The opinion of the court was delivered by: JOHN BISSELL, Chief Judge, District
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' motion for summary
judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.
This case was brought by Plaintiff Dennis Silver ("Plaintiff"
or "Mr. Silver") against his former employer American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants ("Defendant" or "AICPA"). The
case was transferred to this Court from the Eastern District of
New York on October 22, 2001.
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges employment discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Mr. Silver
alleges that AICPA discriminated against him based on race, age
and gender. Mr. Silver cites "harassment, disparities of
treatment with respect to race, increase[d] scrutiny of my work
and hostile work environment." Compl. at ¶ 9. Furthermore, Mr.
Silver cites to "retaliation" as a cause of action. See id.
at ¶ 10.
On March 25, 2005, Defendant filed a motion for summary
judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.
I. Standard for Summary Judgment Motion Pursuant to Rule 56
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) provides that summary judgment should be
granted "if pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);
Kreschollek v. Southern Stevedoring Co., 223 F.3d 202, 204 (3d
Cir. 2000). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court
must construe all facts and inferences in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. See Boyle v. Allegheny
Pennsylvania, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998). The moving party
bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of
material fact remains. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
The Supreme Court has stated that in evaluating a defendant's
motion for summary judgment:
[t]he judge must ask . . . not whether . . . the
evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other
but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict
for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. The mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of
the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there
must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably
find for the plaintiff. The judge's inquiry,
therefore, unavoidably asks whether reasonable jurors
could find by a preponderance of evidence that the
plaintiff is entitled to a verdict. . . .
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. A fact is "material" only if it will
affect the outcome of a lawsuit under the applicable law, and a
dispute over a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such
that a reasonable fact finder could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party. See id. Only evidence that would be admissible at trial may be used to
test a summary judgment motion; evidence with a deficient
foundation must be excluded from consideration. See Blackburn
v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 1999 WL 360546 (3d Cir. 1999).
In order to survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving
party must present more than a mere scintilla of evidence in his
favor. Id. The non-moving party "cannot simply reallege
factually unsupported allegations contained in his pleadings."
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; see also Clark v. Clabaugh,
20 F.3d 1290
, 1294 (3d Cir. 1994).
II. The Elements of a Prima Facie Case Under Title VII
Title VII provides, in relevant part, that it "shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
It is well established that Title VII claims are to be
evaluated according to the burden-shifting framework established
by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973) and then elaborated in Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 n. 6 (1981). As described
by the Court in Burdine: First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of
discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in
proving a prima facie case, the burden [of
production] shifts to the defendant to articulate
some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
[adverse employment decision]. Third, should the
defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then
have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that legitimate reasons offered by the
defendant were not his true reasons, but were a
pretext for discrimination.
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53. It is worth noting that although
the burden of production may shift under the McDonnell Douglas
analysis, the Title VII plaintiff always bears the ultimate
burden of persuasion of establishing intentional discrimination.
See United States Postal Serv. Bd. ...