Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 97-cv-00497 District Judge: Honorable William J. Martini.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Ambro, Circuit Judge
Before: SLOVITER, AMBRO and MICHEL,*fn1 Circuit Judges
Appellants in this case are owners and operators of industrial facilities located throughout the United States that are contaminated with hazardous waste. They admit they are responsible for some of the contamination at these sites (which they cleaned up voluntarily), but allege the United States Government is also responsible for some part. They thus seek a ruling that the Government must contribute to them a share of the cleanup costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. Two of our precedents - New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116 (3d Cir. 1997), and Matter of Reading Co., 115 F.3d 1111 (3d Cir. 1997) - limit their claim. New Castle County limits potentially responsible parties to an express cause of action for contribution under CERCLA § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (thus barring them from another type of claim called "cost recovery" under CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)).*fn2 Reading held that § 113 also replaced any implied or common law causes of action for contribution by potentially responsible parties with an exclusive statutory remedy.
In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004), the Supreme Court held that § 113 by its express terms is not available to parties that clean up sites voluntarily. Appellants now ask that we decide whether, in light of Cooper Industries, our decisions in New Castle County and Reading limiting contribution to § 113 should be reconsidered to allow them to clean up their sites voluntarily and still share the costs with others. We conclude that Cooper Industries does not give us cause to reconsider our precedents here. Hence, because appellants are themselves partly responsible for the contamination at the subject sites, and their cleanups were voluntary, they may not seek contribution from other potentially responsible parties (including the Government).
Before considering the factual background and procedural history of this case, it is necessary first to understand the applicable legal framework. In 1980, Congress enacted CERCLA to remedy the "serious environmental and health risks posed by pollution." United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55 (1998). CERCLA is a broad remedial statute that "grants the President . . . power to command government agencies and private parties to clean up hazardous waste sites," Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 814 (1994), and provides that "everyone who is potentially responsible for hazardous-waste contamination may be forced to contribute to the costs of cleanup," Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 56 n.1 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted); see Morton Int'l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 343 F.3d 669, 676 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that "[t]wo of the main purposes of CERCLA are prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites and imposition of all cleanup costs on the responsible party" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Unfortunately, "CERCLA is not a paradigm of clarity or precision [due to] inartful drafting and numerous ambiguities attributable to its precipitous passage." Artesian Water Co. v. Gov't of New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 363 (1986) (noting that many CERCLA provisions are "not . . . model[s] of legislative draftsmanship," and are "at best inartful and at worst redundant"). As one court has noted, "wading through CERCLA's morass of statutory provisions can often seem as daunting as cleaning up one of the sites the statute is designed to cover." CadleRock Props. Joint Venture, L.P. v. Schilberg, No. 3:01CV896, 2005 WL 1683494, at *5 (D. Conn. July 19, 2005).
This case requires us to dive head-first into a particularly convoluted area of the law: apportionment of cleanup costs among potentially responsible parties ("PRPs").*fn3 See Artesian Water, 851 F.2d at 648 (noting that CERCLA's "difficult[ies] [are] particularly apparent in the response costs area"). Several sections of CERCLA are relevant to this issue.
Under CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a)the United States may take action to "secure such relief as may be necessary to abate" a "substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment because of an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance from a facility." CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), defines "covered persons" who are liable for these and other costs as:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance . . . .
CERCLA § 107(a)(1)-(4). These covered persons "shall be liable for":
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe, not inconsistent with the [N]ational [C]ontingency [P]lan;*fn4
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under section 9604(i) of this title.
In 1986, Congress passed the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613. SARA amended CERCLA to add CERCLA § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 9613, which provides, in subsection (f)(1):
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) [CERCLA § 107(a)] of this title, during or following any civil action under section 9606 [CERCLA § 106] of this title or under section 9607(a) [CERCLA § 107(a)] of this title. . . . In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action under section 9606 [CERCLA § 106] of this title or section 9607 [CERCLA § 107] of this title.
CERCLA § 113(f)(1). The section also provides that: (1) a PRP that "has resolved its liability to the United States or a State in an administrative or judicially approved settlement" is immune from claims for contribution from other PRPs "regarding matters addressed in the settlement," id. § 113(f)(2); (2) a settling PRP can seek contribution from other non-settling PRPs, id. § 113(f)(3)(B); and (3) the statute of limitations for an action under § 107(a) is six years, while the statute of limitations for an action under § 113(f)(1) is only three years, id. § 113(g).
CERCLA § 120(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1), also enacted as part of the 1986 SARA amendments, contains a broad waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity, providing that "[e]ach department, agency, and instrumentality of the United States" is subject to CERCLA's provisions "in the same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any non-governmental entity, including liability under section 9607 [CERCLA § 107] of this title." See FMC Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 840 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc) ("[W]hen the government engages in activities that would make a private party liable [under CERCLA] if the private party engaged in those types of activities, then the government is also liable. This is true even if no private party could in fact engage in those specific activities." (emphases omitted)).
D. Evolution of Liability Under CERCLA and SARA
1. Pre-SARA Liability: Implied Contribution Rights
Prior to the enactment of the SARA amendments in 1986, several courts held that CERCLA exposed PRPs to joint and several liability, and that this implied a right of contribution among joint tortfeasors. See, e.g., United States v. S.C. Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 994 (D.S.C. 1986), vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 807-08, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983). Innocent parties were allowed to recover their full response costs from any PRP under § 107(a)(4)(B), see Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 889, 891-92 (9th Cir. 1986); Walls v. Waste Res. Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 317-18 (6th Cir. 1985), and PRPs were allowed contribution pursuant to either an implied cause of action under § 107, see City of Phila. v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142-43 (E.D. Pa. 1982), or the common law, see United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1267-69 (D. Del. 1986) (hereafter "NCC"); Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1489-90, 1491 (D. Colo. 1985). As the Supreme Court has explained, these cases allowed private parties, including PRPs, to seek contribution for costs incurred in forced or voluntary cleanups. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 161-62 (citing cases); Reading, 115 F.3d at 1118-19 (same, and noting that, "[u]ntil the passage of SARA in 1986, the judicially[ ] created expansion of § 107(a)(4)(B) served as the sole means by which parties could obtain contribution").
2. Post-SARA Liability: Cost Recovery and Contribution Actions
Following the passage of SARA and the inclusion of § 113 in CERCLA (which specifically provides contribution rights), courts retreated from implied causes of action for PRPs to seek contribution under § 107(a). Instead, they interpreted §§ 107 and 113 as establishing two "clearly distinct" remedies: "cost recovery" under § 107(a), and "contribution" under § 113(f). See, e.g., Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 163 & n.3; Morton Int'l, 343 F.3d at 675 ("Accordingly, CERCLA and SARA together create two legal actions by which parties that have incurred costs associated with cleanups can recover some or all of those costs: (1) Section 107 cost recovery actions; and (2) Section 113 contribution actions.").
In New Castle County, we determined that a cost recovery action under § 107 is not available to a PRP.*fn5 Rather, "a section 107 action brought for recovery of costs may be brought only by innocent parties that have undertaken clean-ups. An action brought by a potentially responsible person is by necessity a section 113 action for contribution." New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1120 (second emphasis added). We based our conclusion on the understanding that, although § 107 is not limited by its terms to innocent parties, the section "was designed to enable innocent persons who incur expenses cleaning up a site to recover their costs from potentially responsible persons," and thus "a potentially responsible person does not experience section 107 injury and cannot obtain section 107 relief." Id. at 1122.*fn6 Indeed, because § 107 imposes strict, joint, and several liability on all PRPs for the costs of cleanup, a PRP allowed to bring a cost recovery action under § 107 against another PRP "could recoup all of its expenditures regardless of fault" - which, we noted, "strains logic." Id. at 1120-21 (emphasis in original). Moreover, we concluded that it made little sense to allow a PRP the choice of proceeding under either § 107 or § 113, because parties would always choose § 107 (which allows recovery based on joint and several liability with a six-year statute of limitations) over § 113 (which allows recovery based on equitable apportionment of costs with a three-year statute of limitations), thus "render[ing] section 113 a nullity." Id. at 1123.*fn7
In Reading, decided a few weeks after New Castle County, we held that a PRP also may not invoke the pre-SARA implied cause of action for contribution under § 107.*fn8 Examining the legislative history of § 113, we noted that the section was intended to "'clarif[y] and confirm the right of a person held jointly and severally liable under CERCLA to seek contribution from other potentially liable parties, when the person believes that it has assumed a share of the cleanup or cost that may be greater than its equitable share under the circumstances.'" Reading, 115 F.3d at 1119 (quoting S. Rep. No. 99-11, at 44 (1985)) (alterations in original); see also New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1122 (same, quoting H.R. Rep. No. 99-253(I), at 79 (1985)). Based on the statute's language, the legislative history, relevant case law, and "the fact that § 113(f)(1) specifically permits an action for contribution to be brought 'in the absence of a civil action under . . . section ,'" Reading, 115 F.3d at 1120 (alterations in original),*fn9 we held that, "[i]n passing § 113(f), Congress acted to codify existing federal common law and to replace the judicially crafted measure with an express statutory remedy." Id. at 1119.
Thus we concluded that "Congress intended § 113 to be the sole means for seeking contribution." Id. at 1120 (emphasis added). It "replaced the judicially created right to contribution under § 107(a)(4)(B)" with an express (and exclusive) statutory remedy, id. at 1119, and also superseded common law remedies:
[W]hen Congress expressly created a statutory right of contribution in CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f), it made that remedy a part of an elaborate settlement scheme aimed at the efficient resolution of environmental disputes. Permitting independent common law remedies would create a path around the statutory settlement scheme, raising an obstacle to the intent of Congress. We conclude therefore that [the plaintiff's] common law claims are preempted by CERCLA § 113(f).
In so holding, we acknowledged dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Key Tronic that "§ 107 unquestionably provides a cause of action for private parties to seek recovery of cleanup costs," 511 U.S. at 818, and that CERCLA "expressly authorizes a cause of action for contribution in § 113 and impliedly authorizes a similar and somewhat overlapping remedy in § 107," id. at 816. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1120. We determined, however, that the "overlap" consisted of the fact that (as New Castle County held) an innocent private party (most likely a landowner who purchased land that had been contaminated by others) may bring a cost recovery action under § 107 holding a PRP jointly and severally liable for the full cost of the cleanup. Reading, 115 F.3d at 1120. "The fact, however, that a direct action might be brought under § 107(a) [by an innocent landowner against a PRP] does not open the door for [the] PRP to bring an action for contribution [against other PRPs] under that same section." Id.
In sum, after SARA introduced the § 113 contribution provision, our Court and other courts concluded that §§ 107 and 113 were complementary (but not really "overlapping," as the Supreme Court had suggested in Key Tronic) remedies. Section 107 allowed the Government or an innocent landowner to recover the full cost of cleanup from a PRP on the basis of strict, joint, and several liability. The PRP could then seek contribution from other PRPs under § 113(f)(1). Moreover, according to the understanding at that time (as intimated in Reading), § 113(f)(1) allowed a PRP to seek contribution even in the absence of an action under § 106 or § 107; in other words, a PRP that voluntarily cleaned up a contaminated site sua sponte could seek contribution from other PRPs without waiting for an enforcement action, a Government or innocent-landowner cost recovery suit, or a settlement of liability.
In Cooper Industries, the Supreme Court significantly altered this understanding. The Court held that the plain language of § 113(f)(1) (i.e., "Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under section  of this title, during or following any civil action under section  of this title or under section  of this title.") required a pre-existing civil action (either pending or completed) against the PRP under § 106 or § 107 before the PRP could seek contribution from other PRPs. The Court concluded that, "if § 113(f)(1) were read to authorize contribution actions at any time, regardless of the existence of a § 106 or § 107(a) civil action, then Congress need not have included the explicit 'during or following' condition" in § 113(f)(1). Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 166. Thus, a PRP may only seek contribution under § 113(f)(1) if it is the subject of a § 106 or § 107 civil action or has been adjudged liable as a result of such an action. Id.*fn10
The Court also considered the so-called "saving clause" of § 113(f)(1) ("Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action under section  of this title or section  of this title."). We relied on this sentence in Reading when we said that § 113(f)(1) "specifically permits" a PRP to seek contribution from other PRPs without a pre-existing action under § 106 or § 107. 115 F.3d at 1120. Insofar as this statement implied that § 113(f)(1) permitted such an action, the Supreme Court disagreed, noting that "[t]he sole function of the [saving clause] is to clarify that § 113(f)(1) does nothing to 'diminish' any cause(s) of action for contribution that may exist independently of § 113(f)(1)." Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 166 (emphasis added). As the Court explained,
the sentence [i.e., the saving clause] rebuts any presumption that the express right of contribution provided by the enabling clause [in § 113(f)(1)] is the exclusive cause of action for contribution available to a PRP. The sentence, however, does not itself establish a cause of action; nor does it expand § 113(f)(1) to authorize contribution actions not brought "during or following" a § 106 or § 107(a) civil action; nor does it specify what causes of action for contribution, if any, exist outside § 113(f)(1). Reading the saving clause to authorize § 113(f)(1) contribution actions not just "during or following" a civil action, but also before such an action, would again violate the settled rule that we must, if possible, construe a statute to give every word some operative effect.
The Court left open the questions of whether a PRP may seek cost recovery under § 107, and whether that section includes an implied cause of action for contribution on which a PRP may rely independently of § 113. With respect to the former question, the Court noted that numerous decisions from the Courts of Appeals, including this Court's decision in New Castle County, had held that a § 107(a) cost recovery action is only available to an innocent party, and concluded that the question had not been briefed to the Supreme Court and thus it was "more prudent to withhold judgment on these matters." Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 169-70. While the Court did not reach the latter issue as well, it drew the litigants' attention to those cases in which "this Court has visited the subject of implied rights of contribution before," id. at 170-71 (citing Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 638-47 (1981), and Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 90-99 (1981)). It noted further that, "in enacting § 113(f)(1), Congress explicitly recognized a particular set (claims 'during or following' the specified civil actions) of the contribution rights previously implied by courts from provisions of CERCLA and the common law." Id. at 171.*fn11
II. Facts and Procedural History
With this context, we turn to the facts of this case. Appellants E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., ConocoPhillips Co., and Sporting Goods Properties, Inc. (collectively "DuPont" or "appellants")*fn12 appeal from a March 1, 2004 order of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey granting the United States judgment on the pleadings and denying DuPont's motion for judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and its request for certification of an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). This order rested on an earlier opinion and order, entered on December 30, 2003, granting the Government summary judgment in a "test case" brought to determine whether DuPont had a cause of action against the Government for contribution under CERCLA.*fn13 DuPont asserts the District ...