The opinion of the court was delivered by: Simandle, U.S. District Judge
Third-Party Defendant Samuel P. Martin Insurance Agency, Inc. ("Martin") has moved for reconsideration of the Court's June 22, 2005 Opinion and Order granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff in this declaratory judgment action.*fn1 Martin argues that the Court overlooked evidence that superior coverage was available to Brida from Plaintiff. Martin had argued previously that "all of the evidence indicates that such coverage was not available . . . ." (Martin Opp. Br. at 8.) The Court relied on that representation in reaching its decision.
Martin now argues that the Court should reconsider its holding granting summary judgment to Plaintiff. For two primary reasons, the motion for reconsideration will be denied. First, the Court considered all the evidence in the record and concluded, as Martin urged the Court to do, that superior coverage was not available to Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Anthony M. Brida, Inc. ("Brida"). Second, there is no issue of fact regarding the availability of superior coverage. Accordingly, Martin's motion will be denied.
This action arises out of a suit filed by Chata Coating and Laminating, Co. ("Chata") seeking damages for water damage to machinery being transported by Brida in December 2001 ("Underlying Action"). The Court will only recount those facts that bear upon this motion for reconsideration.
On October 25, 1999, Hartford Fire Insurance Company ("Hartford") issued policy no. 13 UUM 1D8655 (the "Policy") to Brida, providing coverage under Form MS 00 39 04 89 (the "Cargo Coverage Form") for direct physical loss to property being transported by Brida.*fn2 The Policy was procured through Martin, a licensed insurance agent.
Following an inquiry by Martin, on November 8, 1999 Imelda Toland, Hartford's underwriter assigned to the Brida account, notified Jacqueline McAllister of the Martin Agency by fax that no coverage for wetness, dampness or rust was provided by the Hartford Policy. On November 15, 1999, Ms. McAllister contacted Daniele Brida of Brida and advised her of Hartford's position that no coverage was afforded for wetness, rust, or corrosion.
That same day, Ms. McAllister sent a fax to Ms. Brida confirming that conversation and forwarding Hartford's reply that no coverage was provided for wetness, dampness or rust under the policy.
On December 26, 2001, Hartford was advised by Martin of a potential cargo claim by Chata against Brida. On March 19, 2002, Chata presented a formal written claim against Brida, which was forwarded to Hartford, alleging that Brida failed to properly tarp or otherwise protect the printing press which had been tendered to Brida for transport. On April 18, 2002, Hartford advised Brida in writing that it was declining the claim on the grounds that the type of losses at issue were specifically excluded from the Policy.
Chata filed a complaint in federal district court in South Carolina on April 26, 2002. On June 7, 2002, Hartford filed this declaratory judgment action against Chata and Brida seeking a declaration that Hartford has no obligations to provide Brida with indemnity or a defense for Chata's claims against Brida. By Opinion and Order dated June 22, 2005, this Court granted the motion for summary judgment by Hartford Fire Insurance Company, thereby holding Hartford free from any obligation to provide Brida with indemnity or a defense for Chata's claims.*fn3
Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) of the United States District Court, District of New Jersey, governs the instant motion for reconsideration.*fn4 That rule requires that the moving party set forth the factual matters or controlling legal authority that it believes the court overlooked when rendering its initial decision. L. Civ. R. 7.1(i). Whether to grant reconsideration is a matter within the district court's discretion, but it should only be granted where such facts or legal authority were indeed presented but overlooked. DeLong Corp. v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 622 F.2d 1135, 1140 (3d Cir. 1980), overruled on other grounds by Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975 (3d Cir. 1981); Williams v. Sullivan, 818 F. Supp. 92, 93 (D.N.J. 1993).
A "motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle to reargue the motion or to present evidence which should have been raised before." Bermingham v. Sony Corp. of America, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 834, 856-67 (D.N.J. 1992), aff'd, 37 F.3d 1485 (3d Cir. 1994). A motion for reconsideration is improper when it is used solely to ask the court to rethink what it has already thought through -- rightly or wrongly. Oritani Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 744 F. Supp. 1311, 1314 (D.N.J. 1990)(citing Above the Belt v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983)), rev'd on other grounds, 989 F.2d 635 (3d Cir. 1993). Finally, a motion for reconsideration does not allow a ...