March 11, 2009
RUDY MANNE, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
SUSAN MANNE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County, Docket No. FM-12-2664-02C.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Submitted February 11, 2009
Before Judges Fisher and King.
This is an appeal from an order by Judge Garruto dated May 28, 2008, specifically. That section of the order states:
The Defendant's request for reimbursement for SACC [East Brunswick Division of Recreation School Age Child Care] and EMP [East Brunswick Public Schools Early Morning Program] costs is denied. This is the third request from the Defendant for the reimbursement of these costs, all of which have been denied in previous Court Orders. The matters of SACC and EMP costs have been sufficiently explored by the Court during prior Motions. The Defendant has exhausted her bites at the apple regarding these costs.
Also possibly drawn in question on this appeal is Judge Garruto's further order of June 11, 2008 which tersely stated: "10. The Defendant's request for reimbursement of SACC and EMP costs is DENIED."
In her letter to the judge, appellant Susan Manne informed the judge of her failure to understand the rulings on these two orders. She stated in pertinent part in her June 19, 2008 letter as follows:
You were incorrect in your June 11, 2008, order with regard to before-school and after-school child care expenses for my (now) 10 year old daughter (SACC and EMP programs) when you stated "This is the third request from the Defendant for the reimbursement of these costs, all of which have been denied in previous Court Orders."
This was the first request for the 2008 SACC and EMP expenses. My 2007 request for Spring 2007 SACC expenses to Judge Hyland was awarded by Judge Hyland in his November 14, 2007 order (see attached). The provided documentation very clearly states the dates of service provided. I would greatly appreciate your revision of your order to include Plaintiff's responsibilities for these expenses.
My divorce decree very plainly states that all work related child care expenses are to be shared by both parents (point 10, page 3, dated July 13, 2004, Judge Mayer). Your order dated January 30, 2008, (point 6) states that "All future child care costs and unreimbursed medical expenses shall be divided between the parties as such: Plaintiff-55%; Defendant 45%." Why does this court not enforce it's own orders? Or is this a promotion for latchkey children starting at the age of 10? My daughter has been a participant in the Early Morning Program (EMP for 4 years) and my son was previously a participant for 5 years. This is nothing new. Plaintiff paid his share of these expenses prior to being incarcerated -why does the court feel it should be only my burden now? Is this punishment for being responsible and ensuring the care of my children while I work full time?
I am truly baffled as to why Judge Hyland denied the 2007 EMP expenses. . . .
Appellant Manne makes a single point on this appeal: "Point I: The Court's decision was made without a rational explanation." Under the Child Support section of the property settlement agreement, incorporated in Judge Mayer's amended judgment of divorce of July 13, 2004, the parties agreed that:
Consistent with the child support guidelines sheet annexed to this letter opinion, plaintiff shall be obligated to pay 64% of work-related child care expenses for the children. These costs are to be paid by plaintiff within fifteen (15) days of defendant's submission of an invoice or billing statement representing the work-related child care expenses for the children.
Finally, the record before us demonstrates confusion between the 2007 and the 2008 expenses for EMP and SACC. We conclude that the only solution to this appeal is a remand for a reasoned explanation by Judge Garruto as to his disposition on the 2008 expenses. Of course, he may alter his disposition if he thinks that the facts so require. The judge also may call for argument by the parties and testimony, if needed, to complete this remand.
We direct the judge to complete the remand with findings of fact and conclusions of law, see Rule 1:7-4, by April 30, 2009, and send us the original of his opinion with copies to the parties.
Remanded; we retain jurisdiction pending completion of the remand.
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