The opinion of the court was delivered by: Mary L. Cooper United States District Judge
THE PLAINTIFF PRO SE applies for in-forma-pauperis relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 ("Application"). The Court will address the Application before reviewing the complaint's sufficiency. See Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 n.1 (3d Cir. 1990).
The plaintiff contradictorily asserts that he (1) is currently employed, (2) has "received no income since early summer 2005. I am employed by the General Services Administration in Newark, New Jersey," and (3) has not received any money from a business or profession in the past twelve months. (App., at 1.) Thus, the Court cannot determine if he has recently received any income from any employment.
The plaintiff asserts that he does not own real estate or anything else of value. (Id. at 2.) According to Westlaw's "Asset Locator" library, (1) the plaintiff purchased a home in Wall, New Jersey, in 1991, (2) he is listed as the owner - along with his spouse - by a county tax assessor as of 2006, and (3) the home has an assessed value, as opposed to a market value, of $190,800. He also does not clarify whether he receives support from another person, e.g., his spouse.*fn1
The Court will deny the Application because the plaintiff fails to show entitlement to in-forma-pauperis relief. See Spence v. Cmty. Life Improv., No. 03-3406, 2003 WL 21500007, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2003); Daniels v. County of Media, No. 03-377, 2003 WL 21294910, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2003). It is the plaintiff's burden to "provide the [Court] with the financial information it need[s] to make a determination as to whether he qualifie[s] for in forma pauperis status." Thompson v. Pisano, No. 06-1817, slip op. at 1 (3d Cir. Nov. 15, 2006) (dismissing appeal from order denying in-forma-pauperis application). The plaintiff is not entitled to in-forma-pauperis relief merely because he has brought this action pro se and has expenses. See Schneller v. Crozer Chester Med. Ctr., 201 Fed.Appx. 862, 862 (3d Cir. 2006) (dismissing appeal from order denying motion for in-formapauperis relief, as such relief not justified merely because plaintiff spent discretionary income elsewhere); Spring & Assocs. v. Johnson, No. 04-1555, 2005 WL 1384686, at *1 (D. Del. May 6, 2005) (denying application, as plaintiff received income recently and owned cars); Woodard v. Upland Mortg., No. 03-4382, 2003 WL 22597645, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2003) (denying application, as plaintiff, inter alia, owned home), aff'd, 100 Fed.Appx. 127 (3d Cir. 2004).
The Court may dismiss a complaint sua sponte if it is frivolous, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and "accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). The Court need not credit bald assertions or legal conclusions. Id. A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact, or contains "inarguable legal conclusion[s]" or "fantastic or delusional scenarios." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328 (1989).
The plaintiff asserts in his twenty-five-page complaint that he is the "sole propriator [sic] of NABRA." (Compl., at 1.) The Court's own research - as the complaint lacks an explanation - shows that NABRA stands for National American Bulldog Rescue Alliance. The plaintiff lists as defendants four individuals employed by the United States General Services Administration ("GSA"), and "ABR Members 1 through 20," and notes that "[t]his includes defendants Mentioned by name, but not charged herein." (Id. at 1-3.) ABR appears to be an organization concerning the well-being of bulldogs.
The plaintiff asserts that he is "a white male", he was employed by GSA, and there is jurisdiction here under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act. (Id. at 3-4.) He apparently bases his claims on the GSA's failure to accommodate his "anxiety/stress disorder," and exacerbation of this condition by creating a hostile work environment from 2002 through 2005. (Id. at 5.)
The plaintiff states that he spoke to a GSA Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") counselor, and "[w]hen the EEO counselor was unable to resolve his concerns, [he] filed a formal complaint of discrimination" with the GSA. (Id. at 5-6.) He was then advised by an EEO officer that "one aspect of his complaint had been accepted for further processing," but the GSA dismissed the other claims therein - despite his request that they be reinstated - "citing untimelyness [sic]." (Id. at 6-7.) He has not advised the Court as to the status of the part of the formal complaint accepted for further processing. He also appears to allege that he may be seeking further relief through the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB"). (Id. at 23.)
The plaintiff then makes the following allegations:
31.1 Plaintiff exercised his right to pursue a public ...