The opinion of the court was delivered by: Wolfson, United States District Judge
Plaintiffs Keith Litman and Robert Wachtel (collectively "Plaintiffs"), Verizon customers since at least 2004, bring this class action lawsuit against Defendant Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless ("Defendant" or "Verizon") alleging Defendant improperly imposed an administrative charge on their cellular telephone accounts. In accordance with the Customer Agreements between the Plaintiffs and Verizon, which included arbitration provisions, Defendant files the current Motion to Compel Arbitration in lieu of an Answer.*fn1 Plaintiffs argue that the arbitration provisions' preclusion of class arbitration should be invalidated because they are unconscionable under New Jersey law. On the other hand, Defendant claims that the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), as interpreted by the Third Circuit, preempts New Jersey law. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that the arbitration agreement is enforceable and Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration is granted.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
The Court will only recount facts relevant for the purpose of this motion. On October 9, 2007, Plaintiffs filed this suit against Verizon on behalf of other similarly situated Verizon customers claiming that they were unlawfully charged an "administrative charge" of $0.40 and/ or $0.70, as part of the monthly charges for each of their Verizon phone lines. Complaint ("Compl.") ¶ 1. Verizon provides wireless communication services to over 60 million customers and telephone lines nationally. Id. ¶ 8(b). Plaintiffs allege that at the time they became Verizon customers and entered into their fixed price contracts with Verizon, Verizon did not charge an administrative charge and nothing in the service agreements specifically authorized Verizon to add such a charge. Id. ¶ 21(a). Plaintiffs, however, allege that in October 2005, Defendant unilaterally decided to assess an administrative charge to all customers and informed all customers of this change with a standard notice form. Id. ¶ 21(b).
Plaintiffs have been Verizon customers since at least 2004 and concede that, prior to January 2005, Verizon used a standard customer agreement ("Agreement") with an arbitration provision. Id. ¶ 9.*fn2 The Agreement required Plaintiffs and Verizon "TO SETTLE DISPUTES (EXCEPT CERTAIN SMALL CLAIMS) ONLY BY ARBITRATION." Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration ("Def. Mot.") Ex. A, CA-7; D, 12 (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs allege that, in January 2005, Verizon "adhesively" modified the Agreement's arbitration provision. Id. ¶¶ 9, 10. The modification stated that the "THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT APPLIES TO TH[E] AGREEMENT" and that the Agreement "DOESN'T PERMIT CLASS ARBITRATION." Def. Mot. at Ex. A, CA-8; D, 12 (emphasis in original). This revised Agreement also states that "IF FOR SOME REASON THE PROHIBITION ON CLASS ARBITRATIONS . . . IS DEEMED UNENFORCEABLE, THEN THE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE WILL NOT APPLY." Id.at Ex. A, CA-9 (emphasis in original).
In accordance with the Agreement's arbitration provision, Verizon has moved to compel Plaintiffs to individually arbitrate their claims, consistent with the requirements of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). In response, Plaintiffs argue that because the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 189 N.J. 1 (2006), has held that an arbitration provision in a consumer contract of adhesion that precludes class arbitration of low-value claims is unconscionable under New Jersey law, similarly, the arbitration provision in their Agreement is unenforceable. On the other hand, while the parties agree that Plaintiffs may proceed with this lawsuit if Muhammad controls, Defendant contends that, for a number of reasons, Muhammad is preempted by the FAA, the class arbitration waiver is valid, and Plaintiffs must arbitrate their claims individually. This Court agrees.
A. The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")
"[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit." AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986) (citations omitted); see also Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am. v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 868 F.2d 573, 576 (3d Cir. 1989) (per curiam). "The question whether the parties have submitted a particular dispute to arbitration . . . is an issue for judicial determination unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise." Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see alsoLaborers' Int'l Union of N. Am., 868 F.2d at 576. The court does not consider the merits of the claim, but "decides only whether there was an agreement to arbitrate, and if so, whether the agreement is valid." Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 228 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2). If the court finds there is an agreement to arbitrate, the disposition of the merits is left to the arbitrator. Id.The Third Circuit has set forth a two-prong inquiry for courts to use when determining whether to compel arbitration. Under this two-prong test, the questions posed are: "(1) Did the parties seeking or resisting arbitration enter into a valid arbitration agreement? (2) Does the dispute between those parties fall within the language of the arbitration agreement?" John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Olick, 151 F.3d 132, 137 (3d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
With respect to the first prong, "[f]ederal law determines whether an issue governed by the FAA is referable to arbitration." Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.. 183 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 1999). Similarly, the interpretation and construction of arbitration agreements is determined by reference to federal substantive law. See Id. at 179;see alsoMoses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n. 32 (1983). While federal law is used to interpret such agreements, state law may be applied, pursuant to § 2 of the FAA. Harris, 183 F.3d at 179. Section 2 of the FAA provides that arbitration agreements are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. The FAA was implemented "to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts." Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 378 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991)). As such, the FAA creates a "strong presumption in favor of arbitration, and doubts 'concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.'" Great W. Mortg. Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 228 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25). Nonetheless, "generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 2." Doctor's Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996). "The party challenging a contract provision as unconscionable generally bears the burden of proving unconscionability." Harris, 183 F.3d at 181.
The Third Circuit has recently reaffirmed that "[t]he text of § 2 provides the touchstone for choosing between state-law principles and the principles of federal common law envisioned by the passage of the FAA: An agreement to arbitrate is valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, as a matter of federal law, 'save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.'" Gay, 511 F.3d 369 at 394 (quoting Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n. 9 (1987)) (emphasis in original). "[S]tate law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally." Id. In Perry, the Supreme Court found:
A state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with this requirement of § 2. A court may not, then, in assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an arbitration agreement, construe that agreement in a manner different from that in which it otherwise construes nonarbitration agreements under state law. Nor may a court rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court to effect what we hold today the state legislature cannot.
483 U.S. at 492 n. 9 (internal citations omitted). Confirming that the "FAA reflects a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements," the Third Circuit, in addressing class action waivers in arbitration agreements, held that "whatever the benefits of class actions, the FAA requirespiecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement." Gay, 511 F.3d at 394 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). Therefore, the Third Circuit has found that class action waivers in arbitration agreements are not per se unconscionable, but rather are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable under 9 U.S.C. § 2. Id.
The second part of the two-prong test requires the Court to determine if the dispute between the parties falls within the language of the arbitration agreement. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 151 F.3d at 137. Because Plaintiffs do not dispute that the Agreement's arbitration provision, if valid, applies ...