Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Rinaldo v. Komar

January 12, 2007

KIMBERLY K. RINALDO (NEIFERT), PLAINTIFF,
v.
OFFICER RICHARD KOMAR, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Simandle, District Judge

OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Currently pending before the Court are motions for judgment on the pleadings by Defendants Barber [Docket Item 25], Houck [Docket Item 26], Komar [Docket Item 27] and County of Atlantic ("Atlantic County") [Docket Item 30]. For the reasons explained below, the Court shall grant the motions for judgment on the pleadings and dismiss Plaintiff's claims against these four defendants.

II. BACKGROUND

In June 2005, Plaintiff brought this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, among other things that Officers Barber, Houck, and Komar used excessive force in arresting her on May 3, 2003 . The Court screened the Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, and permitted Plaintiff to proceed with her excessive force claims against them. Rinaldo v. Komar, No. 05-3037, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2267, at *11 (D.N.J. Jan. 19, 2006).

The Court also construed the Complaint as alleging a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Id. at *13. However, because Plaintiff asserted these claims against defendants who were not suable, the Court did not permit this claim to proceed. Id. at *13-15. Specifically, the Court found that the Atlantic County Justice Facility was not a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that Plaintiff had not alleged that the Warden of the facility had specific knowledge of her needs. Id. Rather, it appeared that Plaintiff was merely suing the Warden on a supervisory liability theory, which is not viable under § 1983. Id. at *14-15. However, the Court afforded Plaintiff forty-five days to amend her Complaint to add proper parties as defendants for her deliberate indifference claims. Id. at *15. In addition, the Court held that the Complaint failed to state a claim against the County, itself, because there was no allegation of any failure to train nor any allegation that any official custom or policy caused Plaintiff's alleged constitutional deprivations. Id. at *18.

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint apparently asserts claims for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs by Atlantic County and the medical staff at the Atlantic County Justice Facility.*fn1 However, only Barber, Houck, Komar and the County were served with the Amended Complaint. Therefore, Atlantic County is the only properly served defendant allegedly implicated in Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim.

The County answered the Amended Complaint, filed a third-party Complaint against Correctional Medical Care, Inc., and cross-claimed against Defendants Barber, Houck and Komar.

Defendants Barber, Houck and Komar answered the Amended Complaint, filed a third-party Complaint against Correctional Medical Care, Inc. and asserted a cross-claim against the County.

These motions for judgment on the pleadings followed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Specifically, Defendants Barber, Houck and Komar asserted that Plaintiff's claims against them were barred by the applicable statute of limitations and the County asserted that it is not suable under § 1983.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Rule 12(c) Standard

Under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." While motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), must be brought before, and in lieu of, filing answers, a Rule 12(c) motion is appropriate after the defendants have answered the Complaint, as in this case.*fn2 Thus, the parties properly moved for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).

However, the difference between Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c) is purely procedural, as the same standards govern both motions. See Turbe v. Gov't of the Virgin Islands, 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir. 1991); Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 223 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004) ("There is no material difference in the applicable legal standards"). The Court must take all allegations in the Complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts, Inc., 140 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 1988); Robb v. Philadelphia, 733 F.2d 286, 290 (3d Cir. 1984). A district court must accept any and all reasonable inferences derived from those facts stated in the Complaint, Glenside West Corp. v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 761 F. Supp. 1100, 1107 (D.N.J. 1991), and must deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [the asserted claims that] would entitle [her] to relief," Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). The question before the Court is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail; rather, it is whether that plaintiff can prove any set of facts in support of its claims that would entitle it to relief. Hishon v. King & ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.