The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hillman, District Judge
This matter, concerning the lease of space in a mall by a Hollywood Tans franchise, has come before the Court on defendants' motions to dismiss all of plaintiff's claims against them. For the reasons expressed below, defendants' motions will be denied except as to Hollywood Tans, LLC. In addition, the Court will direct the parties to undertake jurisdictional discovery to establish concretely this Court's subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims against defendants Tan Holdings, LLC and HT Systems, LLC and to amend the pleadings accordingly.
On June 26, 2005, defendant Hollywood Tanning Systems, Inc. ("HTS") leased space in a mall in Pittsburgh to operate a Hollywood Tans tanning salon. The lease was for ten years and was entered between Falls Creek Development and HTS. In February 2006, plaintiff Rowen Properties ("Rowen")*fn1 purchased the shopping mall from Falls Creek Development. As a result, Rowen became the landlord of HTS.
According to Rowen's complaint, on or about May 31, 2007, HTS sold all or a portion of its assets to defendant Tan Holdings pursuant to an asset purchase agreement ("APA"). In that same month, HTS contacted Rowen for approval of an assignment of their lease to Tan Holdings. According to the terms of the lease, HTS was permitted to assign the lease to another tenant "whose net worth is equal to or exceeds" HTS's. To that end, Rowen received a document titled "Tan Holdings, LLC (formerly Hollywood Tanning Systems, Inc.) Projected Opening Balance Sheet," dated May 31, 2007, which represented that Tan Holdings had substantial net assets. Rowen reviewed this document, as well as a "Form of Assignment and Assumption Agreement," which was between HTS and Tan Holdings and had the effect of HTS assigning to Tan Holdings all of HTS's rights under the lease, and Tan Holdings agreeing to assume and be bound to perform the obligations of the tenant under the lease. Based on these documents, Rowen approved the assignment of the lease as between HTS and Tan Holdings. On May 14, 2007, Rowen received the Assignment of Lease and a form "Acknowledgement, Agreement and Consent" for his signature. According to Rowen, he signed these documents based on the parties' prior conversations and prior documents he reviewed.
Rowen came to discover, however, that the Assignment of Lease did not indicate an assignment between HTS and Tan Holdings, but rather between HTS and defendant HT Systems. Rowen admits that he did not read the Assignment before signing the Acknowledgment because all previous discussions and documents concerned Tan Holdings, and not HT Systems. Rowen was never provided financial information regarding HT Systems, and the defendants never informed him of the change. Rowen also claims that he would have never approved HT Systems as an assignee of the lease because HT Systems was essentially a shell company, was undercapitalized, and lacked the financial resources to assume and discharge its obligations under the lease. Based on this conduct, Rowen claims that he was fraudulently induced into approving the assignment, and that it also constituted a fraudulent conveyance. He brings fraud claims against HTS, Tan Holdings, HT Systems, Hollywood Tans, LLC and the individual members of HTS and HT Systems.
Rowen has also asserted a breach of contract claim against HTS and HT Systems. At some point following the assignment of the lease, HTS and/or HT Systems failed to pay rent and other charges for more than $950,000. Notwithstanding any fraud issues, Rowen claims that pursuant to the lease, HTS remained primarily liable under the lease for the remainder of its term. Further, Rowen represents that on June 22, 2007, pursuant to the APA between HTS and Tan Holdings, HTS and HT Systems entered into an assignment of lease, whereby HTS assigned its rights under the lease to HT Systems. Thus, Rowen claims that both HTS and HT Systems, as well as the yet-to-be-identified individual members of HT Systems, are liable for breach of contract.
All defendants have moved for the dismissal of Rowen's claims against them. Rowen has opposed these motions.
Plaintiff alleges that this Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because there is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. As discussed below, see infra note 11, the Court will direct the parties to undertake expedited jurisdictional discovery to determine the citizenship of HT Systems and Tan Holdings.
B. Motion to Dismiss Standard
When considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a court must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005). It is well settled that a pleading is sufficient if it contains "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Under the liberal federal pleading rules, it is not necessary to plead evidence, and it is not necessary to plead all the facts that serve as a basis for the claim. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 562 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977). However, "[a]lthough the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set forth an intricately detailed description of the asserted basis for relief, they do require that the pleadings give defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 149-50 n.3 (1984) (quotation and citation omitted).
A district court, in weighing a motion to dismiss, asks "'not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claim.'" Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1969 n.8 (2007) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhoades, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that the "Supreme Court's Twombly formulation of the pleading standard can be summed up thus: 'stating... a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest' the required element. This 'does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead 'simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary element"). A court need not credit either "bald assertions" or "legal conclusions" in a complaint when deciding a motion to dismiss. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., ...