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Akshayraj, Inc. v. Getty Petroleum Marketing

August 27, 2008


The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hillman, District Judge



This case, which began with plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction to prevent the rebranding of their Mobil gasoline stations to Lukoil, has a long procedural history. The preliminary injunction was denied, and all of plaintiffs' claims have been dismissed from the case except for Count IV for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which survived defendants' motion to dismiss.*fn1 Defendants have now moved for summary judgment on Count IV with regard to plaintiffs NC Enterprises [Docket No. 97], Graner's Mobil d/b/a Graner's Service Station [Docket No. 110], and Quick Flow, Inc. [Docket No. 111].*fn2 Plaintiffs NC Enterprises and Graner's have opposed defendants' motions, while plaintiff Quick Flow has not*fn3 .


A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate where the Court is satisfied that "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

An issue is "genuine" if it is supported by evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the nonmoving party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is "material" if, under the governing substantive law, a dispute about the fact might affect the outcome of the suit. Id. In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving party's evidence "is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Marino v. Industrial Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004)(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).

Initially, the moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must identify, by affidavits or otherwise, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. Thus, to withstand a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must identify specific facts and affirmative evidence that contradict those offered by the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57. A party opposing summary judgment must do more than just rest upon mere allegations, general denials, or vague statements. Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001).

B. Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the claims of plaintiff NC Enterprises

Plaintiff NC Enterprises's ("NCE") remaining claim against defendants alleges that defendants' actions breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by setting prices for Lukoil gasoline "arbitrarily, unreasonably, and capriciously and with the objective of depriving the Plaintiffs of their reasonable contractual expectations by a) artificially inflating the price charged by the Plaintiffs for gasoline; b) charging unreasonably high prices in excess of the prices charged by other suppliers in the market; and c) charging the Plaintiffs discriminatory prices that wrongfully favor company operated gasoline stations to the Plaintiffs' detriment" (Count IV).

The New Jersey Supreme Court has articulated a test for determining whether the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has been breached:

[A] party exercising its right to use discretion in setting price under a contract breaches the duty of good faith and fair dealing if that party exercises its discretionary authority arbitrarily, unreasonably, or capriciously, with the objective of preventing the other party from receiving its reasonably expected fruits under the contract. Such risks clearly would be beyond the expectations of the parties at the formation of a contract when parties reasonably intend their business relationship to be mutually beneficial. They do not reasonably intend that one party would use the powers bestowed on it to destroy unilaterally the other's expectations without legitimate purpose.

Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 773 A.2d 1121, 1130 (N.J. 2001).

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim because NCE had not yet converted to a Lukoil station when these claims were made (in May 2006), and despite believing that the rebranding to Lukoil would result in such injuries, in November 2006, NCE voluntarily agreed to rebrand its station to Lukoil. Because NCE agreed to continue its business with Lukoil, defendants argue that they could not have breached the implied ...

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