancery Court noting that the action was amicably settled between the parties.
Coleman brings this case against Chase asserting numerous causes of action based on her claim that Chase demanded, and was paid, fees in excess of $5,000 of what is permitted by Fair Housing Act regulations*fn2 and New Jersey statute and court rules. She purports to bring these claims on her behalf and on behalf of similarly situated individuals who have also paid these allegedly excessive fees.*fn3
Previously, Chase moved to dismiss Coleman's claims by contending that they are barred by the entire controversy doctrine and otherwise fail to state a claim. Coleman opposed Chase's motion. On an independent review of Coleman's complaint, however, the Court found that subject matter jurisdiction may be lacking. Coleman asserted that this Court has jurisdiction over her case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), which provides, in relevant part, that "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class action in which . . . (A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant." The Court noted that Coleman had not properly pleaded this Court's subject matter jurisdiction because, applying the CAFA jurisdictional requirement for unincorporated associations, Coleman stated that Chase is organized under the laws of Delaware, but she did not state where Chase has its principal place of business. Thus, it was not clear whether Coleman, a New Jersey citizen, is a citizen of a different state from Chase.
The Court also found that even if Coleman cured her jurisdictional statement, and, therefore, subject matter jurisdiction had been properly averred pursuant to § 1332(d)(2), CAFA has an exception to federal jurisdiction over "home state" controversies. See Hirschbach v. NVE Bank, 496 F. Supp. 2d 451, 458 (D.N.J. 2007) (citing Judiciary Committee Report on Class Action Fairness Act, S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 28 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 28) (providing a detailed analysis of CAFA and "home state" controversies). This "home state" exception, explained in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(3) and (4), identifies certain class actions over which subject matter jurisdiction may not exist, despite satisfaction of § 1332(d)(2). The home state exception has both a mandatory and a discretionary facet. Hirshbach, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 459. A district court must decline jurisdiction over a class action in which two-thirds or more of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate and the primary defendants are citizens of the state in which the action was originally filed. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4). A district court has discretion to decline jurisdiction where the class composition is greater than one-third but less than two thirds of the class are citizens of the forum state, and where the primary defendants are citizens of the forum state. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3).
In the prior Opinion, the Court found that if Chase was a citizen of New Jersey, this case presents a clear "home state" case, which requires the declination of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court explained:
Coleman describes the potential class as "1) Individuals who have had home loans held or serviced by the Defendant in the State of New Jersey from sixteen years prior to the filing of the complaint through the date of class certification, 2) individuals who received a payoff or reinstatement from Defendant whose home loan was in default, 3) individuals who were charged attorneys fees and/or other costs which were in excess of the amount actually incurred and/or in excess of the amount allowed by law." (Compl. ¶ 8.) Based on this description, it appears that at least two-thirds of the class are New Jersey citizens. Thus, under the mandatory jurisdictional provision of CAFA, the Court would be required to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if Chase is a citizen of New Jersey.
A review of the discretionary factors further supports dismissal if it is determined that Chase is a citizen of New Jersey. The claims of the potential class are all based on New Jersey state law and New Jersey court rules, and no national or interstate interests are implicated. Further, Coleman's attorney had previously filed suit in New Jersey state court asserting the same claims, albeit with a different named plaintiff, although it appears that Coleman would have been a class member had the class been certified. (See Def. Ex. A.) Consequently, the "interests of justice and looking at the totality of the circumstances," § 1332(d)(3), warrants that the Court would be likely to decline subject matter jurisdiction if Chase is a citizen of New Jersey. Compare Hirshbach, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 461 (declining to exercise jurisdiction under CAFA based on the number of class members hailing from the state in which the action was originally filed). (May 11, 2009 Op. at 9-10.)
Following jurisdictional discovery, where it was determined that Chase is indeed a citizen of New Jersey, Coleman amended her CAFA claims to redefine the proposed "national" class: "1) Individuals who have had FHA home loans held or serviced by the Defendant from sixteen years prior to the filing of the complaint through the date of class certification, 2) individuals who received a payoff or reinstatement from Defendant whose home loan was in default, 3) individuals who were charged attorneys fees and/or other costs which were in excess of the amount actually incurred and/or in excess of the amount allowed by FHA regulation." (Amend. Compl. ¶ 8.) Coleman also defines a subclass for claims arising under New Jersey law. (Id. ¶ 9.)
In its renewed motion to dismiss, Chase argues that Coleman has not cured the subject matter jurisdiction problem. Chase points out that the FHA fee schedule applicable to Coleman*fn4 allowed for $1,300 in fees, which causes to be without merit Coleman's allegation that Chase's demand of $1,004 in fees violates the FHA. Further, Chase points out that Coleman admittedly paid only $900 in foreclosure fees, which is within the $1,300 cap allowed by the FHA. Thus, without any valid FHA claim, Chase argues that Coleman cannot maintain a "national" class.*fn5 Without a national class, all that remains of Coleman's CAFA claims are state causes of action--i.e., a clear "home state" case--and subject matter jurisdiction is therefore lacking.
Coleman counters that she paid $6691.73 in fees and costs, which were not itemized and could contain hidden attorney's fees. Coleman states that under the FHA, Chase may only charge for services actually incurred, and she claims that she paid over ten times what is allowed by the FHA for fees and costs. Accordingly, Coleman ...