On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Salem County, Docket No. L-14-05.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Reisner and Alvarez.
Plaintiffs Barbara Jane Tucker and Paul Tucker appeal from an award of summary judgment dismissing their complaint against their landlord, defendant Walter Rosenstock,*fn1 for personal injuries Barbara sustained as a result of a fall in the leased premises. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
The tenancy commenced on August 1, 2002. The lease agreement between the parties recited that plaintiffs had inspected the property and were satisfied with its condition. It also provided that should repairs be necessary, plaintiffs were to promptly notify defendant and were not to undertake them without defendant's express written consent.
On January 14, 2003, Barbara tripped and fell down an interior half-flight of stairs when her sock caught on the head of a nail used to secure a threshold to the flooring. Plaintiffs contend that had the handrail alongside the steps been properly configured, and had it been extended to the proper length, Barbara would have been able to catch herself.
Prior to Barbara's fall, the nail worked itself loose on at least two other occasions, and Paul simply hammered it down. Because they considered the problem minimal, plaintiffs never informed defendant, although other repairs were made at their request, such as to the hot water heater.
Plaintiffs retained an expert who opined that screws, rather than nails, should have been used to affix the threshold. He also concluded that there should not have been a threshold at all in the interior doorway at the top of the stairway and that the height and extension of the handrail alongside the stairs created a hazard and violated relevant building codes. The structure, originally a single family dwelling, was converted into two apartments some time between 1988 and 1990, under the supervision of defendant's now deceased son.
Plaintiffs contended in opposition to the motion for summary judgment that defendant should be held to the standard of care due a business invitee. The motion judge found, to the contrary, that although the landlord had a duty to provide habitable premises to his tenants, the applicable duty within the context of a tenancy requires notice to the landlord of latent defects. The judge therefore concluded, as a matter of law, that there was no breach of the duty of care owed by the landlord to the tenants and granted summary judgment.
Plaintiffs contend on appeal that a landlord has a duty to inform residential tenants of latent defects in the property existing when the leasehold begins. As a result, they assert that the motion judge erred in his conclusion that defendant was entitled to prevail as a matter of law. We disagree.
In Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995), the Court stated that when deciding a case on summary judgment, the motion judge must "consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." The motion judge determines whether the evidence requires a full hearing, or is "so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 533 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed. 2d 202, 214 (1986)). If there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law, then summary judgment must be granted. R. 4:46-2(c). We review the motion judge's decision pursuant to the same standard: if no genuine issue exists as to any material fact, and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the award will be affirmed. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 (1998).
In Szeles v. Vena, 321 N.J. Super. 601, 602 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 129 (1999), Szeles, a tenant who had lived at the same premises for about three years, was injured when he fell on an exterior staircase due to a loose brick. Ibid. The suit alleged as bases for recovery both negligence theories and breach of an implied warranty of habitability. Ibid. Prior to the accident, Szeles was unaware that the brick was loose, although the steps were in an obvious state of disrepair. Id. at 603. He contended that "constructive notice should apply because of a . . . continuing duty of the landlord to inspect the premises." Id. at 604.
We reiterated in Szeles that "[a]t common law[,] a landlord was not liable to his lessee for physical harm caused by a dangerous condition existing on the land when the lessee took possession," and that this principle has very limited exceptions. Id. at 605-06. Additionally, the condition had not been brought to the attention of the landlord by the tenant, nor was it a condition about which the landlord should have been aware given the length of the tenancy. Id. at 607-08. Specifically, we said, "There is also no ...