Here, however, Petitioner states that he has not exhausted his
Although 28 U.S.C. § 2241
contains no statutory exhaustion requirement, a federal prisoner
ordinarily may not bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the execution of his
sentence, until he has exhausted all available administrative
remedies. See, e.g., Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627
(3d Cir. 2000); Arias v. United States Parole Comm'n,
648 F.2d 196
, 199 (3d Cir. 1981); Soyka v. Alldredge, 481 F.2d 303
(3d Cir. 1973). The exhaustion doctrine promotes a number of
(1) allowing the appropriate agency to develop a
factual record and apply its expertise facilitates
judicial review; (2) permitting agencies to grant the
relief requested conserves judicial resources; and
(3) providing agencies the opportunity to correct
their own errors fosters administrative autonomy.
Goldberg v. Beeler, 82 F.Supp.2d 302
, 309 (D.N.J. 1999),
aff'd, 248 F.3d 1130 (3d Cir. 2000). See also Moscato v.
Federal Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757
, 761 (3d Cir. 1996).
Nevertheless, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
required where exhaustion would not promote these goals. See,
e.g., Gambino v. Morris, 134 F.3d 156
, 171 (3d Cir. 1998)
(exhaustion not required where petitioner demonstrates futility);
Lyons v. U.S. Marshals, 840 F.2d 202
, 205 (3d Cir. 1988)
(exhaustion may be excused ...