July 31, 2008
PAUL AUGE, APPELLANT,
NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD, RESPONDENT.
On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Submitted: May 19, 2008
Before Judges C.S. Fisher and Kestin.
Paul Auge, an inmate in the State prison system, appeals from a decision of the State Parole Board denying his internal appeal from a Board panel decision establishing a thirty-six- month future eligibility term (FET). The issue related to Auge's parole eligibility date (PED), and bore upon the extent of commutation credit to which he was entitled towards reduction of the FET. Auge contended that his FET should have been reduced by 576 days of commutation credit, rather than the 252 days awarded. The full Board, in its letter decision, rejected Auge's arguments.
On appeal from the full Board decision, Auge raises the following issues:
BY NOT APPLYING NJSA 30:4-140 AS INTENDED BY THE LEGISLATURE, THE STATE DENIES THE APPELLANT A TIMELY PAROLE RELEASE HEARING, THUS VIOLATING THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT.
THE PAROLE BOARDS APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAWS VIOLATED THE EX-POST FACTS CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AS INTERPRETED IN WEAVER vs GRAHAM, 101 Sct 960 (1981), LYNCE vs MATHIS 117 Sct 891 (1997) AND OTHER SUPREME COURT CASES.
We take Auge's sentencing history to be as set out in his brief. He represents that, on March 5, 1976, he "was sentenced to life, plus 151/2 to 17 years to run consecutively." He also states that, on April 19, 1981, "the consecutive sentences were aggregated and [a] PED of [April 29, 1993] was set"; that, on October 26, 1994, he received from the Board "a 15-year hit"; that, on March 24, 2004, he received from the Board "a 5-year hit"; and that, on August 29, 2006, he received from the Board (a Board panel) "a 3-year hit . . . [and a] total of 252 commutation credits . . . at a rate of 7 days per month on the additional term only." On his internal appeal to the full Board from the last of these determinations, Auge argued that "pursuant to statutory law [he] was entitled to 576 credits at a rate of 16 days per month."
In disposing of Auge's contentions of statute-based entitlement, the full Board held that the award of commutation credit on a progressive basis applies only to the calculation of the initial parole eligibility date. Upon denial of parole and establishment of a future eligibility term, a new parole eligibility date is calculated by adding the future eligibility term established to the current actual parole eligibility date and including commutation credit based on the future eligibility term only.
We have analyzed the arguments Auge raises in his challenge to the Board's decision in the light of the record before us, and determine that those arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11- 3(e)(1)(D),(E). We find no basis in law or in logic for the arguments Auge advances.
Therefore, the decision of the Parole Board is affirmed.
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