Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.


September 13, 2005.


The opinion of the court was delivered by: FAITH HOCHBERG, District Judge


This matter is before the Court upon a settlement agreement between the manufacturers of the anti-depressant drug Remeron, Organon USA Inc. and Akzo Nobel N.V. (Defendants or Organon), and the end-payor purchasers of Remeron along with all Attorney Generals of the United States of America and territories. The settling parties seek (1) final approval of their class action settlement agreement and plan of distribution, (2) final certification of an end-payor settlement class pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, and (3) award of attorneys' fees to Plaintiffs' Counsel, reimbursement of litigation expenses, and incentive awards to named Plaintiffs. The Court preliminarily approved the settlement on January 25, 2005 after a preliminary fairness hearing on December 1, 2004. The final Fairness Hearing was conducted on June 28, 2005.


  A. The Litigation

  1. The Complaint

  In 2002, end-payor purchasers of Remeron filed class action complaints against Defendants. Complaints were filed by United Food and Commercial Workers Local 56 Health & Welfare Fund, Board of Trustees of United Food and Commercial Workers Local 56 Health & Welfare Fund, Vista Healthplan, Inc., Gayle Taylor, Dianne Mason and Robert Kapella (End-Payor Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs). These complaints were followed by a Consolidated Class Action Complaint on September 11, 2002, and thereafter by an Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint (Complaint) in In re Remeron End-Payor Antitrust Litigation, Master Docket No. 02-CV-2007 (D.N.J.), filed January 5, 2004.

  The Complaint alleges violations of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, and violations of state antitrust and/or unfair competition statutes. It alleges that Defendants (a) obtained United States Patent No. 5,977,099 ('099 patent) through fraud on the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), (b) improperly listed the '099 patent in the United States Food and Drug Administration's (FDA's) "Approved Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations" (Orange Book) to preserve their monopoly, (c) improperly delayed the listing of that patent in the Orange Book to prolong their monopoly, and (d) thereafter improperly commenced lawsuits asserting sham claims of patent infringement under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355, and the United States patent laws against generic drug companies (Generic Manufacturers), which sought permission to market generic versions of Organon's antidepressant drug, Remeron.

  The Complaint alleges that Defendants took these several actions in order to forestall the market entry of FDA-approved generic versions of Remeron (i.e., generic mirtazapine). As a result, end-payor purchasers — composed of Third-Party Payors (such as health benefit funds, HMOs, health insurers and hospitals), governmental entities, and individual consumers — were allegedly required to purchase brand-name Remeron at monopoly prices instead of being able to purchase generic mirtazapine at a fraction of the price. Absent Defendants' illegal activities, it is alleged that patients would have been able to purchase lower-priced generic mirtazapine earlier, resulting in a savings of millions of dollars.

  2. Extensive Discovery and Litigation Prior to Settlement

  This litigation was complex and hotly contested from the outset, beginning with Defendants' initial unsuccessful efforts to obtain a stay from the Magistrate Judge. On December 18, 2002, this Court granted summary judgment in favor of certain Generic Manufacturers with respect to Organon's patent claims against them. Following that decision, class action complaints and individual complaints were filed by various direct purchasers of Remeron (Direct Purchasers), who are not a part of this litigation or settlement.

  The Court then entered a case management Order on June 18, 2003, coordinating discovery in the End-Payor class actions, the Direct Purchaser cases, and the antitrust counterclaims filed by the Generic Manufacturers. Additional coordination and case management Orders were issued on July 16, 2003; August 11, 2003; and December 11, 2003, and several Orders regarding discovery were issued September 26, 2003; December 23, 2003; January 15, 2004; January 16, 2004; February 3, 2004; February 10, 2004; and February 13, 2004.

  On December 3, 2003, the Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss several antitrust counterclaims by Generic Manufacturers including the (a) allegation that the '099 patent had been improperly listed by Defendants in the FDA's Orange Book for anticompetitive reasons, and (b) allegation that the Defendants' patent litigation against the Generic Manufacturers was baseless and brought for anticompetitive purposes to prolong Defendants' monopoly.

  Overall, discovery was extensive. Approximately 800,000 pages of documents and data were produced by Defendants and third parties. Documents produced included hundreds of thousands of pages relating to Defendants' various anti-generic strategies for Remeron; Defendants' internal patent planning and life cycle management strategy; Defendants' regulatory and Orange Book listing strategies; Defendants' clinical development files, which contained additional documentation regarding other regulatory exclusivity strategies for Remeron; Defendants' patent files, including file wrapper and patent prosecution history documentation; and numerous scientific and medical articles and other publications which impacted upon the issues of non-infringement and invalidity of the '099 patent. End-Payor Plaintiffs' briefs revealed extensive research into the various legal and regulatory issues in this case, including an analysis of various FDA regulations and the case law interpreting those regulations.

  End-Payor Plaintiffs' counsel pressed Defendants on the adequacy of their document production at a hearing on December 19, 2003, through a Notice of Deposition of Corporate Defendants Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(6), and through a letter brief on February 2, 2004. They took depositions of numerous current or former employees of the Defendants. These included many high-level executives and employees, who were deposed on complicated and highly technical issues relating to Defendants' various legal, regulatory, marketing and other anti-generic strategies for Remeron. Plaintiffs also consulted heavily with counsel for the Direct Purchasers, counsel for the Generic Manufacturers, and the State Attorneys General. In all, over 50 depositions were taken.

  The End-Payor Plaintiffs also provided extensive discovery, including Rule 26 Initial Disclosures on October 15, 2002, answers to interrogatories on September 8, 2003, supplemental voluminous document production, and deposition testimony by the two institutional End-Payor Plaintiff Class Representatives (Vista Healthplan, Inc. and United Food & Commercial Workers Local 56 Health & Welfare Fund). End-Payor Plaintiffs also engaged and met extensively with economic and other experts to develop support for theories of liability and to measure the monetary harm suffered by End-Payors of Remeron.

  Defendants moved to dismiss or stay the End-Payor Plaintiffs' Consolidated Amended Complaint on November 14, 2002. End-Payor Plaintiffs filed a comprehensive Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or Stay on January 17, 2003, and a Notice of Supplemental Authority in opposition on February 6, 2003, as well as a letter brief regarding subsequent authority on April 25, 2003, and a letter brief on further supplemental authority on June 3, 2003. Defendants filed their Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss or Stay on February 21, 2003, and filed a response to End-Payor Plaintiffs' April 25 letter brief on May 8, 2003, and a response to End-Payor Plaintiffs' June 3 letter brief on June 5, 2003.

  Defendants opposed End-Payor Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file the End-Payor Plaintiffs' Consolidated Amended Complaint. End-Payor Plaintiffs filed an extensive Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend on November 18, 2003. After briefing and oral argument, the Court granted End-Payor Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend on December 31, 2003. Following oral argument, Defendants' initial motion to dismiss was denied as moot in light of End-Payor Plaintiffs' Amended Consolidated Complaint, by Order dated January 15, 2004.

  Defendants thereafter moved to dismiss End-Payor Plaintiffs' Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint on January 20, 2004. End-Payor Plaintiffs moved to certify a nationwide class of End Payors, including consumers as well as public (non-federal) and private institutional End Payors, on October 27, 2003. End-Payor Plaintiffs filed a comprehensive Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, together with a detailed and extensive Declaration from Harvard University health economist Professor Richard G. Frank in support of class certification. The Court had not issued a ruling on these two motions at the time of the proposed settlement.

  As the End-Payor Plaintiffs were developing their case, the working group of State Attorneys General were conducting their own economic and factual investigation relating to the claims, underlying events, and conduct alleged by the End-Payor Plaintiffs and others. Beginning in March 2003, the Office of the Attorney General of Texas issued Civil Investigative Demands (CIDs) for documents and answers to written interrogatories to the Defendants and to third parties, including the Generic Manufacturers. A multi-state working group of State Attorneys General that was formed during the summer of 2003 conducted a targeted review of the 200 CD-ROMs of document images produced in response to the CIDs. The working group also reviewed transcripts of depositions and hearings from the patent litigation and the End-Payor and Direct Purchaser litigation. The State Attorneys General also researched and analyzed may legal and regulatory issues involving patents, the FDA and the Hatch-Waxman process. In addition, the State Attorneys General gathered data relating to purchases of Remeron from their state agencies, including their state Medicaid programs, as well as sales and pricing data from the Defendants and the Generic Manufacturers, and retained economists to analyze the data and create damages estimates. The State Attorneys General undertook extensive legal research and analysis and consulted with economic and intellectual property law experts regarding the theories of liability at issue in this case.

  B. Mediation and Settlement

  In December 2003, the parties began to explore the possibility of settlement with the working group of State Attorneys General. The settlement negotiations included a multi-day global settlement mediation before Judge Politan in January 2004. This was followed by a series of settlement discussions between Defendants' and End-Payor Plaintiffs' counsel in coordination with the working group of State Attorneys General. These discussions laid the groundwork, but settlement was not achieved until the end of a two-day settlement conference before this Court. The broad outlines of this agreement were discussed with the Court in chambers on February 18, 2004.

  For the next half year, the End-Payor Plaintiffs and the States together engaged in further negotiations with Defendants to craft and finalize the detailed written settlement agreement. Other negotiations included crafting and finalizing the escrow agreement, the proposed preliminary approval order, the proposed final judgment, and the class notice of the proposed settlement. The working group of State Attorneys General, in conjunction with the Federal Trade Commission, engaged in many further negotiations with Defendants to draft and finalize the Stipulated Injunction. State Attorneys General who were not involved in the working group were later invited to join the settlement.

  C. Preliminary Approval of the Settlement and Execution of the Notice Plan

  On October 20, 2004, End-Payor Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff States filed their Memorandum in Support of End-Payor Plaintiffs' and States' Motion for Preliminary Approval of Proposed Settlement. Contemporaneous with the filing of that Memorandum, a Complaint including all of the 50 States, the District of Columbia, and all U.S. territories was filed with the Court, along with the fully executed settlement agreement.*fn1

  On November 17, 2004, the Court issued an Order requesting End-Payor Plaintiffs and Plaintiff States submit a brief addressing in further detail their proposed Notice Plan. On November 24, 2004, End-Payor Plaintiffs and Plaintiff States submitted a Supplemental Memorandum in Further Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval that addressed the issues raised. On December 1, 2004, the Court held a hearing on the proposed preliminary approval of the settlement. At that hearing, the Court requested that the parties develop a proposed Plan of Distribution and include details regarding that plan in the notices, which the parties did. On January 14, 2005, the End-Payor Plaintiffs and Plaintiff States submitted a Second Supplemental Memorandum in Further Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval, setting forth the proposed Plan of Distribution and revised notices. On January 24, 2005, the Court followed up with an e-mail to the parties seeking additional information regarding certain language in the proposed order and the notice. End-Payor Plaintiffs and Plaintiff States responded to the Court's questions by return e-mail and revised the long-form and summary notices in response to the Court's inquiries.

  On January 25, 2005, the Court entered an Order Conditionally Certifying Settlement Class, Preliminarily Approving Proposed Settlement, and Preliminarily Approving Representation of Attorneys General. In compliance with the settlement agreement and the Court's January 25, 2005 Order, Defendants paid $35 million into escrow on February 1, 2005. Then the Notice Plan was carried out. The claims administrator, Complete Claim Solutions (CCS), mailed 13,431 notice packages to Third-Party Payor (TPP) class members. As of May 25, 2005, with the cooperation of the pharmacies, CCS had caused to be mailed 854,046 notice packets to potential consumer class members. The media consultant retained by CCS published the summary notice in national publications, such as Reader's Digest, Parade, USA Today and USA Weekend. To provide adequate coverage for class members residing in one of the United States Territories, the media consultant published summary notice in El Nuevo Dia, the Pacific Daily News and the Virgin Islands Daily News. The media consultant also published the summary notice in an industry periodical, National Underwriter, to reach TPP class members. Additionally, CCS contacted 22,643 physicians, and numerous mental health, senior and women's organizations soliciting their assistance in notifying their members of the settlement. CCS distributed Public Service Announcements (PSAs) to 1,000 radio stations. As of May 25, 2005, 60 radio stations reported airing the PSAs a total of 11,179 times. CCS designed and developed a website for potential class members to obtain information and for consumer class members to file a claim online; and CCS set up and operates a toll-free 800 telephone number to answer class members' questions. As of May 25, 2005, over 40,000 visits have been made to the website and nearly 30,000 calls have been made to the toll-free telephone number.

  D. The Settlement Terms

  A copy of the settlement agreement and its exhibits were filed with the Court on October 20, 2004 with the motion by End-Payor Plaintiffs and States for preliminary settlement approval.

  1. Monetary Payments And Distributions

  The settlement provides for settlement payments by Defendants in a total amount of up to Thirty-Six Million Dollars ($36,000,000.00) (Settlement Consideration) consisting of: (1) Thirty-Three Million Dollars ($33,000,000.00) that Defendants paid into an escrow account on February 1, 2005, plus any interest, dividends and other distributions and payments earned on that sum while in escrow (Settlement Fund); (2) Two Million Dollars ($2,000,000.00) that Defendants paid on February 1, 2005 into a separate escrow account to pay for costs and expenses of settlement class notice and future costs of settlement administration, plus any interest, dividends and other distributions and payments earned on that sum while in escrow (Notice Fund); and (3) up to One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00) that the Defendants will pay to the States following the effective date of the settlement agreement for their reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in their investigations of Defendants relating to this matter and in connection with the approval and administration of this settlement.

  a. The Settlement Fund

  On February 1, 2005, Defendants deposited into escrow the sum of Thirty-Three Million Dollars ($33,000,000.00). This Settlement Fund may be used for purposes of distribution to the members of the settlement class and the Plaintiff States, payment of further notice or administrative costs in excess of the amount of the Notice Fund up to $500,000.00, and payment of End-Payor Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs, and incentive awards for the class representatives.

  Under the Plan of Distribution, the net settlement amount (the settlement fund less notice and claims administration costs, attorneys' fees, expenses, and incentive awards) will be allocated as follows: 32.8% to consumers, 16.5% to state governmental purchasers, and 50.7% to TPPs. End-Payor Plaintiffs' Co-Lead Counsel have applied to the Court for an attorneys' fees award from the Settlement Fund equal to $7.8 million (23.6% of the Settlement Fund) plus 23.6% of interest that has accrued on the Settlement Fund, as well as reimbursement of almost $500,000.00 in expenses (including expert fees and costs). Attorneys' fees and expenses will be distributed by End-Payor Plaintiffs' Co-Lead Counsel among the ten law firms that initiated and litigated these End Payor cases. In addition, End-Payor Plaintiffs seek an award of incentive awards to the Class Representatives in the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00).

  b. The Notice Fund

  Defendants deposited into escrow a separate amount of Two Million Dollars ($2,000,000.00) used exclusively for the payment of notice and administrative fees and costs reasonably incurred for the purpose of providing notice of settlement to members of the settlement class, processing claims and administering the settlement, paying any taxes and tax expenses with respect to the escrow accounts, and paying reasonable fees and costs to the escrow agent.

  c. Payment to State Attorneys General

  After the effective date of the settlement agreement, Defendants will reimburse the Plaintiff States for their reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in connection with their investigations of Defendants relating to this matter, as well as their future reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses to be incurred in connection with settlement approval and administration. The aggregate amount of all such fees and expenses of all Plaintiff States that shall be reimbursable shall not exceed One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00).

  d. Any Unclaimed Money

  Any amount in the Settlement Fund that remains after payment of all claims, Court-approved fees, costs, expenses, and incentive awards, and any supplemental distribution to settlement class members and Court-approved supplemental fees and costs, will be distributed to charitable organizations or state agencies that provide health or legal services to settlement class members, as recommended by End-Payor Plaintiffs' Co-Lead Counsel and/or State Liaison Counsel and approved by the Court.

  2. Injunctive Relief

  Defendants have agreed to an injunction prohibiting certain future conduct (Injunction), which will become effective when the settlement agreement becomes effective. The Injunction, which was negotiated by the Plaintiff States in conjunction with the Federal Trade Commission states, inter alia, that Defendants (a) "shall not seek, maintain, certify to, or take any other action in furtherance of, the listing or continued listing of any Patent in the Orange Book where the listing of such Patent in the Orange Book violates Applicable Law" and (b) "shall not" provide to the FDA "Listing Information that [is] false or misleading."

  3. Release of Claims

  Members of the settlement class (who have not made valid and timely elections to exclude themselves from the settlement class) release and discharge forever the Defendants from all claims which could have been asserted from the facts and circumstances giving rise to this case, from the beginning of time through January 25, 2005 (the date this Court preliminarily approved the Settlement Agreement).


  A. Class Certification for Purposes of Settlement

  In its Order preliminarily approving the settlement agreement, the Court conditionally certified the Settlement Class, defined in the settlement agreement as:
All End Payors (including any assignees of such End Payors) who purchased and/or paid all or part of the purchase price of Mirtazapine Products in the United States during the period beginning June 15, 2001 through January 25, 2005 (the date of the Preliminary Approval Order). Excluded from the Settlement Class are (i) Defendants and any of their subsidiaries and affiliates, (ii) all federal governmental entities, agencies and instrumentalities, and (iii) all wholesalers and retailers and all persons or entities that purchased Mirtazapine Products primarily for purposes of resale.
The Court also preliminarily approved the following as Class Representatives:
United Food and Commercial Workers Local 56 Health & Welfare Fund, and Board of Trustees of United Food and Commercial Workers Local 56 Health & Welfare Fund, a health benefit fund operated for the benefit of present and retired members of the union local and their families;
Vista Healthplan, Inc., a health maintenance organization that provides comprehensive healthcare benefits to its members; and
Gayle Taylor, Dianne Mason, and Robert Kapella, all of whom are consumers who purchased Remeron during the Class Period.
  Under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court must engage in a two-step analysis in order to determine whether it should certify a class action for settlement purposes. First, the Court must determine whether the End-Payor Plaintiffs and Plaintiff States have satisfied the prerequisites for maintaining a class action as set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). If the End-Payor Plaintiffs and Plaintiff States can satisfy these prerequisites, the Court must then determine whether the alternative requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) or 23(b)(3) are met. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) advisory committee's note. "Confronted with a request for settlement-only class certification, a district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(b)(3)(D), for the proposal is that there be no trial." Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619 (1997).

  1. The Requirements of Rule 23(a)

  Rule 23(a) provides that class members may maintain a class action as representatives of a class if they show the court that: (a) the class members are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;

(b) the action addresses questions of law or fact common to the class;
(c) the claims or defenses of the class representatives are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and
(d) the class representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
a. Numerosity
  Courts will ordinarily discharge the prerequisite of numerosity if the class is so large that "joinder of all members is impracticable." Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998). "The plaintiff need not precisely enumerate the potential size of the proposed class, nor is the plaintiff required to demonstrate that joinder would be impossible." Cannon v. Cherry Hill Toyota, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 540, 543 (D.N.J. 1999); accord Wachtel v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 223 F.R.D. 196, 211 (D.N.J. 2004). Moreover, "[i]t is proper for the court to accept common sense assumptions in order to support a finding of numerosity." Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 120 F.R.D. 642, 646 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (citation omitted); accord In re Nasdaq Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 169 F.R.D. 493, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).

  Here, the plaintiff class consists of End Payors, including consumers, who paid all or part of the price of Remeron in the United States during the class period. "There can be no serious question that joinder of all these parties, geographically dispersed throughout the United States, would be impracticable." In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 80 F.R.D. 244, 247 (S.D. Tex. 1978). Hundreds of thousands of class members have received notice and tens of thousands have filed proofs of claim across. The class thus easily fulfills the numerosity requirement. "[N]umbers in excess of forty, particularly those exceeding one hundred or one thousand have sustained the [numerosity] requirement." Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 808 n. 35 (3d Cir. 1984).

  b. Commonality

  The threshold commonality inquiry is whether there are any questions of fact or law that are common to the class. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(2). "[C]ommonality does not require an identity of claims or facts among class members." Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 183 (3d Cir. 2001). Rather, "[t]he commonality requirement will be satisfied if the named plaintiffs share at least one question of fact or law with the grievances of the prospective class." "Even where individual facts and circumstances do become important to the resolution, class treatment is not precluded." Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 57 (3d Cir. 1994) Id. at 57. "The threshold of commonality is not high." In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986).

  In this case, many common questions exist. They include, inter alia, (1) what is the relevant product market?; (2) did Defendants have market power in that market?; and (3) did Defendants unlawfully monopolize that market? Antitrust actions often present common questions of law and fact, and are, therefore, frequently certified as class actions. See, e.g., Transamerican Ref. Corp. v. Dravo Corp., 130 F.R.D. 70, 73 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (antitrust price-fixing claims and common law fraud); Cusick v. NV Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische Industrie, 317 F. Supp. 1022, 1024 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (consumer class action charging monopolization). The commonality requirement is satisfied here.

  c. Typicality

  The Third Circuit has "set a low threshold for satisfying" the typicality requirement holding that "[i]f the claims of the named plaintiffs and class members involve the same conduct by the defendant, typicality is established." Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 1838-4 (3d Cir. 2001); accord Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 58 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating "cases challenging the same unlawful conduct which affects both the named plaintiffs and the putative class usually satisfy the typicality requirement").

  The typicality requirement "does not mandate that all putative class members share identical claims." Newton, 259 F.3d at 84; see also Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 176-77 (3d Cir. 1988). Plainly, "there is nothing in Rule 23(a)(3) which requires named plaintiffs to be clones of each other or clones of other class members." In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 202 F.R.D. 12, 27 (D.D.C. 2001); accord In re Catfish Antitrust Litig., 826 F.Supp. 1019, 1036 (N.D. Miss. 1993).

  In this case, the Class Representatives' and the class members' claims are identically predicated upon Defendants' alleged actions of improper listing and late listing of the '099 Patent in the Orange Book, fraud on the PTO, and filing of allegedly baseless patent infringement lawsuits against Generic Manufacturers. Thus, "[t]here are no differences as to the type of relief sought or the theories of liability upon which plaintiffs will proceed." In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 80 F.R.D. 244 (S.D. Tex. 1978). The Class Representatives' claims and those of the class members arise from the same course of conduct. "[S]ince the various claims alleged appear to stem from a single course of conduct . . . we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in holding that the typicality requirement was met." Grasty v. Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, 828 F.2d 123, 130 (3d Cir. 1987). Accordingly, the Class Representatives' claims are typical of those of the class members.

  d. Adequacy of Representation The final requirement of Rule 23(a) is that "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4). The Third Circuit has held that "adequate representation depends on two factors: (i) the plaintiff's attorney must be qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation, and (ii) the plaintiff must not have interests antagonistic to those of the class." Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912, 923 (3d Cir. 1992); accord In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 532 (3d Cir. 2004); Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 1975).

  As to the first factor, End-Payor Plaintiffs' counsel have successfully prosecuted numerous antitrust class actions. Plaintiffs' Co-Lead Counsel, Arthur M. Kaplan, is a graduate of the Harvard Law School (J.D., cum laude, 1970) and has been active in antitrust and other complex litigation. Mr. Kaplan was Co-Lead Counsel for plaintiffs in the In re Nasdaq Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 187 F.R.D. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), in which plaintiffs achieved settlements totaling $1.027 billion.*fn2 End-Payor Plaintiffs' Co-Lead Counsel Joseph H. Meltzer likewise is experienced. Mr. Meltzer is a graduate of the Temple University School of Law (J.D., cum laude) and has focused his practice exclusively on antitrust and complex class action litigation. In addition to prominent roles in prosecuting several major antitrust class actions to successful conclusions, including In re Sorbates Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., C98-4886 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (settlements exceeding $92 million), Mr. Meltzer was appointed Co-Lead Counsel in Ryan-House v. GlaxoSmithKline plc, C.A. 2:02cv442 (E.D. Va.), a pharmaceutical antitrust class action brought on behalf of end payors of the prescription medication Augmentin which recently settled for $29 million. End-Payor Plaintiffs' Acting Co-Lead Counsel Jeffrey S. Istvan is a 1992 graduate of the University of Virginia School of Law, where he was a Hardy Cross Dillard Scholar. Following a federal judicial clerkship, he has been active in antitrust and consumer class actions. Mr. Istvan was sole lead counsel in Parsky v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 2001 WL 535786 (C.C.P. Phila. May 8, 2001), a consumer class action that recently ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.