On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Hunterdon County, Docket No. FM-10-288-04.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Fuentes and Grall.
Defendant Michael B. Looney appeals from an order denying his post-judgment motion in this divorce case. We affirm substantially for the reasons stated by Judge Buchsbaum in his final memorandum of decision dated June 8, 2007. We add only the following brief comments.
Plaintiff Doreen M. Robert and defendant were divorced on May 17, 2005. On June 15, 2005, the court entered an amended judgment incorporating a property settlement agreement that the parties placed on the record on May 17, 2005. Nearly one year later, defendant filed a motion seeking to amend the judgment to address equitable distribution of personal property.
On June 2, 2006, Judge Rubin entered an order permitting defendant to depose plaintiff's attorney "to determine if there was an agreement, inadvertently left off the record, regarding personal property." Noting the amount of time that had passed since the judgment had been entered, Judge Rubin determined that he would not reopen the judgment unless plaintiff's attorney acknowledged that "it was the parties' intent to divide th[e] items" defendant sought.
Nearly one year later, on May 9, 2007, defendant filed a motion to enforce litigant's rights. Among his requests for relief was a request for division of the personal property. That motion was supported by defendant's certification, in which he represented that plaintiff's attorney had a recollection of the parties' discussion of personal property that differed from his attorney's recollection. Judge Buchsbaum, finding that defendant failed to meet the conditions for reopening the judgment set by Judge Rubin, denied defendant's motion.
On appeal, defendant argues that a hearing was required to resolve a dispute of fact material to his request to reopen a judgment, which was entered two years before the motion was filed. The argument lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E); see R. 1:6-6 (providing that affidavits and certifications submitted on motions must be based "on personal knowledge, setting forth only facts which are admissible in evidence to which the affiant is competent to testify"); R. 4:50-2 (requiring a motion for relief from judgment to "be made within a reasonable time").
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