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Greaney v. Nitech Polysystems


October 31, 2008


On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Docket No. L-1372-05.

Per curiam.


Submitted October 2, 2008

Before Judges Stern and Lyons.

Plaintiff, Michele Greaney, appeals an order dismissing her complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction against defendants, Nitech Polysystems, Ltd. (Nitech), its successor company, 1343081 Ontario, Ltd., Ameri-Can Machinery, Ltd., Frank Sanguiliano (president of Nitech, 1343081 Ontario, Ltd., and Ameri-Can Machinery, Ltd.) and GN Gear & Machine Manufacturing, Ltd. (GN Gear). The motion judge found that defendants lacked the required minimum contacts with New Jersey to support jurisdiction. We agree and therefore affirm. The following factual and procedural history is relevant to our consideration of the issues advanced on appeal.

Plaintiff, a resident of Hudson County and an employee of Cantar Polyair Corporation (Cantar), was injured in a work related accident on March 24, 2003. Cantar is a wholly owned subsidiary of Polyair Interpac, Inc., which is a publicly traded corporation headquartered in Toronto, Canada. Cantar is headquartered in Youngstown, Ohio and has several facilities throughout Canada and the United States, including a location in New Jersey.

Plaintiff's injury occurred when her hand and arm were caught in a winding machine used to manufacture plastics at Cantar's Carlstadt, New Jersey, manufacturing site. The winding machine is very large, measuring approximately twelve-feet wide by sixteen-feet long.

Cantar's Ontario facility custom ordered this winding machine from defendant Nitech,*fn1 a Canadian corporation located in Ontario. It is undisputed that the machine was ordered from Ontario and not New Jersey.

Nitech has never had any offices, real estate, agents, or employees in New Jersey. Furthermore, it has never advertised or otherwise attempted to solicit business from New Jersey residents nor registered to do business in this State.

The winding machine was the only one of its type that Nitech ever sold. After Nitech received a deposit of $59,000 from Cantar, it ordered the machine from GN Gear, a company that specializes in designing and constructing manufacturing equipment. GN Gear is also a Canadian corporation located in Ontario. It does not do any business in the United States.

There is a dispute as to who actually designed the winding machine. Frank Sanguiliano, the president of Nitech, claims that GN Gear was solely responsible for the machine's design, while GN Gear contends that it received all the specifications from Nitech.

It is undisputed that the winder was eventually installed at Cantar's Carlstadt, New Jersey site. However, there is no information in the record explaining how the machine got there. All evidence indicates that Nitech was to ship the winder to a Cantar facility in Ontario upon completion. For example, Nitech's packing slip and invoices for the winder listed the shipping address for delivery as "Cantar/Polyair Ltd. 195 Rexdale Blvd. Toronto, ON." Both of Nitech's invoices to Cantar state that the winder was sold to "Cantar/Polyair Ltd. Paul Cornigan 195 Rexdale Blvd. Toronto, Ontario."

Based on Nitech's purchase order to GN Gear, it appears that GN Gear agreed to ship the finished machine back to Nitech, who would then arrange for delivery to Cantar. However, it is not clear that this actually occurred. Sanguiliano testified in his deposition that individuals employed by Cantar went to GN Gear's facility in Ontario to inspect the machine upon its completion. He stated that those employees then transported the machine to a Cantar facility. Sanguiliano did not elaborate as to whether those individuals were from Ontario or New Jersey. GN Gear contends that it never had any contact with Cantar and dealt exclusively with Nitech. However, GN Gear does not provide any proof of how the winder left its possession.

Cantar paid for the winder by check in two installments. Both checks show that the payor is "Cantar/Polyair Corporation, 495 Meadow Lane Parkway, Carlstadt, New Jersey, 07072." The checks are drawn on the Hongkong Bank of Canada, located in Toronto. The identity of the individual who signed the checks was not provided in the record. When plaintiff's counsel deposed Sanguiliano and questioned him about these checks, Sanguiliano stated "The check is drawn on a Toronto bank and delivered by a Toronto company. We didn't look at the check." Plaintiff did not present any proofs showing that Cantar actually sent the checks from New Jersey. Furthermore, both of Nitech's invoices to Cantar state that the winder was sold to Cantar's Ontario facility.

On March 15, 2006, plaintiff filed a third amended complaint naming Nitech, 1343081 Ontario, Ltd., Ameri-Can Machinery, Ltd. and Frank Sanguiliano as defendants.*fn2 Shortly after defendants filed their answer, plaintiff requested leave to file an amended complaint to add GN Gear as a direct defendant. Plaintiff joined GN Gear on December 11, 2006.

On November 17, 2006, Nitech, 1343081 Ontario, Ltd., AmeriCan Machinery, Ltd. and Frank Sanguiliano filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The motion judge entered an order allowing plaintiff to take discovery only on the issue of personal jurisdiction until December 31, 2006. Defendants' motion to dismiss was adjourned until January 5, 2007. Plaintiff's subsequent motion to extend discovery was denied.

On January 17, 2007, the motion judge, treating the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, dismissed plaintiff's complaint against Sanguiliano, Ameri-Can Machinery, Ltd., Nitech, and 134081 Ontario, Ltd., without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, GN Gear failed to answer and the court entered a default on March 20, 2007. Plaintiff waived the default and GN Gear filed its answer on August 6, 2007. On August 15, 2007, GN Gear filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff opposed the motion and requested further discovery in her opposition brief.

The motion judge, treating GN Gear's motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, dismissed plaintiff's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction with prejudice on November 19, 2007.

Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her complaint and presents the following arguments for our consideration:





In a letter to the court,*fn4 defendant Nitech contends that plaintiff's appeal is time barred pursuant to Rule 2:4-1(a). Therefore, we must first address whether plaintiff's appeal was timely filed.

Rule 2:4-1(a) provides that "final judgments or orders of judges sitting as statutory agent [...] shall be taken within 45 days of their entry." The motion judge granted Nitech's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on January 17, 2007. Plaintiff filed her appeal of that decision on January 16, 2008, nearly one year after the motion judge dismissed her complaint.

Nitech has misapplied Rule 2:4-1(a). It is well settled that a judgment, in order to be eligible for appeal as a final judgment, must be final as to all parties and all issues. Wein v. Morris, 194 N.J. 364, 377 (2008); see also Yuhas v. Mudge, 129 N.J. Super. 207, 209 (App. Div. 1974). GN Gear was also a defendant in plaintiff's action against Nitech at the time Nitech's motion was granted. Plaintiff's claim against GN Gear was not dismissed until November 19, 2007. It was not until that date that all issues as to all parties in plaintiff's action were adjudicated. Plaintiff's time to appeal Nitech's motion to dismiss began to run only when the motion court dismissed plaintiff's claim against GN Gear. Plaintiff filed her appeal on December 28, 2007, which she later amended on January 16, 2008, to include Nitech's dismissal. Thus, plaintiff appealed within the time permitted by Rule 2:4-1(a).*fn5

The next issue considered is whether New Jersey courts have jurisdiction over defendants in this case. New Jersey's "long-arm rule" permits personal jurisdiction to be established over nonresidents by service of a summons and complaint in whatever manner "due process of law" permits. Avdel Corp. v. Mecure, 58 N.J. 264, 268 (1971).

Our Supreme Court has explained that the test for due process: requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he [or she] be not present within the territory of the forum, he [or she] have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." [Blakey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 164 N.J. 38, 66 (2000)(quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, 102 (1945)).]

When a defendant maintains "continuous and systematic activities in the forum state," that defendant is "subject to jurisdiction on any matter, irrespective of its relation to the state." Bayway Refining Co. v. State Utilities, Inc., 333 N.J. Super. 420, 428 (App. Div. 2000), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 605, (2000). Such jurisdiction is considered "general." Ibid. Plaintiff does not contend that either defendant maintains sufficient activity in New Jersey to subject them to general jurisdiction in this State.

Thus, the question on appeal is whether plaintiff's cause of action against defendants arises out of a sufficient relationship between defendants and the State of New Jersey to invoke the court's specific jurisdiction. Waste Mgmt. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 106, 122 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1183, 115 S.Ct. 1175, 130 L.Ed. 2d 1128 (1995). This requires that the defendants have certain "minimum contacts" with the State. Ibid. "Ensuring that an application of the minimum-contacts test satisfies the jurisdictional requirement of due process calls for a case-by-case analysis of a defendant's relationship with the forum state." Ibid.

Due process is satisfied so long as there is "some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 2 L.Ed. 2d 1283, 1298, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1239 (1958). Accord Avdel, supra, 58 N.J. at 273 (citing Hanson). The minimum contacts for specific jurisdiction require that the "purposeful acts by the [defendant] directed toward this State" must be of a kind that "make it reasonable for [it] to anticipate being haled into court here." Mastondrea v. Occidental Hotels, 391 N.J. Super. 261, 268 (App. Div. 2007). In weighing the sufficiency of those contacts, our Supreme Court has considered whether the "cause of action arose out of the defendant's contact with the State. If the two are related, the contacts support the exercise of jurisdiction." Waste Mgmt., supra, 138 N.J. at 123. Furthermore, "[i]t is the purposeful act of the defendant, not the unilateral activity of another who merely claims a relationship to the defendant, that connects the defendant to the forum." Charles Gendler & Co. v. Telecom Equipment Corp., 102 N.J. 460, 471 (1986).

In this case, plaintiff contends that defendant Nitech knew, or reasonably should have known, that the winding machine was sold for use in New Jersey, thus creating sufficient minimum contacts with this State. She emphasizes that while Cantar's Canadian facility placed the order for the winder, the payment checks were inscribed with Cantar's New Jersey address. She also argues that because the machine was very large and was custom built specifically for Cantar, someone from Nitech must have known that the machine was going to eventually be installed in New Jersey. In support of her argument, plaintiff cites Cruz v. Robinson Engineering Corp., 253 N.J. Super. 66 (App. Div. 1992), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 9 (1992). The motion court found that Cruz was not controlling, and we agree.

In Cruz, plaintiff was injured at work by a large urn filter press used to manufacture coffee. Id. at 68. The filter press was specially designed and built in California by a California corporation, Robinson Engineering Corp. (Robinson), for plaintiff's employer, Altra Filters, Inc. (Altra). Ibid.

Altra was also a California corporation, but had a facility in New Jersey. Ibid. Producing the filter press for Altra constituted Robinson's sole contact with New Jersey. Id. at 69. As such, Robinson argued that New Jersey could not exercise proper in personam jurisdiction, specifically noting that it was not aware that the press was meant for use in New Jersey when it entered into the contract with Altra. Id. at 73.

While Robinson may not have known that the filter press would be installed in New Jersey when it first entered into the contract, plaintiff presented letters from Altra to Robinson specifically referencing the fact that the press was crucial to Altra's New Jersey operation. Id. at 69. In addition, Robinson shipped the press to New Jersey via a common carrier. Id. at 73. These facts, coupled with the unique nature of the filter press, led us to determine that Robinson knew for the majority of the contract period that "the subject of the agreement was not only to be shipped to New Jersey but was, moreover, the sine qua non of Altra's New Jersey plant, the predicate of the whole New Jersey operation." Ibid. Based on this, we held that New Jersey did have specific jurisdiction. Id. at 74.

Cruz can be distinguished from the case at bar because plaintiff here failed to produce any evidence, other than two checks carrying Cantar's Carlstadt address, showing that Nitech knew the winder was meant for use in New Jersey. Nitech, like Robinson, contracted to produce a unique piece of equipment. However, the fact that Nitech provided a custom built product to Cantar is not enough to establish jurisdiction. We have stated that "[t]he existence of a contractual relationship alone is not enough to sustain jurisdiction unless the foreign corporation entering into that relationship can reasonably have contemplated 'significant activities or effects' in the forum state." Bayway Refining Co., supra, 333 N.J. Super. at 431 (quoting Corporate Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Warren-Teed Pharm., Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 143, 155 (App. Div. 1968), certif. denied, 52 N.J. 535 (1968)). All of the evidence presented in the record indicates that Nitech expected the winding machine to be installed in Ontario (e.g., the invoice and packing slips were addressed to Cantar's Ontario site). Furthermore, plaintiff has presented no evidence that Nitech shipped the winder to Cantar's Carlstadt facility. Based on the facts presented, Nitech's conduct here was not "an intentional act calculated to create an actionable event" in New Jersey. Id. at 437 (quoting Waste Management, supra, 138 N.J. at 126).

Plaintiff calls attention to the fact that Nitech received checks bearing Cantar's New Jersey address. However, the fact that the checks carried a New Jersey address does not definitively determine that they were actually sent from New Jersey. This court has acknowledged that "it is not uncommon for large corporations to have billing offices or banking relationships with a state other than the state where the corporation or its customer is located." Bayway Refining Co., supra, 420 N.J. at 432. Because we cannot premise specific jurisdiction on the "'random,' 'fortuitous,' and 'attenuated'" location of billing offices, we cannot consider the address on two checks enough to establish minimum contacts with this forum. Ibid. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2183, 85 L.Ed. 2d 528, 542 (1985)).

Furthermore, if Cantar did send the checks from this State, that alone is not enough to establish that Nitech engaged in deliberate and "significant activities within" the forum. Wash. v. Magazzu, 216 N.J. Super. 23, 27 (App. Div. 1987) (quoting Burger King Corp., supra, 471 U.S. at 475). This is because Nitech was merely accepting payment from Cantar, a third party to this litigation. If the checks were mailed from New Jersey, that would be a "unilateral act" on Cantar's part and our Supreme Court has made it clear that such acts are not sufficient standing alone to establish specific jurisdiction. See Charles Gendler & Co., supra, 102 N.J. at 471. The Court has also established that payment checks sent from the forum, without more, are insufficient to establish minimum contacts. Cf. Lebel v. Everglades Marina, 115 N.J. 317, 324-25 (1989) (holding that New Jersey had personal jurisdiction over an outof-state seller who received payment from a New Jersey buyer only after considering several other factors connecting the seller to this State).

Because the evidence reveals no intent on Nitech's part to do business in New Jersey, nor to benefit from its laws, nor to affect persons or events here, we hold that defendant's minimal contacts with this State do not rise to the level of the constitutionally mandated "minimum contacts."

We next address plaintiff's contention that the motion judge improperly granted defendant Nitech's motion to dismiss under summary judgment standards. The Appellate Division uses the same standard as the trial court when deciding a summary judgment motion. Jolley v. Marquess, 393 N.J. Super. 255, 267 (App. Div. 2007); Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 (1998). Summary judgment may be granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-2.

"Genuine" issue of fact means "only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact." R. 4:46-2(c). If there is no genuine issue of fact, this court must then decide whether the trial court's ruling on the law was correct. Prudential, supra, 307 N.J. Super. at 167.

The facts are derived from evidence submitted by the parties in support of, and in opposition to, the summary judgment motion, viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). Even if the allegations in the pleadings raise an issue of fact, if the other papers on file show that there is not a real material issue, then summary judgment can be granted. Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954). A non-movant who offers no substantial or material facts in opposition to the motion cannot complain if the court takes as true the uncontradicted facts in the movant's papers. Ibid.; R. 4:46-5.

Plaintiff argues that there was a genuine issue of material fact that should have precluded summary judgment, namely, Nitech's knowledge that the winding machine was meant for Cantar's Carlstadt, New Jersey facility. Plaintiff contends that Nitech was aware of the winding machine's destination and as proof of this, plaintiff points to the two checks bearing Cantar's Carlstadt, New Jersey address. Frank Sanguiliano, president of Nitech, stated in his deposition that no one "looked at the checks." As such, he claims that he was unaware that the payments may have been coming from New Jersey. Plaintiff asserts that the existence of the checks places Nitech's knowledge of the machine's destination at issue.

After carefully reviewing the evidence, the motion judge found that plaintiff failed to demonstrate sufficient minimum contacts between Nitech and New Jersey. Plaintiff did not establish that the checks were actually sent from New Jersey, see Bayway Refining Co., supra, 420 N.J. at 432, and even if they were, our Supreme Court has made clear that "unilateral activity" of a third party, without more, cannot connect a defendant to the forum. Charles Gendler & Co., supra, 102 N.J. at 471.

Furthermore, Rule 4:46-5 requires the party opposing summary judgment to "respond by affidavit [...] setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." In other words, a party cannot successfully resist the motion by relying on conclusory allegations or denials in his or her pleadings. See e.g. Robbins v. Jersey City, 23 N.J. 229, 241 (1957). Plaintiff did not submit any affidavits, but instead continued to point to the New Jersey addressed checks referenced in her pleadings.

The Court has stated that "when the evidence 'is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law,' the trial court should not hesitate to grant summary judgment." Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 540 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed. 2d 202 (1986)). Other than producing payment checks that may or may not have been sent from New Jersey by a third party to this litigation, plaintiff has failed to provide any proofs showing Nitech's connection to New Jersey. The evidence here is clearly "one-sided" and favors Nitech's contention that it does not have the necessary minimum contacts with this forum. Ibid. Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint.

We next address plaintiff's contention that the motion judge improperly dismissed her complaint against GN Gear, Nitech's subcontractor. Plaintiff includes within this point heading an argument that the motion judge erred in failing to grant her request for plenary discovery.

In support of her contention that GN Gear has adequate minimum contacts with New Jersey to establish jurisdiction, plaintiff notes that GN Gear and Nitech dispute who actually designed the winding machine and again points to the checks Nitech received from Cantar's New Jersey facility. Plaintiff also asserts that Cantar employees were frequently at GN Gear's facility to inspect the winder, a point which GN Gear contests.

We disagree with plaintiff's contention that the dispute between GN Gear and Nitech over who designed the winding machine is significant from a jurisdictional standpoint. Plaintiff has not shown that the designer of the machine actually knew that it was meant for Cantar's New Jersey facility. Thus, even if plaintiff could prove that GN Gear did design the winder, this is not necessarily relevant to establishing specific jurisdiction without more. Also, in opposing the summary judgment motion, plaintiff failed to submit any affidavits setting forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial as required by Rule 4:46-5. Instead of producing facts, plaintiff made sweeping statements about what GN Gear may or may not have known. This is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.

Likewise, plaintiff's assertion that individuals employed by Cantar went to GN Gear's facility in Canada to inspect the machine, without more information, is irrelevant for the purpose of establishing personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff has not provided any evidence to show that the machine's intended destination was ever discussed during those inspections. Furthermore, the motion judge accepted GN Gear's assertion that all of its contact regarding the winder was with Nitech. We must "review the court's factual findings with respect to jurisdiction" only for the absence of "support by substantial, credible evidence[.]" Mastondrea, supra, 391 N.J. Super. at 268 (citing Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). It is clear from Nitech's invoices and order records that most, if not all, of GN Gear's information about the machine came from Nitech. Thus, the motion judge's finding that GN Gear dealt exclusively with Nitech is supported by substantial credible evidence and will not be disturbed.

Furthermore, the fact that Nitech may have received checks from New Jersey for payment on the machine does not in any way suggest that GN Gear purposefully availed itself "of the privilege of conducting activities within" New Jersey. Denckla, supra, 357 U.S. at 253. Plaintiff has not produced any evidence showing that GN Gear ever even saw those checks.

After thorough review of the record, it appears that most, if not all, of GN Gear's interaction regarding the winding machine was with Nitech in Canada. GN Gear did nothing to avail itself of the benefits or protections of New Jersey law, nor did it have reason to contemplate that by building a winding machine for a Canadian corporation, it would be causing significant effects in New Jersey. As such, we affirm the Law Division's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

We next address plaintiff's contention that the motion judge improperly dismissed her claim against GN Gear without first granting her plenary discovery. Plaintiff argues that discovery was necessary both to determine whether Nitech or GN Gear designed the winding machine and to learn if either defendant was aware that the machine would eventually be used in New Jersey.*fn6

Our Court Rules states that if a new party is joined in an action, the scheduled discovery end date is extended for a sixty-day period. R. 4:24-1(b). However, the trial judge may reduce or enlarge the time for discovery for good cause shown. Ibid. That sixty-day extension applies to the end date of the discovery period in effect and begins after service of the new party's initial pleading.

In this case, plaintiff did not join GN Gear to her complaint until December 11, 2006. GN Gear failed to answer and the court entered a default on March 20, 2007. Plaintiff waived the default and GN Gear filed its initial pleading on August 6, 2007. At that point, the motion court had denied plaintiff's request for further discovery with respect to Nitech and granted Nitech's motion to dismiss. Thus, by the time GN Gear filed its answer, plaintiff's discovery period as to Nitech had long since expired. As such, plaintiff's time for discovery of GN Gear, a newly added party, was automatically extended sixty-days from the date of GN Gear's answer to October 5, 2007. R. 4:24-1(b).

GN Gear filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on August 15, 2007. Plaintiff opposed the motion and requested plenary discovery in her opposition brief but did not cross move for an extension of discovery as to GN Gear. Plaintiff also failed to serve any discovery on GN Gear throughout the period leading up to October 5, 2007.

The motion judge granted GN Gear's motion on November 19, 2007, forty-five days after plaintiff's sixty-day discovery extension ended pursuant to Rule 4:24-1(b). Though the motion judge did not address plaintiff's plenary discovery request, he implicitly denied a discovery extension. Rule 4:24-1(b) states that the sixty-day period may be "enlarged by the court for good cause shown." It is clearly within the motion judge's discretion to strictly limit the discovery period to the time allowed by the Rule. See Rivers v. LSC Partnership, 378 N.J. Super. 68, 82 (App. Div. 2005), certif. denied, 185 N.J. 296 (2005) (holding that the grant of the extension [pursuant to R. 4:24-1(b)] requires good cause shown) (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff had been granted discovery extensions with respect to Nitech and failed to serve any discovery on GN Gear during the time she was allotted, i.e., up to October 5, 2007.

Furthermore, plaintiff failed to point to any specific discoverable information that would establish New Jersey's personal jurisdiction over GN Gear. The party resisting a summary judgment motion on the ground of incomplete discovery is obliged to specify the discovery still required. Trinity Church v. Lawson-Bell, 394 N.J. Super 159, 166 (App. Div. 2007). In plaintiff's letter brief in opposition to GN Gear's motion to dismiss, she requested "full discovery of all the parties." This court has stated that a "generic contention that discovery is incomplete" is not enough to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Ibid. By simply requesting plenary discovery, plaintiff made such a "generic contention." Ibid. Therefore, the motion judge did not abuse his discretion by implicitly refusing to extend discovery any further.

We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Law Division dismissing plaintiff's complaint for lack of jurisdiction.


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