Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.


December 16, 2005.

WARDEN MINER, Respondent.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: JEROME SIMANDLE, District Judge


Petitioner Candido Ortiz-Martinez filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his federal sentence as unconstitutional under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Respondents filed a motion to dismiss, accompanied by a memorandum of law, and Petitioner filed a reply to the motion. Having thoroughly reviewed the submissions of the parties, this Court grants the motion to dismiss the Petition for lack of jurisdiction. I. BACKGROUND

  Petitioner challenges an aggregate 592-month sentence entered in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri in 1991 after a jury found him guilty of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine, distribution of cocaine, and using and carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking crime. See United States v. Ortiz-Martinez, 1 F.3d 662, 668 (8th Cir. 1993). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in 1993. Id.

  Petitioner thereafter filed three § 2255 motions to vacate in the sentencing court. Ortiz-Martinez v. Al Herrera, 44 Fed. Appx. 806, 807 (9th Cir. 2002). The sentencing court denied the first § 2255 motion on the merits and dismissed the next two as successive § 2255 motions. Id. The Eighth Circuit twice refused Petitioner's requests for authorization to file successive § 2255 motions. Id. In 2001, while Petitioner was incarcerated at Lompoc United States Penitentiary in California, he filed his first § 2241 motion challenging his conviction. Id. The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Id. Petitioner appealed and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that Petitioner failed to carry his burden of showing that § 2255 was an inadequate or ineffective remedy. Id. Petitioner, who is now incarcerated at F.C.I. Fairton in New Jersey, filed this Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his sentence as unconstitutional under Booker.


  A. Jurisdiction

  Section 2241 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides in relevant part:
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless — . . . He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
  As a result of the practical difficulties encountered in hearing a challenge to a federal sentence in the district of confinement rather than the district of sentence, in its 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, Congress established a procedure whereby a federal prisoner might collaterally attack his sentence in the sentencing court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343-44 (1974); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952). Section 2255 provides in relevant part:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255, ¶ 1.
  Generally, a challenge to the validity of a federal conviction or sentence must be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974); Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002). This is because § 2255 expressly prohibits a district court from entertaining a challenge to a prisoner's federal sentence under § 2241 unless the remedy under § 2255 is "inadequate or ineffective" to test the legality of the petitioner's detention.*fn1 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Specifically, paragraph five of § 2255 provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241] in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
28 U.S.C. § 2255, ¶ 5; see Cradle v. U.S. ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 2002); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997); Millan-Diaz v. Parker, 444 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1971); Application of Galante, 437 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1971) (per curiam); United States ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis, 212 F.2d 681, 684 (3d Cir. 1954).

  A § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective, authorizing resort to § 2241, "only where the petitioner demonstrates that some limitation of scope or procedure would prevent a § 2255 proceeding from affording him a full hearing and adjudication of his wrongful detention claim." Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538. "It is the inefficacy of the remedy, not the personal inability to use it, that is determinative." Id. "Section 2255 is not `inadequate or ineffective' merely because the sentencing court does not grant relief, the one-year statute of limitations has expired, or the petitioner is unable to meet the stringent gatekeeping requirements of the amended § 2255. The provision exists to ensure that petitioners have a fair opportunity to seek collateral relief, not to enable them to evade procedural requirements." Id. at 539.

  In In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251, the Third Circuit applied the "inadequate or ineffective" test to a § 2241 claim challenging a sentence on the basis of a change of substantive law that occurred after Dorsainvil's first § 2255 motion was decided.*fn2 The Third Circuit first determined that Dorsainvil could not raise the Bailey claim in a successive § 2255 motion because the AEDPA restricted successive § 2255 motions to constitutional claims. However, the court held that, in this narrow situation where Dorsainvil had no other opportunity to raise the claim, § 2255 was inadequate and ineffective. The Court reasoned:
Dorsainvil does not have and, because of the circumstances that he was convicted for a violation of § 924(c)(1) before the Bailey decision, never had an opportunity to challenge his conviction as inconsistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 924(c)(1). If, as the Supreme Court stated in [Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974)], it is a "complete miscarriage of justice" to punish a defendant for an act that the law does not make criminal, thereby warranting resort to the collateral remedy afforded by § 2255, it must follow that it is the same "complete miscarriage of justice" when the AEDPA amendment to § 2255 makes that collateral remedy unavailable. In that unusual circumstance, the remedy afforded by § 2255 is "inadequate or ineffective" to test the legality of [Dorsainvil's] detention.
Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251 (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346-47 (1974)).
  The Third Circuit emphasized the narrowness of its holding:
We do not suggest that § 2255 would be "inadequate or ineffective" so as to enable a second petitioner to invoke § 2241 merely because that petitioner is unable to meet the stringent gatekeeping requirements of the amended § 2255. Such a holding would effectively eviscerate Congress's intent in amending § 2255. However, allowing someone in Dorsainvil's unusual position — that of a prisoner who had no earlier opportunity to challenge his conviction for a crime that an intervening change in substantive law may negate, even when the government concedes that such a change should be applied retroactively — is hardly likely to undermine the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255.
Dorsainvil at 251 (emphasis added).*fn3

  Turning to the case at bar, Petitioner argues that his 49-year sentence is unconstitutional under Booker. It is clear that a Booker claim challenging a sentence is within the scope of claims that are cognizable under § 2255. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction under § 2241 to entertain Petitioner's Booker claim unless § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective for him to raise it.

  Booker evolved from the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).*fn4 In Apprendi, the Supreme Court determined that Apprendi had a constitutional right to have a jury, rather than a judge, find bias because the finding was necessary to support an enhanced sentence under the New Jersey hate crimes law. The Supreme Court reversed Apprendi's sentence pursuant to the principle that, "under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n. 6). In Booker, the Supreme Court determined that, for reasons explained in Apprendi, Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.