On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, No. L-10027-04.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Submitted October 28, 2008
Before Judges Wefing, Parker and LeWinn.
Defendants appeal from various orders which resulted in judgment being entered for plaintiffs. After reviewing the record in light of the contentions advanced on appeal, we affirm.
The parties signed a contract under which defendants agreed to purchase plaintiffs' home in West Orange. The contract called for a closing to take place in August 2001, but that date was moved forward to June 12, 2001. Prior to that closing, defendants had the premises inspected and the results revealed nothing that deterred them from proceeding with the transaction. We are also informed that at the closing, for reasons that are not apparent from the record, a question of the presence of radon gas arose. The parties agreed to the following escrow agreement:
It is hereby agreed that the sum of $1,500 will be held in escrow by Fein, Such, Kahn and Shepard, Esqs, Attorneys for the Sellers pending an enhanced Radon Test. Should said test show a radon level in excess of 4.0 picocuries/liter, then the $1,500 will be used to remedy the radon condition. Should the reading be less than 4.0 p/l then the escrow will be released to the Seller.
The agreement contained the handwritten addition that the test was to be performed in accordance with New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection procedures and by an approved independent laboratory. It did not contain a date by which either the test or the remediation, if necessary, was to be completed.
Additionally, plaintiffs had not completely vacated the premises by June 12, 2001, and they wished to stay one more day. The parties also agreed to place an additional $1000 in escrow to cover plaintiffs' use and occupancy of the premises for this one day and to secure against possible damage to the premises from that use and occupancy. The agreement provided that if plaintiffs did not vacate by June 13, defendants could retain the $1000 as liquidated damages and would be entitled to an additional $100 per day for each day their possession was delayed.
Plaintiffs completed their move on June 13 and defendants took up residency. Unfortunately, that did not conclude matters between the parties.
In July 2002, plaintiffs' attorney wrote to defendants' attorney, stating that more than a year had passed since the closing, they had heard nothing with respect to the radon, and he proposed to release the $1500 to his clients. Defendants' attorney responded that he objected to release of the escrow funds because radon remediation was required and that he was about to file suit against plaintiffs. Nearly a year later, plaintiffs' attorney again wrote to defendants' attorney, noting that it was almost two years after the closing, a radon report had never been received, no suit had been commenced and that plaintiffs demanded return of the entire $2500 which had languished in escrow. The attorneys continued to exchange correspondence, without achieving a resolution.
Finally, in July 2004, plaintiffs filed suit in Special Civil Part, demanding return of the $2500 held in escrow since June 2001. Defendants filed an answer and counterclaim, in which they alleged that plaintiffs had willfully concealed material facts about the condition of the property and defendants had incurred significant expenses to repair the premises. Defendants asserted a claim for fraudulent concealment, consumer fraud and punitive damages and removed the matter to Superior Court, where the parties engaged in an extensive period of discovery.
In March 2007, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. Defendants opposed the motion, contending that it was only when they moved into the house that they discovered certain structural flaws, which plaintiffs had concealed. The trial court, after argument, directed that $250 of the $1500 held in escrow be returned to plaintiffs, defendants having spent $1250 for testing and remediation. It also concluded there was a question of fact precluding summary judgment with respect to the $1000 held under the use and occupancy agreement. Finally, it concluded that plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on the counterclaim.
We are compelled to note that the trial court gave no reasons for its disposition beyond the provision for return of $250. We infer from the transcript of the argument that the trial court based its decision upon the fact that defendants did not produce an expert's report in support of their contention, but only a written statement by their attorney summarizing what the expert had orally related to him. In light of the passage of time and the expenses the parties have incurred, we have elected not ...